

# THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Edited by John T. Saywell

VOLUME XLI, NO. 4

DECEMBER, 1960

Clerics, Politicians, and the Bilingual Schools

Issue in Ontario, 1910-1917

MARGARET PRANG 281

Arbitration and the Oregon Question

JAMES O. MCCABE 308

Reviews (*see following page*)

328

Recent Publications Relating to Canada

364

Books Received

370

Contributors

372

---

PUBLISHED BY UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

## REVIEWS

STACEY, <i>Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. III. The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945</i> : by Forrest C. Pogue .....	328
LANCOT, <i>Histoire du Canada. I. Des origines au régime royal</i> : by A. L. Burt .....	330
LEFEBVRE, Marie Morin: <i>Premier historien canadien de Villemarie</i> : by Jacques Monet, S. J. ....	331
KOS-RABCEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI, and GREENING, Sir Casimir Stanislaus Gzowski: <i>A Biography</i> : by John S. Moir .....	331
BRUN, comp. <i>Guide to the Manuscript Maps in the William L. Clements Library</i> : by Theodore E. Layng .....	332
ANDERSON, <i>Surveyor of the Sea: The Life and Voyages of Captain George Vancouver</i> : by Margaret A. Ormsby .....	333
LAMB, ed. <i>The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806-1808</i> : by J. H. Stewart Reid .....	334
FAIRLEY, <i>Sverdrup's Arctic Adventures</i> : by L. H. Neatby .....	335
KIRWAN, <i>The White Road: A Survey of Polar Exploration from the Vikings to Fuchs</i> : by Morris Zaslow .....	335
CARELESS, <i>Brown of The Globe. I. The Voice of Upper Canada</i> : by D. G. G. Kerr .....	336
IRVING, <i>The Social Credit Movement in Alberta</i> : by J. R. Mallory .....	338
KNORR, ed. <i>NATO and American Security</i> ; MCINNIS, <i>The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War</i> ; MINIFIE, <i>Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World</i> : by Kenneth McNaught .....	339
LADNER, <i>The Idea of Reform</i> : by John Gordon Rowe .....	341
MATTINGLY, <i>The Defeat of the Spanish Armada</i> : by W. K. Stockdale .....	343
BLET, <i>Le Clergé de France et la monarchie: Etude sur les Assemblées Générales du Clergé de 1615 à 1666</i> : by A. Lloyd Moote .....	344
VAN PAASSEN, <i>A Crown of Fire: The Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola</i> : by H. C. Porter .....	345
KENISTON, <i>Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to the Emperor Charles V</i> : by Wallace K. Ferguson .....	346
WANGERMAN, <i>From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials: Government Policy and Public Opinion in the Habsburg Dominions in the Period of the French Revolution</i> : by R. R. Palmer .....	346
HOLLYDAY, <i>Bismarck's Rival: A Political Biography of General and Admiral Albrecht von Stosch</i> : by Ivo N. Lambi .....	347
CURTIS, <i>Three Against the Republic: Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras</i> : by John C. Cairns .....	349
HEILBRONER, <i>The Future as History</i> : by Richard M. Saunders .....	349
ROWSE, <i>The Elizabethans and America</i> : by W. B. Willcox .....	350
READ, <i>Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth</i> : by W. W. Piepenburg .....	351

(continued, page 372)

---

## THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW Continuing

### *The Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada*

Founded at the University of Toronto in 1896

Articles in the REVIEW are indexed in the *Canadian Index* and in the *International Index to Periodical Literature*.

Communications with regard to subscriptions and advertising should be addressed to The Director, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Canada. Individual subscriptions \$4.00 a year.

AUTHORIZED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER BY THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT, OTTAWA

## Clerics, Politicians, and the Bilingual Schools Issue in Ontario, 1910-1917

MARGARET PRANG

THE CONSERVATIVE VICTORY in the Ontario election of 1905 brought to power a party which had gone on record fifteen years earlier as opposing the use of any language but English in the schools of the province. During their years in opposition the Conservatives had made few criticisms of the regulations of 1890 which provided that French and German might be taught in districts where parents desired instruction in one of these languages, as long as English remained the language of general instruction. But a Conservative cabinet which included several Orangemen and a party which had a militant Orange wing might be expected to take a more active interest in the question. The most vigilant guardians of French-Canadian interests were now apprehensive.

They soon found cause for concern on February 25, 1906, when English-speaking separate school ratepayers in Ottawa passed a resolution calling for an end to the unified administration of the separate schools of the city, established only three years earlier, and a return to separate control of the finances and administration of the schools attended by the children of the two groups.<sup>1</sup> For the present, the English-speaking Catholics, who had recently become a minority in Ottawa, made no progress with their demands; however, at the end of 1909 they were cheered by the announcement that Father Michael Fallon, who had been a leading figure in the language controversy at the University of Ottawa and who had subsequently spent several

<sup>1</sup>C. B. Sissons, *Bilingual Schools in Canada* (Toronto, 1917), 72. For a concise outline of the language question in Ontario from pre-Confederation days see *Report of the Royal Commission on Education in Ontario*, 1950 (Toronto: The King's Printer), chap. xvi.

years in "exile" in the United States, was to return to Ontario as Bishop of London.

Bishop Fallon had been consecrated only some six months when much of the French-Canadian press began to accuse him of attempting to Anglicize the schools of his diocese by reducing or abolishing the teaching of French; Fallon denied that he wished to exterminate French from the schools but asserted that he favoured full obedience to a law which countenanced bilingual, but not French, schools.<sup>2</sup> Although determined to maintain the primacy of English in the schools, Bishop Fallon was anxious lest the school question explode in such a way as to make separate schools and the French language synonymous in the minds of the Protestant majority in the province. This catastrophe might well be precipitated by the majority's growing awareness of the rapid increase in the French-speaking population in Northern Ontario and the counties just west of the Ottawa River.

At the moment, separate school supporters could have no complaints against the Whitney government; early in 1910 the government began to draft plans for a redistribution of funds to the elementary schools, under which the separate schools would receive larger grants.<sup>3</sup> The proposed change naturally had the support of the bishops of the province,<sup>4</sup> and the English-speaking majority among their number hoped that agitation over the language question would not provoke hostility against separate schools in general so that the government would refuse to proceed with the redistribution. As a consequence of these fears the formation of the French-Canadian Education Association of Ontario in January, 1910, with its demand for "equal rights" for the French language in Ontario, created much tension between the French and English bishops.<sup>5</sup> Within two months of the Association's formation the fears of the English group proved justified when Premier Whitney informed the archbishops of the province that because of recent public agitation about the language question the government was unable to proceed with the plan for a redistribution of school funds.<sup>6</sup>

In the spring of 1910 when Bishop Fallon paid his first official visit to Sarnia, he invited the local member of the Legislature, W. J. Hanna, who was also Provincial Secretary, to call on him; to Hanna the bishop complained that in some schools in the county of Essex, which lay within his diocese, there were large numbers of pupils who were

<sup>2</sup>*Canadian Annual Review*, 1910, 421.

<sup>3</sup>University of Toronto Library. "Correspondence between the Ontario Department of Education and the Roman Catholic Authorities concerning the Bi-lingual School Issue," John Seath to Sir William Meredith, Feb. 17, 1910.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, G. F. Shepley to Sir William Meredith, March 10, 1910.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, memorandum of Bishop Fallon for the bishops of Ontario, Jan. 24, 1917.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, copy of Whitney to the archbishops of Ontario, March 9, 1910.



unable to speak English. The immediate cause of Fallon's alarm was the assertion by an English-speaking school inspector in Essex that he had received instructions from the Department of Education to cease inspecting certain bilingual schools, and his belief that a French-speaking inspector would be appointed in his place; further, Fallon had heard that the department was prepared to accept some Quebec teaching certificates in the Ottawa area. In short, it appeared to Fallon that the government was about to succumb to French-Canadian agitation; if his information proved correct he was prepared to wage total war against the government; meanwhile, he would do all he could to discourage the perpetuation of bilingual schools in his own diocese. Hanna, who seems to have been somewhat surprised and mystified by the intensity of Fallon's feelings, assured him that he was misinformed as to the government's intentions; then he sent a written account of the interview to Premier Whitney and to the Minister of Education, Dr. R. A. Pyne.<sup>7</sup> For the present Fallon made no public denunciation of what he understood to be government policy.

In mid-August the activities of the French-Canadian Education Association were the subject of heated discussions at a meeting of the bishops of the ecclesiastical provinces of Kingston and Toronto most of whom now believed that the whole position of separate schools was seriously threatened; they delegated Fallon to wait on Premier Whitney to request that there be no yielding by the government to the demands of the bilingualists; Fallon came away well satisfied that the premier had accepted his argument.<sup>8</sup> A month later the Twentieth Eucharistic Congress, the first such assembly held in North America, met in Montreal. This added to Protestant apprehensions (already aroused by the struggle over the application of the *Ne Temere* decree in Quebec) that the influence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Canada might be growing. The Eucharistic Congress did add fuel to the bilingual controversy when Archbishop Bourne of Westminster issued his unexpected call to the Canadian church to identify itself thoroughly with the English language if it would fully serve the Roman Catholic mission in Canada. This provoked an impromptu and impassioned reply from Henri Bourassa which immediately enhanced the nationalist leader's public influence and served notice on the rest of Canada that the fight for the French language throughout the Dominion would not be abandoned.<sup>9</sup>

It was against this background that G. Howard Ferguson, spokesman

<sup>7</sup>W. J. Hanna to R. A. Pyne, May 23, 1910, printed in full in Sissons, *Bilingual Schools*, 73-9.

<sup>8</sup>"Correspondence . . . concerning the Bi-lingual School Issue," Fallon to Pyne, Jan. 2, 1912.

<sup>9</sup>Robert Rumilly, *Henri Bourassa* (Montreal, 1953), chap. xviii, gives a colourful account of this episode and its effect in Quebec.

for the ultra-Protestant wing of the Ontario Conservatives, introduced in the Ontario Legislature in the spring of 1911 a motion asserting that "no language other than English should be used as a medium of instruction" in any school in Ontario.<sup>10</sup> For reasons which were probably not unconnected with the current efforts of the federal Conservative party to form the alliance with the Quebec Nationalists which was to prove so fruitful in the election later that year, Ferguson soon withdrew this resolution. He then introduced a modified resolution which declared that English should be "the language of instruction and of all communication with the pupils in the public and separate schools . . . except where, in the opinion of the department, it is impracticable by reason of the pupils not understanding English." This resolution received the unanimous support of both parties.<sup>11</sup>

In mid-October the unauthorized publication of W. J. Hanna's letter of eighteen months ago describing his interview with Fallon<sup>12</sup> caused the controversy to flare up again. The bishop exonerated Hanna from responsibility for publishing the letter, although he said that the document as published did not entirely accord with his own recollection of his conversation with Hanna; in particular, he asserted that the reference to a meeting of the bishops of Ontario had no basis in fact.<sup>13</sup> It appeared that Fallon was not averse to seeing the bilingual issue brought into the arena of full public debate; once this had happened his first contribution was a denunciation of the attempt of the Department of Education to carry on the study of both languages simultaneously, an approach which he believed pedagogically unsound, resulting in inadequate training in both languages and "encourag[ing] incompetency, giv[ing] a prize to hypocrisy, and breed[ing] ignorance."<sup>14</sup> Within a few days the government announced that Dr. F. W. Merchant, an official of the Ontario Department of Education had been appointed to investigate conditions in the bilingual schools.

With the question thus removed at least partially from politics for the moment, Whitney suddenly called an election for December 11. But the issue inevitably became an important one in the campaign although the newly elected leader of the Liberal party, N. W. Rowell, did not go out of his way to make it so, contenting himself in his initial address to the electors with a promise of "adequate training

<sup>10</sup>*Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario*, March 22, 1911, 260.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.* This resolution was simply a confirmation of the existing law, Statutes of Ontario, 59 Vic. c. 70, s. 76.

<sup>12</sup>See note 7. The secretary of the French-speaking Minister of Public Works, Dr. J. O. Reaume, lost his position on charges that he had released the private letter for publication to a Quebec paper: Sissons, *Bilingual Schools*, 73.

<sup>13</sup>In two other documents Fallon says that the meeting was held. "Correspondence . . . concerning the Bi-lingual School Issue," Fallon to Pyne, Jan. 2, 1912 and memorandum of Bishop Fallon for the bishops of Ontario, Jan. 24, 1917.

<sup>14</sup>*Globe*, Oct. 18, 1911.

schools, a sufficient supply of competent teachers . . . to ensure under proper regulations that the pupils in every school . . . shall receive a thorough English education."<sup>15</sup> Rather, it was certain prominent members of the Conservative party and the Conservative papers, the *Toronto Telegram* and the *News*, who seemed most determined to keep the issue alive with their promises that they would oppose the teaching of any French in the schools.<sup>16</sup> But the Liberal *Toronto Daily Star* also helped to keep the issue before the public by publishing the results of investigations by two of its own reporters which showed that there were some areas of the province where French was used exclusively and that standards were generally low in the bilingual schools.<sup>17</sup>

As the election battle developed, it became increasingly clear that the language question cut across party lines. In the government ranks, the Attorney-General, J. J. Foy, a Roman Catholic of Irish origin representing the riding of Toronto South, declared for nothing but English,<sup>18</sup> thus allying himself with Bishop Fallon, Howard Ferguson, and the Orange Order. Foy's statement created anxiety among some Conservative politicians who predicted losses for the party in the coming election unless Premier Whitney publicly refuted Foy.<sup>19</sup> The statement of the Minister of Public Works, Dr. J. O. Reaume, a few days later, that, as a French-speaking Canadian he could confidently support Whitney's view that all children should learn English and might be allowed to use French in the early grades,<sup>20</sup> was apparently intended to undo any damage that might have been wrought by Foy.

Although the Liberals tried to use this display of cabinet dissension to show that the Conservatives had no policy, there was slight advantage in doing so, since they also exhibited a variety of convictions on the subject. While the recently retired Liberal leader, A. G. MacKay, member for the strongly Orange riding of Grey North, argued for no language but English,<sup>21</sup> Rowell told a North Bay audience that "the state has no right to say that these same children should grow up without further knowledge of the language which they first lisped at their mothers' knees."<sup>22</sup> Rowell's emphasis was somewhat less positive in the riding he was personally contesting, North Oxford; there, he stated that there was no excuse for schools where only French was

<sup>15</sup>Public Archives of Canada, Rowell Papers, *Address to the Electors by N. W. Rowell* (Ontario Reform Association, 1911).

<sup>16</sup>*Canadian Annual Review*, 1911, 473.

<sup>17</sup>*Toronto Daily Star*, especially issues of Nov. 20 and 22, 1911.

<sup>18</sup>*Globe*, Nov. 21, 1911.

<sup>19</sup>Ontario Archives, Whitney Papers, Andrew Broder to Whitney, Nov. 23, 1911; A. A. Aubin to Whitney, Nov. 28, 1911.

<sup>20</sup>*Globe*, Nov. 30, 1911.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1911.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1911.

taught and called on Whitney to declare whether he stood with Mr. Foy or Dr. Reaume.<sup>23</sup>

There were only two Ontario ridings, Prescott and Russell, in which French-Canadians were in the majority, but there were fourteen others in which they constituted 10 per cent or more of the population and possibly another six in which they might be decisive in a very close contest;<sup>24</sup> most of these were at present held by the Conservatives. When the election results came in two of the five seats gained by the Liberals were in ridings where the French-speaking vote was probably significant.<sup>25</sup>

In the first session of the new legislature, Rowell lost no time in raising the bilingual issue; in his first speech he observed that although the premier had said during the campaign that such schools did not exist in Ontario the public accounts provided for the salaries of three "inspectors of bilingual schools." Whitney refused to make any statement, pending the report of Dr. Merchant, but called attention to the resolution which had been approved unanimously in the previous session requiring English in all schools except where the students did not yet understand the language.<sup>26</sup> Rowell's further efforts to obtain a more specific statement of government policy were met by the well-founded charges of Napoleon Champagne, Conservative member for Ottawa East, that the Liberal leader was thoroughly equivocal in his own statements. Champagne declared that while Rowell had said that nobody should deprive a French-speaking child of his mother tongue, he had never spelled out just what this should mean for school policy. Rowell's reply can scarcely have satisfied Champagne; it asserted that the leader of the Opposition was under no necessity to declare a precise policy, and called attention again to the contradictory statements made by Conservative politicians in various parts of the province. In contrast, declared Rowell, the Liberal policy was consistent; every child must have "a thorough education in English . . . but we have no right to say any child shall be ignorant of its mother tongue."<sup>27</sup>

Toward the end of the session the controversy entered a new phase when the Merchant Report<sup>28</sup> was presented to the legislature on March 6. The report confirmed the charges of the critics of the bilingual schools; Dr. Merchant found that in 80 per cent of the separate schools

<sup>23</sup>*Weekly Sun* (Toronto), Dec. 6, 1911.

<sup>24</sup>The author's calculation, based on figures in *Census of Canada, 1911*.

<sup>25</sup>Party standings after the election were Conservatives, 83; Liberals, 22; Independent, 1; the Conservatives and Liberals each had three French-speaking members.

<sup>26</sup>*Globe*, Feb. 9, 1912.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1912.

<sup>28</sup>F. W. Merchant, *Report on the Condition of English-French Schools in the Province of Ontario* (Toronto: King's Printer, 1912).

in eastern Ontario and in 90 per cent of the rural public and separate schools in the northern districts French was used in teaching all subjects except English, which was treated merely as one subject among others on the curriculum. The professional qualifications of most of the teachers in these schools were minimal and some had so slight a knowledge of English as to be doubtful teachers of the language. Thus, it was revealed that while there were some schools which might properly be called bilingual there were many more which were really French. Moreover, attendance at these schools was often poor and many children left school very early to go to work, equipped with an inadequate education in any language. Although Dr. Merchant admitted that the bilingual schools laboured under a difficulty not faced by others—the necessity of helping students to master a second language, English, in a short period of time—he could only conclude that “the English-French schools are, on the whole, lacking in efficiency.”

Several attempts by the Liberals to secure an immediate debate on the report were rebuffed by government promises of a debate in due course. Finally, half an hour before prorogation, Whitney announced a school policy. The proposal provided for additional inspection of schools to assure testing of progress and enforcement of the regulations; henceforth, government grants to schools would be contingent on the employment of teachers able to instruct in English; no text books other than those authorized by the Department of Education were to be used; instruction in English was to begin as soon as a child entered any school; and, although French might be used as the language of instruction on the recommendation of the supervising inspector, this would not normally be continued beyond the first two years of school. Rowell asked whether the new policy meant that the regulations of the Mowat government, providing that French and German might be used fairly extensively in addition to English in specified areas, would be rescinded, and was told that they would not be withdrawn for the present. The opposition leader interpreted this to mean that, in practice, the use of French as a language of instruction was to continue pretty much as before; for this he thought there was “much to be said.” Rowell also supported Dr. Merchant’s recommendation that French be made a subject of study in public schools throughout the province, as it was in the high schools.<sup>29</sup> Thus, “Sir James had performed the sword dance awkwardly enough, but apparently without cutting his feet. Mr. Rowell had pirouetted on eggs without cracking a shell.”<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup>*Globe*, April 15, 1912.

<sup>30</sup>*World*, Toronto, April 15, 1912.

A few days later Rowell devoted most of an address at a Liberal rally in Toronto to the bilingual question. He accused the government of insincerity and cowardice and charged that the facts revealed in the Merchant Report had been known to the Department of Education for several years. He doubted whether the new provisions for inspection were adequate, but added that if the government pursued its announced policy the whole character of the bilingual schools would be improved.<sup>31</sup> The Liberal leader had, in effect, served notice that the government need fear no serious criticism from his party; there was now an essentially bipartisan policy on the bilingual schools.

The opponents of bilingual education felt confirmed in their views when the official census of 1911 was published. The census provided statistical proof that the racial division in Ontario in the second decade of the twentieth century was very different from what it had been in the days when Mowat had applied more generously regulations which were very similar to those announced by Whitney. Between 1881 and 1911 Ontario's population had increased from 1,926,922 to 2,523,274, a gain of nearly 600,000; in the same period the French-speaking population had increased from 102,743 to 202,442.<sup>32</sup> However, this latter figure was generally believed to be very conservative; the ecclesiastical census of the province in 1909 had reported 247,000 French-Canadians,<sup>33</sup> and the figure usually quoted by the politicians in 1911 was 250,000. Thus, in the preceding thirty-five years the French-Canadians had accounted for about 25 per cent of the total increase; where they had composed 5 per cent of the population in the 1880's they were now about 10 per cent. English-speaking alarmists found in the census support for such assertions as the one made, during the recent campaign by the *Toronto Star*, that in another twenty-five years Northern Ontario would have a population of two million, of whom 75 per cent would be exclusively French-speaking.<sup>34</sup> The prediction was hysterical, but it fed the fears of the majority in Protestant Ontario for whom

<sup>31</sup>*Globe*, April 20, 1912. The essential unity of the two parties on this issue is obviously due primarily to the dominantly English-speaking and Protestant character of Ontario, but in considering the reluctance of the opposition to criticize government policy it must be noted that at this time the Liberal party had a very powerful Protestant "directoriate." Its leader, N. W. Rowell, was one of the most prominent Methodist laymen in the province; in the summer of 1912 a group of Toronto Liberals organized a fund to provide the leader with secretarial assistance and to place a party organizer in the field. This group included A. E. Ames, E. R. Wood, J. H. Gundy, W. E. Rundle, Col. F. H. Deacon, all leading financiers, and J. E. Atkinson, publisher of the *Toronto Star* and J. F. Mackay, business manager of the *Globe*. With the exception of Mackay, who was a Presbyterian, all of these men were active supporters of the Methodist church, and it is evident that they were frequently consulted on party policy.

<sup>32</sup>*Census of Canada, 1911*.

<sup>33</sup>*Canadian Annual Review, 1911*, 471.

<sup>34</sup>*Toronto Daily Star*, Nov. 30, 1911.



religion and language could not be separated; anyone could see that the bilingual schools were nearly all Roman Catholic separate schools. Nobody understood the possible implications of this identification more clearly than the Irish Catholic bishops.

Whitney's policy was formalized on June 15, 1912, when the Department of Education published a new circular of instructions on the bilingual schools, soon popularly known as "Regulation 17."<sup>35</sup> Ten days later in Quebec City the first French Language Congress held in North America pronounced itself firmly in favour of the extension of fully bilingual schools to every province where there were numbers of French Canadians.<sup>36</sup> This aspiration was supported on the platform of the Congress by a member of Whitney's cabinet, Dr. Reaume.<sup>37</sup> Before the opening of the new school term the government issued a further order, "Regulation 18." It ruled that any school which failed to comply with Regulation 17 would forfeit support from public funds and that its teachers would be liable to suspension or cancellation of their certificates.<sup>38</sup> These measures received enthusiastic endorsement by the Irish Catholic clergy of the province who urged Whitney to stand firm in his clear distinction between separate and bilingual schools.<sup>39</sup> At the same time Conservative politicians in Ottawa and Quebec were alarmed at the damage which they believed Whitney's policy would do to the party's prospects in Quebec.<sup>40</sup> Prime Minister Borden commented on "the very great outcry in the Province of Quebec" and requested Whitney to give "a reliable and correct statement of the regulations and the reasons why the same were promulgated . . . to

<sup>35</sup>The most controversial parts of Regulation 17 were in Section 3: "(1) Where necessary in the case of French-speaking pupils, French may be used as the language of instruction and communication; but such use of French shall not be continued beyond Form I, excepting during the school year of 1912-13, when it may also be used as the language of instruction and communication in the case of pupils beyond Form I who, owing to previous defective training, are unable to speak and understand the English language. (2) In the case of French-speaking pupils who are unable to speak the English language well enough for the purposes of instruction and communication, the following provision is hereby made: (a) As soon as the pupil enters the school he shall begin the study and use of the English language (b) As soon as the pupil has acquired sufficient facility in the use of the English language he shall take up in that language the course of study as prescribed for the Public and Separate Schools." The regulation is published in full in Sissons, *Bilingual Schools*, Appendix 2; also in *Report of the Minister of Education, 1912* (Toronto: King's Printer, 1913), 211-13.

<sup>36</sup>Robert Rumilly, *Histoire de la Province de Québec* (32 vols., Montreal, 1940-60), XVII, chap. iv.

<sup>37</sup>*Globe*, June 25, 1912.

<sup>38</sup>*Report of the Minister of Education, 1912*, 213-15.

<sup>39</sup>Whitney Papers, Bishop D. J. Scollard to Whitney, Oct. 21, 1912; Bishop W. A. Macdonell to Whitney, Nov. 13, 1912; Very Rev. A. E. Burke, president of the Catholic Church Extension Society, to Whitney, Nov. 14, 1912.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, Thomas Chapais to Whitney, Oct. 10, 1912; L. P. Pelletier to Whitney, Oct. 21, 1912.

some of our friends in Quebec . . . because misapprehension as to the course your government has pursued is likely to do mischief."<sup>41</sup> Whitney's reply was merely a digest of the Merchant Report. He asserted that the new regulations were designed simply to enforce a policy which had been in effect for many years but which, of late, had not been properly administered; no injustice was being done to anyone and he was confident that the majority of French-Canadian parents in Ontario wanted their children to learn English and were satisfied that this would not rob them of their French language and heritage.<sup>42</sup>

Opposition within the province came to a focus at the end of the year when a large delegation representing nearly all the French-speaking school districts waited on Whitney to demand the withdrawal of Regulation 17. The delegates argued that the ruling was not only unjust and illiberal but also *ultra vires* because it was contrary to the earlier Regulation 12 which still permitted both French and German in some schools. In defending his policy the premier asked "where in any country . . . an hour a day was allowed in each class for the study of one subject" as was allowed for French in Ontario. He found that nobody could mention so generous a provision elsewhere.<sup>43</sup> He then assured the protesters that every inspector would report at the end of the current school year on the effects of the instructions now being followed and might recommend changes, but he allowed none of his audience to entertain the slightest hope that a third type of school, "the racial school," would be tolerated.<sup>44</sup> Many Irish Catholics were now confident that the whole issue was settled and that little more would be heard of it.<sup>45</sup>

Certainly the Liberal party in Ontario, having once given tacit approval to Regulation 17, showed no disposition to discuss the subject. In spite of earlier appeals from some English-speaking Catholic Liberals that the federal Liberal party should publicly disavow the activities of Senator Belcourt and other Liberals in the French-Canadian Education Association of Ontario,<sup>46</sup> Laurier had thus far made no public comment. When Laurier appeared on the platform in Toronto in October, 1912, with Rowell, Sir Allen Aylesworth, and Sir George Ross, who had been Minister of Education under Mowat, there was no

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, Borden to Whitney, Oct. 16, 1912.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, Whitney to Thomas Chapais, Oct. 16, 1912; Whitney to Borden, Oct. 17, 1912; Whitney to L. P. Pelletier, Oct. 22, 1912.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, Whitney to Archbishop C. H. Gauthier, Dec. 28, 1912.

<sup>44</sup>*Globe*, Dec. 28, 1912.

<sup>45</sup>Whitney Papers, Fallon to Whitney, Dec. 28, 1912; Michael O'Brien, inspector of separate schools, Peterborough, to Whitney, Dec. 28, 1912; Whitney to S. M. Genest, Jan. 9, 1913.

<sup>46</sup>P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Fallon to Charles Murphy, June 3, 1911; Murphy to Laurier, June 19, 1911.



reference to the language question. Throughout the autumn Rowell and other Ontario Liberals kept clear of the issue in their prepared addresses. When he was asked a direct question, Rowell's answer was always that he favoured an adequate English education for every child; beyond that he would not go. Laurier's public advice to French-Canadians in Ontario "to speak French at home and English on the street"<sup>47</sup> was understood in some Conservative circles at least to mean that federal Liberal leaders had no serious objections to Ontario's policy.<sup>48</sup>

During the 1913 session of the legislature the only reference to the bilingual issue came from two French-speaking Liberals, Z. Mageau and Gustave Evanturel of the constituencies of Sturgeon Falls and Prescott. They demanded the publication of letters from Bishop Fallon to members of the government since 1910, and, charging that Dr. Reaume's continued presence in the cabinet constituted a betrayal of his race, they called for his resignation. No English-speaking Liberals supported their two colleagues, the government refused to be drawn into battle,<sup>49</sup> and to the evident relief of both parties the session ended without any major discussion.

In the following August the government issued Regulation 17 in a slightly revised form. The Chief Inspector was given power to permit the use of French as the language of communication beyond the first two years of study where he deemed it necessary, and to allow the study of French for more than one hour a day in certain schools, provided he was satisfied that this would not retard the pupils' progress in learning English.<sup>50</sup> Thus, while the objective of the policy remained unchanged, the rules could be applied more leniently at the discretion of the Department of Education. Although the Minister of Education denied charges that this represented a partial retreat from the original policy,<sup>51</sup> the government was chastised by the Conservative *Mail and Empire* for its weakness.<sup>52</sup>

Meanwhile, during the autumn of 1913 meetings of the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Societies in Quebec were better attended than they had been in many years and the dominant theme was always the fate of the beleaguered brethren in Ontario. The fifth annual convention of the French-Canadian Education Association enjoyed the largest registration yet, and during its sessions unrelenting war against Regulation 17

<sup>47</sup>*Ottawa Journal*, Nov. 20, 1912.

<sup>48</sup>Whitney Papers, J. A. Ellis to Whitney, Nov. 27, 1912; Whitney to Ellis, Nov. 29, 1912.

<sup>49</sup>*Globe*, Feb. 8 and March 4, 1913.

<sup>50</sup>*Report of the Minister of Education, 1913* (Toronto: King's Printer, 1914), 318-20.

<sup>51</sup>*Globe*, Sept. 19, 1913.

<sup>52</sup>*Mail and Empire*, Sept. 19, 1913.

was again declared. A few weeks later Henri Bourassa carried his campaign against the regulation into Ontario itself where he delivered a number of addresses.<sup>53</sup> In Ottawa, Roman Catholics who sent their children to public schools to ensure that they were taught in English were threatened with refusal of the sacraments,<sup>54</sup> while the provincial government announced that the Ottawa Separate School Board would receive no public funds, since it had refused to submit reports on its affairs or to admit inspectors during the past year.<sup>55</sup>

During a by-election in Peel when the Provincial Treasurer, I. B. Lucas, challenged the Liberal leader to state his school policy in concrete terms, Rowell was forced into breaking his silence. After noting that the French Canadians were playing an important part in the development of the province and now constituted one-tenth of the population, Rowell chastised the government for the neglect which had produced the conditions revealed in the Merchant Report, rehearsed the conflicting statements of cabinet members on the bilingual issue, and asserted that it was little wonder, in view of Whitney's promises to stand by the original rules, that the Conservative press and the Orange Lodges felt betrayed by the revised Regulation 17; on the other hand, the French Canadians also felt that they were the victims of bad faith. Once more, in contrast to the government's vacillation, the Liberal policy was firm: "What we are concerned about is that they [the pupils] should master English and not that they should be ignorant of French. The problem in its working out is largely one of teachers and administration." There was still no direct comment on Regulation 17 or its revised form.<sup>56</sup>

In the 1914 session of the legislature both parties again ignored the bilingual question. When the ailing Whitney suddenly called an election for June, 1914, the Liberals tried to keep their "abolish-the-bar" programme as the central issue, and to avoid the language question; but the Conservatives, while campaigning primarily on their record in promoting the economic development of the province in the last nine years, seemed less anxious to by-pass it.<sup>57</sup> In any case, in view of the great public interest in recent events in Ottawa, it could scarcely be ignored completely. There, the English and French members of the Separate School Board were at loggerheads over the latter's refusal to

<sup>53</sup>For an account of French-Canadian reaction to Regulation 17 see Rumilly, *Histoire*, XVII-XXII, *passim*.

<sup>54</sup>*Mail and Empire*, Sept. 1, 1913.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1913.

<sup>56</sup>Rowell Papers, MS of address, Oct. 27, 1913.

<sup>57</sup>Rowell told Laurier later that in this election the government had used the bilingual question to divert attention from "abolish-the-bar." Laurier Papers, Rowell to Laurier, April 15, 1916.

enforce Regulation 17. When the French-speaking section sought a city by-law allowing it to issue debentures to raise money for new schools to be operated independently of the Department of Education's language rulings, the English minority obtained a court injunction preventing this move and called on the government to enforce Regulation 17 or to withdraw it. On the eve of the election the Supreme Court of Ontario was beginning hearings on the validity of the injunction.

During the campaign the government renewed its pledges of full enforcement of Regulation 17, while the Liberals continued to assert that there could be no objection to the study of French in the schools as long as children learned English but declined to say what they would do with Regulation 17 if elected. W. R. Plewman, who had recently resigned as editor of the Orange paper, the *Sentinel*, because of the Conservative "betrayal" in revising Regulation 17, urged the election of the Liberals as the means of safeguarding the English language.<sup>58</sup> At the same time the Ottawa paper, *Le Droit*, founded in 1913 for the specific purpose of defending French interests in Ontario, advised its readers to support the Liberals as the guardians of the French language.<sup>59</sup>

At the end of June the Conservatives were swept back into power with a slightly larger popular vote than they had received in 1911, but the Liberals gained six seats including three of the six newly created seats and two previously held by French-speaking Conservatives: one of these was Essex North, where Dr. Reaume was defeated, the other Ottawa East. In the new legislature there were thus six French-speaking members, five Liberals and one Conservative, as compared with three of each in the previous House.

The day after the Ontario provincial election the Ottawa Separate School Board closed all its schools, asserting that since it had been deprived of some of its provincial grants it could not pay its teachers. The chairman of the Board soon admitted that the purpose of this action was to force the Department of Education to consent to the Board's employment of twenty-three Christian Brothers whose teaching certificates were not valid in Ontario. Thus, with the opening of the school term in September, 1914, some 8,000 Ottawa students were without teachers. The Ontario Supreme Court ordered the Board to reopen the schools and to employ only qualified teachers. This court ruling was the signal for renewed protests from French-Canadian leaders. In Montreal on December 21 party ties were forgotten as Nationalists Henri Bourassa and Armand Lavergne, the Conservative

<sup>58</sup>*Canadian Annual Review*, 1914, 448.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 454.

Senator Landry, and Liberal Senators Dandurand and Belcourt appeared on the platform with Archbishop Bruchési and other church dignitaries to launch a campaign to raise funds for "les blessés d'Ontario."<sup>60</sup> Early in January, 1915, Cardinal Bégin published a letter to Archbishop Bruchési defending the inalienable right of every race to its own language and affirming the "noble duty of the French and Catholic province of Quebec to assist with all its influence and all its resources those who suffer and struggle until full justice shall be rendered them."<sup>61</sup> Within a week the Quebec legislature had adopted unanimously a resolution deploring the controversy and asserting that the legislators of Ontario were deficient in their understanding and application of traditional British principles.<sup>62</sup>

The increasingly active participation of the Quebec clergy in the protest movement naturally confirmed Ontario Protestants in their conviction that extension of the French language inevitably meant extension of the power of the Roman Catholic Church. However, Father Michael Whalen of Ottawa soon gave a demonstration that his church did not possess the monolithic character usually ascribed to it by Protestants. He published an open letter to Cardinal Bégin blaming the racial war on *Le Droit* and on extremists in both political and clerical circles:

We can easily explain why continuous reckless raiding on the schools of the province, to make them French, was regarded by the Protestant majority as a carefully planned campaign by the Quebec hierarchy to acquire on Ontario soil dominion in civil affairs. We deny that the French-Canadian raiders on the school system of Ontario have a right to declare, in the name of the Catholic Church, a religious war on the Government of this province. We protest against their dragging religion into their language agitation; we protest against their identifying their cause with that of the Separate Schools; we reprobate their methods as un-Catholic. We assert that only the united Catholic Hierarchy of Ontario has a right to declare a Province-wide religious war against a law or regulation of the Ontario government. The United hierarchy has not done so.<sup>63</sup>

After revealing in the 1915 session of the legislature that 190 bilingual schools had ceased to be eligible for grants of public funds during the past year because of their failure to conform to the language regulations,<sup>64</sup> the government secured passage of a bill empowering it to set up a commission to take over the duties of the Ottawa Separate School Board if that body continued to defy the Department of Education. During the debate on this measure most of the English-speaking

<sup>60</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XIX, 104.

<sup>61</sup>*Globe*, Jan. 9, 1915.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1915.

<sup>63</sup>*Mail and Empire*, Feb. 14, 1915.

<sup>64</sup>*Globe*, March 26, 1915.

Liberals refrained from taking any part, but they voted for the bill.<sup>65</sup> Toward the end of the school term the government announced that it was paying the overdue salaries of qualified teachers in the inspected English separate schools of Ottawa directly to the teachers in order to keep these schools open.<sup>66</sup> Shortly after this, the Ottawa Board's appeal against the earlier court order to reopen the schools was rejected.<sup>67</sup> A week later an Order-in-Council placed the Ottawa separate schools under the jurisdiction of a three-member commission, and in the autumn of 1915 the Supreme Court of Ontario sustained the validity of Regulation 17. Chief Justice Sir William Meredith said he could find no support whatever for the view that the French language was guaranteed either by constitutional or natural right.<sup>68</sup> With every round won by the Ontario government, French-Canadian resistance stiffened.

The issue was now complicated by open expressions of English-Canadian suspicions that French Canada was providing considerably less than its share of army recruits, and by French-Canadian retorts that when justice was done in Ontario it would be time to talk about the war in Europe. At the third biennial congress of the French-Canadian Educational Association of Canada Bishop Latulippe of Temiskaming claimed that his recent presentation of the claims of the Franco-Ontarians had received the entire support of the Pope. Encouraging reports were also presented showing the receipt of funds from even the remotest Quebec villages for the war on the Ontario front.<sup>69</sup> Two weeks later the Quebec legislature bolstered this cause by passing a bill allowing local Catholic school commissions to contribute officially to the fund.<sup>70</sup>

The Quebec legislature's action was greeted with much strong language, especially from the Conservative press of Ontario, and the Liberal *Globe*, in the strongest editorial it had yet published on the subject, now asserted that Regulation 17 was fully justified and denounced much of the French-Canadian press for its unfounded contention that the French language in Ontario had a legal status which must be defended.<sup>71</sup> For the first time Laurier was brought into sharp conflict on this issue with the leaders of Ontario Liberalism. Laurier accused the *Globe's* editor, Stewart Lyon, of deserting traditional Liberal policy; what was needed was an enforcement of the Mowat policy, which would rightly rule out the existence of exclusively French

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, April 2, 1915.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, June 4, 1915.

<sup>67</sup>32 Ont. L.R. 245.

<sup>68</sup>34 Ont. L.R. 335.

<sup>69</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XXI, 45.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 48-52.

<sup>71</sup>*Globe*, Feb. 26, 1916.

schools, but would allow for the learning of French as well as English by those who wished to do so. "Instead of this, Regulation 17 . . . practically wipes out the teaching of French. . . . This is a very serious matter . . . which must be considered immediately if I am to remain in the position which I now occupy."<sup>72</sup> At the same time Rowell complained to Laurier about the intervention of Quebec in the affairs of Ontario through its authorization of "a fund to carry on bilingual agitation in Ontario," and declared that it was essential that he make a statement in the legislature making clear the position of the Ontario Liberal party—that "the question is one which must be settled by the people of Ontario alone." As it was now five years since the Merchant investigation he would propose a new one to see how Regulation 17 had worked out in practice, and whether in fact any French-Canadian children were being deprived of a knowledge of French. He suggested that a three-member commission composed of the Roman Catholic Archbishop, Neil McNeil of Toronto, a representative of the Ontario French-Canadians, and some independent person of the prestige of President Falconer of the University of Toronto should examine present conditions and make recommendations for future policy. Any suggestions Laurier could make about further steps which Rowell might take to improve relations between Ontario and Quebec would be heard gladly, as long as Laurier remembered Rowell's basic position:

I cannot depart from the position I have always taken . . . that it is the duty of the state to see that every child in the Province receives a good English education and that consistent with this requirement, where the parents of the children desire that the children should also study the French language, there should be no objection to their doing so. The practical difficulty is to ensure the first without appearing unduly to interfere with the second, and the difficulty is greatly increased by the extravagant and entirely unwarranted claim put forth by the Nationalists with reference to the right to use the French language in this province.<sup>73</sup>

Laurier said he agreed with Rowell's general statement of policy, but added: "I would express it, however, more strongly than you do, and I would substitute for the words, 'there should be no objection to their doing so,' that 'the law should provide that they may do so.'" He welcomed Rowell's proposed commission, thought Archbishop McNeil an excellent choice, and as the French-Canadian suggested Bishop Latulippe whose extreme views represented a position which must be considered. Laurier thought Rowell's interpretation of the recent action of the Quebec legislature was probably unfounded, but said he would look into it: "I would be much surprised if a man of Gouin's prudence

<sup>72</sup>Laurier Papers, Laurier to Stewart Lyon, Feb. 29, 1916.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, Rowell to Laurier, Feb. 29, 1916.



had allowed the passing of a law to carry on bilingual agitation . . . but what I believe is that the Legislature has authorized municipalities to assist French children in Ontario in obtaining a French education in addition to the English education." Laurier found the Ontario Department of Education "much confused not only in their ideas but in their language," but after studying the rulings he believed he understood their meaning:

. . . the French language can be taught with certain restrictions in all schools where it was taught in the month of August, 1913, but is not to be taught in any other school, that is to say, that henceforth the Orange doctrine is to prevail—that the English language only is to be taught in the schools. That seems to me absolutely tyrannical.<sup>74</sup>

The extent of anxiety among Quebec Liberals about the meaning of the term "hitherto" in the regulation was further revealed when Stewart Lyon held consultations with Laurier, Senator Dandurand, and Rodolphe Lemieux; they interpreted it as prohibiting French entirely in new schools established after August, 1913.<sup>75</sup> Lyon was commissioned to find out what it meant in Rowell's mind. He received an answer which implied that their understanding was probably correct:

He is inclined to take the view that it does not limit the teaching of French after the first form or the second form at the option of the inspectors in a greater degree than the Legislature intended. An amendment, however, except as part of a general settlement, could not be put through the Legislature at the present time. Howard Ferguson and the extreme Orange element feel that there is Party advantage for them in insisting upon greater restrictions in the teaching of French, just as Bourassa, Lavergne and the extreme partisans on the other side feel that there is advantage for them in insisting upon the recognition of French as an official language in the Province of Ontario.<sup>76</sup>

Meanwhile, Rowell's conversations with Archbishop McNeil, who was now making overtures to the Franco-Ontarian bishops to ascertain their terms for a settlement, left him with the conviction that "if McNeil once went into the case his shrewd common sense and absence of bias . . . would be an important factor in settling the dispute." However, he was less hopeful that Premier Hearst would respond to his

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to Rowell, March 1, 1916. This letter is printed in O. D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (2 vols., Toronto, 1922), II, 475.

<sup>75</sup>The disputed word appeared in Section 4: "In schools where French has hitherto been a subject of study, the Public or the Separate School Board . . . may provide, under the following conditions, for instruction in French Reading, Grammar, and Composition in Forms I to IV . . . in addition to the subjects prescribed for the Public and Separate Schools." The regulation clearly allows the interpretation given it by Laurier. However, in expanding the discretionary powers of the department, the revised form of 1913, allowed the minister to designate certain schools so that they would come under the old Regulation 12. See Sissons, *Bilingual Schools*, 108-12.

<sup>76</sup>Laurier Papers, Lyon to Laurier, March 6, 1916.

plan for a fresh investigation of the bilingual schools unless considerable pressure were brought to bear upon him by federal Conservatives.<sup>77</sup> Yet some modification of Conservative policy seemed possible for Laurier was waited upon by an unofficial emissary from Hearst and Borden with the information that the Ontario government was disposed to make a compromise with the Ottawa Separate School Board and agree that if the schools were reopened the government would pay the teachers. Regulation 17 would then remain in abeyance until its validity was determined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. However, said the Conservative spokesman, Hearst was afraid to go ahead with this compromise for fear of attack from the Liberals. Laurier's assurance that Rowell would "consider the matter fairly and even sympathetically"<sup>78</sup> was met by the Ontario leader's willingness to discuss the matter, although he made no comment on the general nature of the proposed compromise.<sup>79</sup> There is no evidence that any overtures were actually made to Rowell, and it must be concluded either that the Ferguson wing of the party refused to have anything to do with a compromise, or that apprehension about the Liberal reaction to such a plan remained sufficiently strong to prevent the move.

The case for a truce was shortly put forward very strongly by representatives of the Montreal Chamber of Commerce who conferred in Toronto with politicians and business leaders of both parties with a view to securing a relaxation in the enforcement of Regulation 17 until the end of the war or the Privy Council decision on its status. This move was dictated by a mixture of patriotism and commercial interest since Montreal firms owned by English-speaking Canadians were finding their goods boycotted by their French-Canadian customers and many Toronto firms had been told by Quebec clients that until Ontario did justice to the French language they would place no further orders.<sup>80</sup>

Within a week of the Montrealers' trip Rowell introduced in the legislature his plan for a three-man commission to examine the operation of Regulation 17 during the past five years. At the same time he reaffirmed Ontario's absolute right to control education without outside interference. The government, speaking through the Acting Minister of Education, Howard Ferguson, claimed that it understood the situation well enough without setting up another commission and nothing came of Rowell's proposal. He can scarcely have expected any other result; the delay occasioned by another investigation might have

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to Rowell, March 4, 1916.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, Rowell to Laurier, March 7, 1916.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*, M. K. Cowan to Laurier, April 12, 1916.



reduced tension within the federal Liberal party and made life easier for certain Montreal and Toronto business interests, but it would undoubtedly have been interpreted by many Ontarians, probably by a majority, as capitulation to Quebec. Given this public temper there was no political necessity for the Ontario government to give even the appearance of being willing to reconsider its policy; indeed, all the political arguments pointed in the opposite direction. By the same token the assurance that the government would reject a further commission made it safe for the Liberals to propose one without too much political risk to themselves; and possibly the gesture would be worth something in relations with the Quebec Liberals in the federal party. In short, there could be no disagreement with the comment of one of Laurier's closest friends in Ontario who declared that public opinion was almost entirely in favour of the strict enforcement of Regulation 17 and would "oppose and slaughter any man or any party who talks of granting greater privileges to the French."<sup>81</sup>

While Ontario maintained this near unanimity there were pressures within both federal parties to take a positive stand in the controversy. Borden refused the request of the three Quebec members of his cabinet that the Dominion government refer the whole question of the status of the French language in Canada to the Privy Council,<sup>82</sup> on the ground that under Section 133 of the B.N.A. Act the issue was already settled.<sup>83</sup> Borden also rejected Senator Landry's suggestion that a government supporter should sponsor a motion of censure of Ontario's policy in the House of Commons,<sup>84</sup> as well as the more desperate remedy sought in a petition signed by Landry, Cardinal Bégin, and most of the French-Canadian bishops—federal disallowance of Regulation 17.<sup>85</sup> As far as short-term political strategy was concerned it was easy enough for Borden to resist these demands. The presence of the three Quebec members in his cabinet was a token only, for the Conservative-Nationalist alliance had begun to collapse long before the war and was now in total eclipse; the Conservatives had little to lose in Quebec.

Inevitably the conflicts within the federal Liberal party were much more severe. In the face of persistent rumours that a Liberal member of the House of Commons would endorse some form of interference in Ontario's affairs Bishop Fallon warned that any such move would

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to M. K. Cowan, April 11, 1916. This letter is printed in Skelton, *Laurier*, II, 472-3. The phrase quoted was originally Cowan's.

<sup>82</sup>P.A.C., Borden Papers, OC302, T. C. Casgrain, P. E. Blondin, and E. L. Patenaude to Borden, April 20, 1916.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, Borden to T. C. Casgrain, P. E. Blondin, and E. L. Patenaude, April 24, 1916.

<sup>84</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XXI, 112.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, 86-8.

be "nationally dangerous" and "politically dishonest,"<sup>86</sup> while Rowell told Laurier that it would seriously inflame public opinion in Ontario.<sup>87</sup> But Laurier's reply to the latter implied that the decision to raise the question in parliament had already been taken and asserted that "if the party cannot stand up for the principles advocated, maintained and fought for by Mowat and Blake . . . it is more than time for me to step down and out."<sup>88</sup> In the lengthy private debate on the Mowat tradition which these comments provoked Laurier and Rowell agreed that provincial rights and justice for minorities were paramount but they were far from agreement on the current application of these principles. Rowell contended that "the minority in each province must depend upon the sense of justice and fair play of the majority to secure any redress of grievances . . . and any action . . . by the Federal Parliament would . . . be looked upon as an interference with the free action of the province in settling its own problems."<sup>89</sup> Laurier agreed with Rowell's belief that, in order to divert attention from the government's incompetence in handling the war effort, the Conservatives were exploiting the racial issue which they themselves had done so much to create by nourishing the Nationalist movement, yet he could not break the force of the Nationalists as long as the Ontario minority was treated unjustly and the toleration practised by Mowat was denied. Laurier rejected disallowance, but he asked, "does the idea of provincial rights go to the extent that it will not receive the complaint of a minority?"; there was ample precedent for the federal parliament if it wanted to make representations to a provincial legislature.<sup>90</sup> But Rowell maintained his objection to comment of any kind from the Dominion parliament: "Of course, it is the duty of any Government to consider all complaints presented to it; but complaints by residents of this province are one thing; resolutions or other proceedings by the Federal Parliament are of an entirely different character."<sup>91</sup> Laurier could only conclude that he and Rowell "had reached a line of cleavage . . . final and beyond redemption."<sup>92</sup>

<sup>86</sup>P.A.C., Murphy Papers, Fallon to Charles Murphy, April 14, 1916. Murphy, who was, at least by his own account, Laurier's most vigorous and faithful political manager in Ontario, had earlier boasted that he had been able, by astute behind-the-scenes organizing "to secure practically the unanimous support of the English-speaking Catholics for the Liberal party." Laurier Papers, Murphy to Laurier, June 19, 1911.

<sup>87</sup>Laurier Papers, Rowell to Laurier, April 15, 1916.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to Rowell, April 18, 1916.

<sup>89</sup>*Ibid.*, Rowell to Laurier, April 26, 1916; see also Rowell Papers, Rowell to Laurier, May 9, 1916.

<sup>90</sup>Rowell Papers, Laurier to Rowell, April 28, 1916; see also Laurier to Rowell, May 11, 1916.

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*, Rowell to Laurier, May 9, 1911.

<sup>92</sup>Laurier Papers, Laurier to Rowell, May 11, 1916. This letter is printed in Skelton, *Laurier*, II, 477.

Ernest Lapointe's resolution of May 10 in the House of Commons<sup>93</sup> threatened to make the rift between the Ontario Liberals and the federal leadership complete. In support of the resolution, Laurier delivered one of his last great addresses in the Commons, with its impassioned appeal not to "constitutional arguments . . . or the cold letter of any positive law . . . but to the sober reasoning and judgment of my fellow-countrymen of all origins." This alone, he felt, could persuade the people of Ontario to take a fresh look at Regulation 17 and prevent Canadians of both races from allowing the language question to poison their thinking about the nation's participation in the war.<sup>94</sup> In opposing the resolution Borden argued that there was no proof that Regulation 17 worked an injustice on French Canadians in Ontario and quoted the Laurier of 1896 on federal intervention in educational affairs.<sup>95</sup> When the vote was called five Conservatives, all from Quebec, supported the Lapointe resolution. All the Liberals from Quebec and the Maritimes voted for it, while all eleven Western Liberals opposed; most of the Ontario men were strongly disposed to vote against it too, but in the end they supported it out of personal loyalty to "the Old Man" who had indicated that he could only resign if the Ontario group went against him.<sup>96</sup>

While the *Globe* castigated the federal party leaders for allowing the introduction of the Lapointe resolution, Rowell, after paying tribute to the tone of Laurier's address in the House, once more denied the constitutionality and the political wisdom of the resolution; the Ontario Liberal party was convinced that just as Mowat had resisted the plea that the Ontario legislature should support an appeal for the disallowance of the Jesuit Estates Act, so the Quebec Liberals should follow the same course now that the situation was reversed. The circumstances were not precisely the same, Rowell admitted; the Lapointe resolution was not a request for disallowance, yet it was more than a personal appeal from a member or group in the House and, in principle, involved "a certain supervisory relation on the part of the Federal Government of Provincial Legislation," and it could do no good, either for relations between Ontario and Quebec, or for the minority in Ontario:

If, upon a question so vital as the province's control over her own educational

<sup>93</sup>Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, May 10, 1916, 3676. The resolution moved "That this House . . . while fully respecting the principle of provincial rights and the necessity of every child being given a thorough English education, respectfully suggest to the Legislative Assembly [of Ontario] the wisdom of making it clear that the privilege of the children of French parentage of being taught in their mother tongue be not interfered with."

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, 3697-3709.

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid.*, 3690-6.

<sup>96</sup>Skelton, *Laurier*, II, 484.

affairs, the Liberal party in this province should surrender its views to the views of the party leaders at Ottawa, it would not only be doing what I believe to be wrong to the Province, but it would be committing political suicide. Surely we should not be expected to do this.<sup>97</sup>

Bishop Fallon was also distressed by the Lapointe resolution, and especially by the fact that the leading Irish Catholic member from Ontario, Charles Murphy, had supported Laurier and Lapointe:

Your public approval of . . . the Lapointe resolution lends your countenance to the baseless and mischievous statement that the French Canadians are an oppressed minority in Ontario. . . . politically, educationally, and religiously, the French Canadians in Ontario have far more . . . than they can [justly] . . . claim. It seems to me that I have heard you say as much.

There is, however, an aspect of your public attitude on this question which calls for the plainest rebuke. I speak as a member of another minority—the unfortunate Irish Catholics. In Quebec, in the Maritime provinces, in Ontario and throughout the whole Northwest, tens of thousands of the men and women of the race to which you and I belong have been lost to the Faith—and that is my only concern—through the callous neglect, the quiet persecution, and the continuous opposition of that same minority of which you now make yourself the champion. You need not travel beyond your own city for undoubted evidence of the truth of my statement. You will not wonder then that many of us are in amazement at the stand you have taken and ask ourselves what is to become of us between the upper millstone of French-Canadian nationalism and the lower millstone of Protestant bigotry.<sup>98</sup>

Faced with the strong possibility of a serious break with the Ontario Liberals, Laurier made plans to go to Toronto immediately after pro-rogation “in a last attempt to clear up what is becoming an intolerable situation.”<sup>99</sup> He was armed with evidence that his understanding of the term “hitherto” in Regulation 17 was well founded—evidence in the form of copies of letters from the Department of Education to the Windsor School Board prohibiting the use of French in a new school in “a place where French has been the language of many for more than two hundred years.”<sup>100</sup> Laurier’s visit to Toronto convinced him that matters were not quite as desperate as he had supposed, although they were serious enough. If the Irish could be restrained something might be salvaged from the party’s disunity in that quarter,<sup>101</sup> since the party as a whole did not feel as violently on the bilingual issue as his Toronto informants had led him to believe. “The resolution will have no effect in any part of the province, if our friends have the courage to maintain that it is right. This, however, will not be done in Toronto, and all the

<sup>97</sup>Rowell Papers, Rowell to Laurier, May 19, 1916.

<sup>98</sup>Murphy Papers, Fallon to Murphy, May 16, 1916.

<sup>99</sup>Laurier Papers, Laurier to Rowell, May 16, 1916.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to Stewart Lyon, May 13, 1916.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to Rodolphe Lemieux, May 26, 1916.

damage we will suffer will come from that direction,"<sup>102</sup> and in particular from the Toronto Liberal press.<sup>103</sup>

For a time, after their discussions with Laurier, Toronto Liberals ceased to make a public issue of the bilingual question. Beyond a few relatively unimpassioned assertions of Ontario's right to control her own affairs neither the *Globe* nor the *Star* had much to say on the subject for some weeks. Early in June when one hundred and fifty leading Liberals from all parts of the province met to consider party policy "there was not a solitary word on bilingual troubles."<sup>104</sup> An uneasy truce was maintained until the early autumn of 1916 when Laurier took exception to a *Star* editorial which had asserted that the sole purpose of Regulation 17 was to ensure that every child received an English education.<sup>105</sup>

This is not the policy which has again and again been put forward in the *Orange Sentinel* and in the *Toronto News*, and which is being carried out insidiously but effectively by the introduction of the word "hitherto" in the fourth paragraph of Regulation 17. No amount of quibbling by Mr. Ferguson has been able to explain this away.<sup>106</sup>

The editor of the *Star*, Joseph Atkinson, who was well able to speak for the inner circles of Toronto Liberalism, asserted that the total exclusion of French was not the intention of any responsible persons known to him; it was, he claimed, the extreme statements of the Orangemen which had given the French Canadians the impression that the real aim was more rigorous. Whatever the theoretical interpretation of the word "hitherto," the regulation must be judged on the basis of its enforcement; he knew of at least two schools where permission to give instruction in French had been granted since the adoption of the regulation, and he believed that the department was disposed to interpret the ruling generously.<sup>107</sup>

During this "era of good feeling" the first project of the Bonne Entente movement was carried out when about fifty prominent Ontario citizens visited Quebec in early October. Although participation was

<sup>102</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to W. M. German, May 27, 1916.

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.*, Laurier to E. M. Macdonald, May 27, 1916.

<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.*, P. C. Larkin to Laurier, June 7, 1916.

<sup>105</sup>*Toronto Daily Star*, Sept. 15, 1916.

<sup>106</sup>Laurier Papers, Laurier to J. E. Atkinson, Sept. 20, 1916.

<sup>107</sup>*Ibid.*, Atkinson to Laurier, Sept. 20, 1916. The Deputy Minister of Education would have agreed with Atkinson's comments on his department's policy. "The French language was in no sense proscribed by it. On the contrary, what is considered a generous provision for the use of French . . . was made. . . . A number of French schools have adopted it. No complaint from them has reached the Department that in the working out of the law French is proscribed or neglected. The law has been, and will be enforced in a reasonable and considerate spirit." Dr. A. H. U. Colquhoun to Lt.-Gov. J. S. Hendrie, Feb. 17, 1916, in "Correspondence . . . concerning the Bi-lingual School Issue."

by no means confined to Liberals, they were the leading spirits in both provinces and the idea had been conceived by a correspondent of the *Toronto Star*, Arthur Hawkes, a journalist much admired by Laurier. The scheme must be understood, at least in part, as an attempt to save the Liberal party from the destruction with which it was threatened by the widening abyss between the two races created by the bilingual issue and the war, and as a design to restore the trade position of English-speaking manufacturers in Montreal. The Ontario pilgrims to Quebec had not long returned when there occurred two events which did more to bank the fires of the language controversy than any truce among party leaders or cordial speeches at Bonne Entente dinners.<sup>108</sup>

The first of these was the publication of the papal encyclical, *Commissio divinitus*, the Vatican's answer to the many representations received from both Irish and French Catholics over the past six years. Pope Benedict XV deplored the enmity and rivalry which had allowed even priests to take an unseemly part in a controversy which threatened the peace and unity of the Canadian church, counselled moderation by all, and said that the bishops most directly concerned must decide on the specific questions at issue. But, the Pope cautioned:

Let the Catholics of the Dominion remember that the one thing of supreme importance above all others is to have Catholic schools, and not to imperil their existence. . . . However, these two requirements are to be met, namely, a thorough knowledge of English and an equitable teaching of French for French-Canadian children.<sup>109</sup>

Although a minority of the Quebec press asserted that the Nationalist cause had been vindicated, clearly there was little reason for thinking so. This was well illustrated by the silence of Bourassa and *Le Devoir* on the encyclical and the rather vague approval given it by most of the French-speaking papers.<sup>110</sup> On the other hand, Bishop Fallon was pleased with the Pope's letter but anxious lest the French-Canadian bishops find it possible to place upon the call to moderation an interpretation other than his own; he therefore prepared a lengthy memorandum for a meeting of the Ontario bishops called by Cardinal Bégin to consider the apostolic letter.<sup>111</sup> Fallon asserted that one of the worst features of the bilingual controversy was the fact that it had undermined a great source of respect for the Roman Catholic Church—its support of lawful authority and a conservative society. The papal

<sup>108</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XXI, 180.

<sup>109</sup>*Globe*, Oct. 27, 1916. The encyclical is also printed in full in Sissons, *Bilingual Schools*, Appendix 3.

<sup>110</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XXI, 188–192.

<sup>111</sup>"Correspondence . . . concerning the Bi-lingual Schools," memorandum of Bishop Fallon for the bishops of Ontario, January 24, 1917.



encyclical had restored that respect, as witness the absence of a single hostile word about it in the English-Canadian press. How great then was the responsibility of the bishops to refrain from any action "that would in the public mind be judged as sympathetic with the dying agitation" which had previously done so much "to jeopardize our entire Catholic school system in Ontario." After a detailed analysis of "the preposterous demands" of the French-Canadian Education Association and its defiance of the moderate course which he had advocated for so long amid so much misunderstanding (and which was now vindicated by His Holiness), Fallon declared that "never before had the French language legally enjoyed such privileges as it does under this much-maligned Regulation 17"; previously, it had depended solely on the good faith of the government but now it had legal protection to the end of the second form.

When the Ontario episcopate met, the three French-speaking members failed to accept Fallon's interpretation of the papal letter,<sup>112</sup> although this fact was not evident in the pastoral letter read in all Ontario churches ten days later. The letter enjoined obedience to "the just laws and regulations enacted from time to time by the civil authorities," asserted that much of the earlier unrest was due to doubt about the meaning of the school regulations, and expressed confidence that the discretionary powers given to the Minister of Education would be used liberally.<sup>113</sup>

A week after the publication of the papal encyclical the waters were calmed further by the Privy Council decision in the two cases referred from the Ontario courts. Although the legislation establishing the Ottawa School Commission was ruled *ultra vires*,<sup>114</sup> Regulation 17 was declared *intra vires*,<sup>115</sup> and the government of Ontario had thus won the essential point. Although their Lordships regretted that the regulation was "couched in obscure language" so that it was "not easy to ascertain its true effect," they found that it was only denominational and not language privileges which were guaranteed under the B.N.A. Act and the Department of Education was free to make any ruling concerning the teaching of French.

While the question hung fire as to whether Quebec and the Ontario minority would accept these ecclesiastical and constitutional defeats gracefully, a Bonne Entente group from Quebec paid a return visit to Toronto and Hamilton when Hearst, Rowell, and Gouin vied with one another in supporting the war effort and national unity.<sup>116</sup> But Senator

<sup>112</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XXII, 25.

<sup>113</sup>*Globe*, Feb. 5, 1917.

<sup>114</sup>*Ottawa Separate Schools Trustees v. Ottawa* [1917], A.C. 76.

<sup>115</sup>*Ottawa Separate Schools Trustees v. Mackell* [1917], A.C. 62.

<sup>116</sup>*Canadian Annual Review*, 1917, 476.

Landry and the members of the French-Canadian Education Association were not devotees of the Bonne Entente. The day after the reading of the pastoral letter of the Ontario bishops Landry urged a fight to the finish against Regulation 17,<sup>117</sup> and the Orange Order soon replied with the threat of a campaign for total abolition of separate schools if the bilingual agitation were revived.<sup>118</sup>

The Ontario government had still to find some way of enforcing Regulation 17, notably in Ottawa. Thus the issue reappeared in the Legislature in the winter of 1917 with the introduction of a bill to appoint another commission to take over the duties of the Ottawa Separate School Board if it persisted in its resistance. The government apparently believed that the bill was sufficiently different from the earlier measure to pass the scrutiny of the courts. Although Rowell doubted the constitutionality of the new bill, and said so publicly,<sup>119</sup> he and his party, except for the five French-speaking members, did not oppose it. Rowell explained this apparent inconsistency to Laurier:

We cannot put ourselves in the position of appearing to excuse non-compliance with the law.

Many of our members think the bill . . . is deliberately introduced with the view to laying a trap for us, and that if we opposed it they would go through all the country in their campaign trying to link us up with the opposition of the Ottawa School Board to the regulation. We cannot permit them to put us in this position.<sup>120</sup>

A further bill empowering the Ontario government to collect from the city of Ottawa the \$300,000 spent during the time it had operated the Ottawa separate schools under the recent commission, now declared illegal, was greeted with a mild protest from Rowell on constitutional grounds, but all the English-speaking Liberals voted for it.<sup>121</sup> Once more Laurier was disgusted with the Ontario Liberal party.<sup>122</sup>

While these two bills were before the legislature the dispute between the English and French wings in the church continued, although no longer before the public gaze, and Cardinal Bégin was impelled to send two envoys to the Vatican for further advice. Thus, by mid-summer of 1917, feeling over the bilingual schools was still acute among Roman Catholics, at least among the bishops, and Senator Landry talked of possible bloodshed and even of schism.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, the English-speaking Protestants, being supported now by

<sup>117</sup>*Globe*, Feb. 6, 1917.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*, March 15, 1917.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*, March 31, 1917.

<sup>120</sup>Laurier Papers, Rowell to Laurier, March 29, 1917.

<sup>121</sup>*Globe*, April 4, 1917.

<sup>122</sup>Laurier Papers, Laurier to Rowell, April 4, 1917.

<sup>123</sup>Rumilly, *Histoire*, XXII, 45.



the Privy Council decision and drawing more comfort from the recent papal encyclical than the leaders of the French-Canadian Education Association, were calmer than they had been in some years. Within the two provincial parties there was only one slight breach in the wall of resistance to any alteration in Regulation 17—the five French-speaking Liberals were at odds with the rest of their party, but they were too few to be significant. The Conservatives rightly believed that the Liberals were never seriously tempted to question the basic premise of Regulation 17<sup>124</sup>—that English was *the* language of the province and all must learn it. The vast majority of the people of Ontario rejected entirely the concept of cultural duality.

In their private and public discussions Laurier and Rowell separated the bilingual schools issue from their disagreement over coalition with the Conservatives, which Rowell began to urge upon Laurier early in 1917, and from the conscription issue which eventually brought the two leaders to the parting of the ways. But extremists in both Ontario and Quebec made no such distinction. Bourassa and the Nationalists declared frequently that the defeat of "the Prussians of Ontario" had a prior claim over the war in Europe. On the other side, the essentially bipartisan policy of the provincial parties on the bilingual problem reinforced the traditional disposition of most Ontarians to display a united front against French Canada. The necessity of "making the French Canadians do their duty" was a prominent feature of Unionist publicity in Ontario during the conscription election of 1917. Although it is impossible to isolate this from other factors in the campaign, the emotions already aroused by the language struggle help to explain the victory of Union government candidates in all but eight of Ontario's eighty-two seats.

<sup>124</sup>Borden, Henry, ed., *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs* (2 vols., Toronto, 1938), II, 588.

## Arbitration and the Oregon Question

JAMES O. MCCABE

IF THERE BE A THREAD of consistency in the pattern of British policy on the Oregon question in the fruitful, decisive, final years of that dispute, it is surely the adherence to the view that arbitration was the best method of settling it. To Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister, and Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, arbitration seemed the most reasonable and sensible way of solving the problem, and whenever the progress of the direct negotiations with the United States tended to languish, they brought it forth. But the United States Government was just as consistently and persistently opposed to arbitration.

The British love of arbitration as a solution could be traced principally to the fact that although they considered the Oregon territory worthless in itself—"miles of pine swamp"—more than twenty years of public clamour had given it what Aberdeen called "a fictitious value in the public mind." To give it up voluntarily, in spite of its worthlessness, involved a point of honour, and that fact alone made the British Government of 1841-6 seek a division of the territory that would not too much resemble surrender. Arbitration was in fact an escape mechanism. As Aberdeen put it to Peel early in the final stages of the negotiation: arbitration would probably mean getting less than what we feel we are entitled to; "but whether more or less, we are relieved from all responsibility." As Richard Pakenham, British Minister in Washington, said, the outstanding merit of arbitration was "no talk and no sacrifice of national honour."<sup>1</sup>

Arbitration had not yet established itself as a completely satisfactory method of adjusting international disputes. It had first been used when Jay's Treaty of 1794 provided for three distinct arbitral methods of settlement of disputes, and a commission set up under Article VII has

<sup>1</sup>British Museum, Aberdeen MSS, Aberdeen to Peel, Sept. 25, 1844, Cf. Aberdeen to Peel, Oct. 21, 1844, and Pakenham to Aberdeen, March 28, 1844, in same.

been called "the notable success of the Jay Treaty."<sup>2</sup> Lord Castle-reagh had proposed arbitration in 1818, but his suggestion had been less than lukewarmly received by the United States. By the middle of the century, however, it was established that arbitration might be resorted to in minor matters of dispute, and the powers accepted the device reluctantly and only when interests deemed vital were not involved. If a country's safety was considered to be in jeopardy, arbitration was simply out of the question, and even authorities on international law shared this assessment.<sup>3</sup> Of all nations, the United States displayed the most awareness of the value of arbitration as a means of solving international disputes, but in her view Oregon was too valuable to be submitted to the vagary and probable compromise solution of an international commission.

Nothing could better illustrate the relative importance given to Oregon by the United States and Great Britain than their respective attitudes to arbitration. The United States Government felt that they dare not risk losing Oregon by submitting their claims to an arbiter; the British Government, on the other hand, deemed possession of the disputed territory so unimportant that they relegated it to the lowest category of arbitral material. Indeed only the fear of a loss of prestige or of the surrender of Hudson's Bay Company interests impelled them to make the resistance they did.

The negotiation of the Oregon question was entrusted to Aberdeen by Peel, though no major issue of policy could be decided without the assent of the Prime Minister. Peel was a real leader in the sense that all facets of Cabinet policy were his affair; nevertheless he gave his friend Aberdeen a free hand, particularly in transatlantic policy. His own predilections were in the field of domestic policy and he was content, therefore, to give Aberdeen considerable latitude. The two had been colleagues under Wellington and working together had induced friendship and mutual respect. Perusal of their private correspondence makes it clear that, while Aberdeen carefully kept the Prime Minister informed of the progress of the Oregon negotiations and usually sought his advice, he did not always take that advice.

Great Britain and the United States were, said Peel, "two great communities boasting a common origin, speaking a common language, whose interests are so closely interwoven that a hostile blow aimed at

<sup>2</sup>J. R. Ralston, *The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals* (Stanford, 1926), xxvi.

<sup>3</sup>E. Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens*, II, 43, quoted by Maureen R. Robson, "Liberals and Vital Interests," *Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research*, XXXII (85), 1959, 38-55. "Russell, like Peel and Palmerston, saw arbitration as a convenient method of clearing up disputes which may have disturbed, but certainly never threatened to disrupt, relations between governments."

the one or the other, recoils upon the hand that strikes it." He tended, therefore, to be impatient of delays in the adjustment of disputes between the two countries, and it is easy to understand how he was consistently for arbitration of Oregon. "I incline to arbitration," he more than once told Aberdeen. As for Aberdeen, whom Greville called the "most lady-like" member of the Peel government, his naturally pacific outlook made him respect arbitration as a satisfactory and modern means of settling diplomatic disputes. His determination to adjust all disputes, even with the traditional enemy, France, by purely peaceful means sometimes made him a minority of one in the Cabinet, but the strength of his conviction and native dourness inspired in him a persistence in urging arbitration of the Oregon question when all seemed lost.

Aberdeen had rejoiced at the Webster-Ashburton agreement of 1842 which had settled the northeast boundary dispute, and in February, 1844, Richard Pakenham had been sent to Washington to replace H. S. Fox, whose manners and habits had made him, according to Peel, unsuitable for negotiating a major settlement like that of the Oregon controversy. Pakenham went with instructions to offer the British line of 1826, failing which he was to propose arbitration.

Under President Tyler and his third Secretary of State, John C. Calhoun, there was some chance that arbitration might prove acceptable to the United States, for Calhoun was the supreme protagonist of a Fabian policy in Oregon—a policy of "masterly inactivity" and delay until the country was settled with American emigrants. Calhoun did not want war over Oregon, but he was slow to formulate a proposition, and it did seem possible to the British in the autumn of 1844 that he would look with favour upon arbitration. Arbitration was par excellence the policy of delay and, from his point of view, with the inevitable postponements concomitant with arbitration, reference to an arbitrator could have seemed a matter of sound policy. He told Pakenham that he might resort to arbitration when all else failed, though the English minister reported home that: "The truth is they will first try to obtain what they want either by negotiation or by bullying, and they will submit to arbitration only as a last extremity."<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately for Pakenham and Aberdeen, the Democratic Convention of 1844 gave Calhoun and Tyler pause to think. The dark horse, James K. Polk, was nominated for the Presidency and later elected on the campaign cry of "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight," that is, on

<sup>4</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Pakenham to Aberdeen (private and confidential), Sept. 29, 1844. Cf. F.O. 5/409, Pakenham's no. 140 of Dec. 9, 1844. "It is evident that they all expect that England in the long run will be teased [sic] and worried into a compromise more advantageous to this Country than could be obtained by the decision of an impartial arbitrator."

the intention to assert his country's claim to the whole of Oregon as "clear and unquestionable." There was now considerably less likelihood of the United States agreeing to arbitrate such a title. After all, if her title to all Oregon was so unquestionable, she could not contemplate anything that looked like compromise of that title, and the idea of arbitration contains an implicit sense of willingness to compromise. It is not inaccurate to say, then, that Polk's presidential campaign constituted the death knell of arbitration hopes so far as the United States was concerned.

But the British Government relentlessly persisted in adherence to their policy. Aberdeen's private views, expressed in September, 1844, which remained virtually unchanged until the end of the controversy almost two years later, supported arbitration as the only alternative to his demands for the line of the 49th parallel, with Vancouver Island to Britain and the use of the harbours of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and of the Columbia River free to both countries.<sup>5</sup>

On January 21, 1845, Calhoun rejected the offer of arbitration, and soon the whole situation flared up, with war not improbable. The developing Mexican situation, the advent of Polk, the rejection of arbitration, and the passage in the House of Representatives of a bill to organize the government of all Oregon up to 54° 40' after the expiry of the year stipulated in the Convention of 1827, all concurred to agitate Aberdeen and Peel. The latter, less optimistic and perhaps more realistic than his colleague, wrote despairingly to the Foreign Secretary that, after the refusal of arbitration and what had passed in Congress "we cannot plead *surprise* [*sic*] whatever may hereafter take place."<sup>6</sup>

In the British Cabinet there was at this time something of a tug of war between the pacific Aberdeen and the pugnacious Duke of Wellington, and the private correspondence of Aberdeen and Peel demonstrates the gap between their respective views, particularly with regard to France. The Duke, who was minister without portfolio and whose great career as soldier and statesman gave him a preponderant influence in the government, consistently saw France as the premier menace to peace in the world and he wanted the country to be prepared at all times for an attack by the French. Lord Aberdeen, on the other hand, refused to see any imminent danger from the French. Peel, while no warmonger, inclined appreciably more to Wellington's views. The Prime Minister therefore followed all negotiations with the United States over Texas and Oregon while glancing apprehensively over his shoulder at Louis Philippe. France, with her undisguised

<sup>5</sup>British Museum, Peel MSS, Aberdeen to Peel, Sept. 25, 1844.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, Peel to Aberdeen, Feb. 23, 1845.

ambitions in the Mediterranean, the African coast, Egypt, Syria, Spain, and even the South Seas, seemed to be in Peel's eyes the greatest threat to peace.<sup>7</sup>

Wellington, in February, 1845, circulated to the Cabinet a memorandum on Oregon and Texas advancing the views of proponents of arbitration. Aberdeen, in answer to it, told the Duke that the Americans would have nothing to do with arbitration, though they had "civilly" declined it, and he went on to calm Wellington by assuring him that "in all probability it will be ultimately accepted," for the subject was one "especially fitted for arbitration." After all, the Oregon country was not of "paramount importance" and only the discussions of twenty years have made it interesting. His final paragraph was evidently designed to appeal to the old man's natural belligerence: if arbitration is rejected, Pakenham has been instructed to tell the Americans that we shall "maintain our rights at all hazards." And, he assured the Duke, he had got Edward Everett, United States Minister in London, to write home to the same effect.<sup>8</sup>

All hope of a peaceful settlement, by arbitration or negotiation, seemed destroyed with the publication of Polk's inaugural speech of March 4, 1845. "Our title to the country of Oregon is clear and unquestionable. . . . The jurisdiction of our laws and the benefits of our republican institutions should be extended over them [our people in Oregon]." These words, together with reference to "other contingencies than a friendly termination" of negotiations, seemed to suggest that the United States wanted war and, thoroughly alarmed, Peel, in a "secret" letter, reminded Aberdeen that the "point of honour is now brought into the foreground."<sup>9</sup>

Relations between the two countries became critical and remained thus for fully a year. Even the pacific Foreign Secretary feared that denunciation of the Convention of 1827 followed by a local collision "must soon take place," though he refused to believe "when they see us determined, that the American Government will drive matters to extremity."<sup>10</sup>

At a time like this it was convenient and comforting to have arbitration in the background, ready to be offered. The language of the new President was so different from that of his predecessors that even the ever optimistic Aberdeen was nonplussed. It was going to be very

<sup>7</sup>In August, 1844, Lord Cowley, British Ambassador in Paris, wrote: "I consider our relations with France to be at this moment in a very precarious position." *Diary and Correspondence of Henry Wellesley, First Lord Cowley, 1790-1846* (London, 1930), 279.

<sup>8</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Aberdeen to Wellington (copy to Peel), March 2, 1845.

<sup>9</sup>Peel MSS, Peel to Aberdeen (secret), Feb. 23, 1845.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, Aberdeen to Peel, March 29, 1845.



difficult to negotiate with one who, having accepted a share of the cake for many years, suddenly announced a "clear and unquestionable" right to all of it. It was surely effrontery to tell England she would have to abandon territory which she had occupied by common consent for many years.

Aberdeen had told Pakenham on March 3 to offer arbitration if there was no United States offer forthcoming. If it was rejected without a specific proposition in reply, the negotiations would be at an end. But if arbitration was declined "civilly" and with an expression of hope for a peaceful settlement, as Calhoun had declined it, the door was not closed. Whatever happened, Pakenham was instructed to hold "temperate but firm" language to members of the government or anyone else.<sup>11</sup> However, receipt of a despatch from Pakenham induced the Foreign Secretary to revise his views. The Minister told him that Senator Archer had intimated to him that he had discussed Oregon with President Polk and that the President would probably agree to arbitration. Pakenham attached "great importance to this, for Archer has always said that the violent party would win out."<sup>12</sup> At once Pakenham was instructed that if James Buchanan, Polk's Secretary of State, offered the line of 49°, all Vancouver Island, and free entrance to Juan de Fuca Strait, such an offer could be made the basis of negotiation. In any event, Pakenham must seek to keep the question open by "recurring to arbitration."<sup>13</sup> Also, the British Minister told Buchanan that if the United States would not accept arbitration it was up to his government to propose an alternative. Thus, it is clear that the question was still kept open, and that that is what the great majority on both sides fervently desired.

The inaugural speech was a notable turning point in the Oregon dispute. Coming immediately after the passage of a bill, on February 3 in the House of Representatives by the convincing majority of 140 to 59, to organize the government of all Oregon up to 54°40' after the expiry of the year stipulated in the Convention of 1827, and the rejection of arbitration by Calhoun on January 21 it was not surprising that there was some alarm in Britain. The initiation of a whole series of defensive moves was the sequel. The Admiralty were instructed by the Prime Minister to send a frigate frequently to Oregon "with a view to give a feeling of security to our own settlers in the country and to let the Americans see clearly that Her Majesty's Government are alive to

<sup>11</sup>Aberdeen, MSS, Aberdeen to Pakenham, April 6, 1845. Cf. Aberdeen's no. 21, in F.O. 5/423.

<sup>12</sup>F.O. 5/425, Pakenham to Aberdeen, no. 40, March 29, 1845.

<sup>13</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Aberdeen to Pakenham, April 18, 1845. Cf. despatch of same date in F.O. 5/423.

their proceedings and prepared, in case of necessity, to oppose them."<sup>14</sup> The Hudson's Bay Company was alerted, and Sir George Simpson sent to Oregon to review the naval and military situation there. The Colonial Office was asked by Aberdeen to take steps to ascertain the military position in Oregon, and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Stanley, was told that war was imminent owing to "excitement" in the United States, the "uncompromising boldness" of United States claims, and the views contained in the President's address.<sup>15</sup> An example of the excitement induced by the march of events soon appeared in the form of an inflammatory and ill-conceived despatch to the Colonial Office from Lord Metcalfe in Canada advising that the states of the Union be conquered singly and that the British navy should destroy American commerce and blockade United States ports, while Oregon should be occupied by forces released from India.<sup>16</sup>

The question was next raised in Parliament on April 4, 1845, when Lord Clarendon, leader of the Opposition in the Lords, and Lord John Russell, leader of the Opposition in the Commons, demanded to know how Great Britain stood in view of the recent "blustering announcement" of the President. In reply, Lord Aberdeen announced: "... we possess rights which, in our opinion, are clear and unquestionable, and by the blessing of God and with your support, we are fully prepared to maintain;" at which there was "loud and prolonged applause."<sup>17</sup> There was a great display of unanimity in Parliament and even the advanced radical, Hume, withdrew all opposition when a vote for 40,000 seamen was made in the Commons. Aberdeen detained the American mail to allow reports of these proceedings to reach the United States as soon as possible.<sup>18</sup> A fortnight later, the Prime Minister made his contribution when, in the debate on the Maynooth grant, he spoke of a rising "cloud in the West."

Even the "lady-like" Foreign Secretary was aroused and he told Princess Lieven "we desire to avoid anything like menace, but we can entertain no doubt of the course which it is necessary for us to pursue. I cannot feel much apprehension of the result, for the present is not a time when any State can venture obstinately to resist the voice of reason and justice with impunity."<sup>19</sup>

But there was surprise in the United States when word came of these demonstrations of belligerence. The Americans were familiar

<sup>14</sup>F.O. 5/440, Foreign Office to Admiralty (confidential), March 5, 1845.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, April 3.

<sup>16</sup>W.O. 1/552, Metcalfe to Colonial Office (confidential), July 4, 1845.

<sup>17</sup>Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 79, April 4, 1845.

<sup>18</sup>F.O. 5/423, Aberdeen to Pakenham, no. 21, April 6, 1845.

<sup>19</sup>"Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven," Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, April 12, 1845.



with the fulminations of politicians, and Polk's inaugural address did not produce in them the effect it created in Great Britain. Some in England, like *The Times* did understand this and with its usual perspicacity stated: "He [Polk] intended simply to flatter a delusion common in all democratic states but especially of the democratic party in the United States, which forces the statesmen whom they have chosen to govern their country to gratify their own popular vanity by affecting a temerity and an overbearing recklessness towards foreign nations which as individuals, neither the president, nor any of his vociferous supporters can be supposed to feel."<sup>20</sup> But the mass of Englishmen were more inclined incorrectly to equate the policy declarations of Presidents with those of Prime Ministers, forgetting that the latter had to be more circumspect in their utterances for which they had to answer in Parliament.

While the news of the reaction in England did have a mellowing effect on United States public opinion, it also had the effect of inducing examination of their title in Oregon. The more closely and dispassionately they examined their claim, the more likely were they to withdraw from their early attitude of a "clear and unquestionable" title to all Oregon. Pakenham was able, therefore, to write home that the reports of the debates in Parliament had produced "alarm and apprehension," as well as having a "sobering" effect on the American public. James Buchanan, Polk's Secretary of State, who, as a senator from Pennsylvania had been an enthusiastic 54°40' man, declared to Pakenham that the British furor, especially the Prime Minister's speech, was a breach of diplomatic etiquette since it was delivered at a time when negotiations were in progress.<sup>21</sup> But the British Minister, fortified by the tenor of the Parliamentary debates and the instructions from the Foreign Office to use "firm language," began to display in negotiations with Buchanan an aggressive attitude altogether foreign to his former manner. He felt, as he said later, that the Prime Minister's declaration had made Polk look "very foolish," "afraid to go forward and ashamed to go back."

In this atmosphere of suspicion and distrust only the tenuous thread of an offer of arbitration served to keep the peace and, tenuous as it was, Aberdeen clung to it. He could never bring himself to believe that, proposed as a last resort, it would be completely rejected. More than once he asserted, as if to reassure himself when things looked blackest, "I am not afraid of this Oregon question" and there is little doubt that this almost unreasoning confidence was based on the belief that the United States would never finally reject arbitration if war

<sup>20</sup>*The Times*, May 9, 1845.

<sup>21</sup>F.O. 5/426, Pakenham to Aberdeen, no. 54, May 13, 1845.

alone were the alternative; it was too late in the day for any State "obstinately to resist the voice of reason and justice with impunity." He believed that a peaceful solution would follow inevitably once the Polk government had convinced themselves of two things: the simple knowledge that a rejection of arbitration would put them in the wrong in the eyes of the world and the realization that the Oregon country was inherently worthless and therefore, the international view of arbitration being what it was, most suitable for the application of the machinery of arbitration. Evidence was soon to show that the Polk government had become aware of both these factors.

It would be easy to overestimate the influence of the press at that time but there is no doubt of its general insistence on the value of arbitration as a solution of the Oregon question. Thus the Tory *Morning Herald*, though anti-Peel, urged arbitration for there was "no sacrifice of national honour in accepting the award of an appointed umpire," especially since Oregon would some day become a state independent of both Britain and the United States.<sup>22</sup> Even the *Morning Chronicle*, Palmerston's organ, which disliked anything that might accrue to the credit of the Peel government, came out for arbitration.<sup>23</sup> And Pakenham was writing to Aberdeen privately that the reputable part of the American press was also urging arbitration.<sup>24</sup> He regularly sent home copies of journals of all shades of opinion, some of which copied whole articles from the London press. Thus the *Union*, the voice of the administration, quoted the *London Examiner* of April 25, 1845, which, in a review of the Oregon question, asserted that arbitration was the best mode of adjustment. The *English Spectator* (Radical) pronounced the "growing frequency of this practice [arbitration] perhaps the greatest triumph of reason in our age." Again it said that only war or arbitration would get the line of 49° for Great Britain, though it reminded its readers that Britain always loses when arbitrators are called in. The *Edinburgh Review* was of opinion that the obvious course of settlement was arbitration, for "the decision of an Arbitrator necessarily saves the honour of each party."<sup>25</sup> Even the patronizing *Times*, which disliked Peel, and which "by putting a cloak of omniscience over its extensive knowledge sought to give an appearance of leading where it might only be following," came out for arbitration.<sup>26</sup>

In the uneasy lull in the summer of 1845, Pakenham, in consonance with Aberdeen's instructions to withhold any further proposition until

<sup>22</sup>Jan. 13, 1845. Cf. issue of April 14, 1845.

<sup>23</sup>Feb. 17, 1845.

<sup>24</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Pakenham to Aberdeen, April 28, 1845.

<sup>25</sup>July, 1845.

<sup>26</sup>March 4, 1845.

the Americans made a counter proposal, contented himself with conversations with Buchanan. The Secretary of State, however, had to tell Pakenham that the United States Cabinet were unanimous in their dislike of arbitration.<sup>27</sup> Pakenham tried to break him down by asking if their opposition was based on general or particular considerations because in the latter case he might have been able to remove some of the grounds of their dissent. But Buchanan quashed this by assuring him that their objection was based on both general and particular grounds, and he defined the principal reason for rejecting arbitration as the final and comprehensive one that the American people would not agree to arbitration. The British Minister suggested that the sole alternative was now war, but Buchanan did not agree that the time had come for choosing between these extreme alternatives. He added, however, that in any case his government would not favour arbitration. The issue was therefore narrowed to negotiation or war, and Pakenham insisted upon narrowing it further by demanding that a proposal be forthcoming from the Secretary of State. After a good deal of verbal sparring, Buchanan reluctantly agreed to formulate a proposition, though his efforts to get Pakenham to indicate what terms would be agreeable to Great Britain were not successful.

The outcome was the celebrated offer of July 12, 1845, by President Polk of the line of 49° with free use to Britain of ports on Vancouver Island south of that line. Buchanan explained to Louis McLane, United States Minister in London, that American insistence upon 54°40' as the boundary would make war inevitable, and "the President doubts whether the judgement of the civilized world would be in our favour in a war waged for a comparatively worthless territory north of 49°, which his predecessors had over and over again offered to surrender to Great Britain."<sup>28</sup> Talk of the "judgement of the civilized world" and claims to "worthless territory" has a familiar ring, though it was Lord Aberdeen who had been first to speak thus.

Unfortunately, the offer of the Americans was peremptorily rejected by Pakenham as not "consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British Government." Pakenham acted without reference to his government who would not have considered it, he felt, because it was "less than the offer tendered by the American plenipotentiaries in the negotiation of 1826 and declined by the British Government." Aberdeen and Peel were mortified, for, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out, it was "difficult to devise any plausible scheme for again bringing on the discussion." What made matters worse was that Polk on August 30 withdrew the offer of July 12. Those in London

<sup>27</sup>F.O. 5/426, Pakenham to Aberdeen, no. 53, May 13, 1845.

<sup>28</sup>Buchanan to McLane, July 12, 1845; J. B. Moore, *Works of James Buchanan* (London, 1908-11), VI, 191.

realized that Pakenham ought to have told Buchanan that there was no chance of his proposal being accepted, but he ought also to have allowed his superiors at home to decide. If Buchanan had then withdrawn his proposition, he would have placed himself so manifestly in the wrong as to have given Britain a distinct advantage. Further, he would have thrown on his government the odium of a precipitate step in holding up the negotiation; now he was able instead to place the odium upon the British.

It was hardly to be wondered that, at this most vital stage of the whole Oregon negotiations, the hardy old reliable British offer—arbitration—was once more produced. It had the great virtue of keeping the question open and, as Aberdeen later told Everett, his reason for employing it was to place us "favourably before the world." If he failed in this offer, he did not know what he would do.<sup>29</sup> Although Peel came to the sensible conclusion that Buchanan had made it clear that the United States would not consider arbitration, the Foreign Secretary remained convinced that the Americans would not go to war over Oregon, and he replied to Peel: "I doubt if it will ever be settled except by arbitration." Indeed, if the two governments would only leave it to McLane and him, he told both Peel and Everett, they could adjust it in an hour round the table.<sup>30</sup>

And so, once again, Pakenham was instructed, on November 28, 1845, to renew the offer of arbitration as that would be most prudent and "best calculated to allay the existing effervescence of popular feelings which might otherwise expose both Nations to the hazard of a rupture upon a point which, however its importance may be magnified by national pride or popular passion on both sides, is, in reality, but of comparatively small publick value or interest to either Party, and not one upon which wise and patriotick Governments would wish to stake the peace and happiness of their people." "The proposal which you are now instructed to make is a proof of our confidence in the justice of our cause."<sup>31</sup> Finally, if arbitration was rejected again, "be the consequences what they may, Her Majesty's Government will have no choice but to maintain unimpaired those rights which they believe Great Britain to possess, and which they had in vain sought to make the subject of equitable compromise."

The optimistic Aberdeen simply could not allow himself to contemplate the possibility of failure of an arbitration offer, and a few days later he told Pakenham "notwithstanding the unpromising appearance of the present stage of the negotiation I feel satisfied that we are now

<sup>29</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Aberdeen to Everett, Jan. 3, 1846.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, Aberdeen to Pakenham, Oct. 17, 1845.

<sup>31</sup>F.O. 5/423, Aberdeen to Pakenham, no. 72, Nov. 28.

nearer a settlement than ever. If we press arbitration, they must either accept it or give us facilities for reopening the direct negotiation. If they do neither, . . . I greatly doubt their receiving the necessary support, even from the hostile portion of the American Publick." As the crisis becomes more imminent, the chance of settlement improves.<sup>32</sup> This view was shared by Pakenham who said that the impasse would continue until the United States would appeal to arbitration "in deference to the opinion of the civilized world."<sup>33</sup> Moreover, Buchanan had declared that, much as he disliked arbitration, he disliked more a quarrel with Great Britain.<sup>34</sup>

Lord Aberdeen had maintained a close correspondence with Edward Everett, now home in Boston after his period of service as United States Minister in London, and Everett was assuring him that the Whig party in the United States would agree to arbitrate the Oregon question rather than risk war. In this Sir Robert Peel took comfort, as he assured Aberdeen.<sup>35</sup> The Foreign Secretary was convinced that his offer to arbitrate would effect a reopening of negotiations, and he told Peel that "in the course of the year we shall see it finally settled, either by arbitration, or by direct negotiation."<sup>36</sup>

To supplement and explain his offer of November 28, Aberdeen summoned McLane for a discussion on Oregon in order to point out "the embarrassment in which he thought the President's withdrawal of his proposition [of 12th July] had placed this Government."<sup>37</sup> "Under these circumstances," reported McLane to Buchanan,

he could only regard the negotiation as having been terminated by the President, and the door to further attempts at compromise being thus closed, this Government had no alternative, in its desire to preserve the peaceful relations of the two countries, than to propose arbitration, and abide the consequences. . . . I think it not improbable that if the offer be declined upon the ground . . . that a more satisfactory adjustment might be obtained through the medium of negotiation, this Government would then submit a new proposition, and so resume the negotiation; but that if it be refused on such terms as to warrant them in assuming that our Government has determined to insist upon the extreme claim, and to decline both negotiation and arbitration, this Government will treat the offer to arbitrate as its ultimatum, and abide the result.

The British attitude to arbitration is thus clarified: they had little or no hope that an offer of arbitration would be accepted by the United

<sup>32</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Aberdeen to Pakenham, Dec. 3, 1845.

<sup>33</sup>F.O. 5/428, Aberdeen to Pakenham, Sept. 13, 1845.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, Pakenham to Aberdeen (separate and confidential), Sept. 28, 1845.

<sup>35</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Peel to Aberdeen, Dec. 3, 1845.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, Aberdeen to Peel, Dec. 25, 1845.

<sup>37</sup>D.S. 56 Despatches, Great Britain, no. 24, McLane to Buchanan, quoted in H. Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington, 1937), V, 49.

States, but it had the virtue of keeping the question open and the very phraseology of the rejection would indicate whether or not the door to negotiation, and therefore compromise, was closed.

Pakenham and Buchanan met on December 27 at the Department of State. The British Minister, who now wanted negotiations reopened on the basis of the rejected American proposition of July 12, offered arbitration and expressed the fervent wish that the question would be "honourably and amicably adjusted," a sentiment which Buchanan urbanely reciprocated. But Buchanan would not consider arbitration, "for the proposition to arbitrate assumed the right to a portion of the territory on the part of Great Britain" and left it to the arbitrator alone to decide in what manner the territory should be divided between the parties. Poor Pakenham had his leg pulled by the Secretary of State who said that, while he was opposed to arbitration on principle, if he were compelled to choose an arbitrator it would be the Pope because he was the best qualified to be impartial among heretics. He assured Pakenham that, even if he or the President were interested in arbitration, no treaty calling for this method of settlement would pass the Senate. Yet Pakenham persisted: "The British Government would be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms; that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the whole territory to [the United States.] They would yield it without a murmur."<sup>38</sup>

The British Minister failed completely, therefore, to have negotiations reopened or arbitration considered. Still, with naval and military preparations going on in Britain at the end of 1845, Lord Aberdeen remained quite unconvinced that the Americans had said the last word on arbitration, which he defined as the "most prudent and perhaps the only feasible step" which could be taken. At any rate, it was the method "best calculated to allay the existing effervescence of popular feeling."<sup>39</sup> But Polk remained intractable, and in Buchanan's written answer of January 3, 1846, the British proposal was denounced for its assumption that the British title to a part of the Oregon territory was valid, "thus taking for granted the very question it posed." Indeed, "under this proposition the very terms of the submission would contain an express acknowledgment of the right of Great Britain to a portion of the territory, and would necessarily preclude the United States from claiming the whole before the arbitrator."<sup>40</sup>

Pakenham, deeply conscious of the fact that his faux pas in rejecting out of hand the offer of July 12 had created a most regrettable impasse which dangerously beclouded the Anglo-American atmosphere, was

<sup>38</sup>Memorandum of Buchanan in Moore, *Works of Buchanan*, 350.

<sup>39</sup>F.O. 5/430, Buchanan to Pakenham, Dec. 27, 1845.

<sup>40</sup>F.O. 5/446, Buchanan to Pakenham, Jan. 3, 1846.



not to be denied. He consulted every scrap of instruction on arbitration he had ever received, going back to December, 1843, when Lord Aberdeen had advised reference of the whole case to arbitration. He discussed the subject with friendly Senators, and on the advice of an unnamed Congressman in whom he placed "great faith,"<sup>41</sup> on January 15, 1846, he once more proposed arbitration by a friendly state or sovereign or by a mixed commission, "subject of course to the condition that if neither should be found in the opinion of the arbitrator to possess a complete Title to the whole Territory which would in the opinion of the arbitrating Power be called for by a just appreciation of the respective claims of each,"<sup>42</sup> a compromise line would be fixed.

This effort met the same fate as previous ones, Buchanan softening the blow by blaming the Senate who, he said, would not agree to arbitration. He pointed out that in the last arbitration with Great Britain, notwithstanding the fact that the arbitrator had been confined to a decision as to which was the line of highlands described in 1783, he had actually advised a line along the bed of a river and divided the land in dispute. The President's final reason for rejection was that he did not believe the territorial rights of the United States to be a proper subject for arbitration.<sup>43</sup>

To Aberdeen, Buchanan's refusal of January 3 seemed the last straw and when he got a copy of it he sent for McLane and showed it to him. The reason assigned for rejection of arbitration, declared the Foreign Secretary, was extraordinary and he could not believe it to be sincere. He was forced to the conclusion, by the manner of the rejection and by Polk's obstinate refusal to renew the proposition of July 12, that the United States did not really want a settlement. Aberdeen therefore told McLane that he had now in consequence withdrawn his objections in the Cabinet to war preparations in Britain and Canada.<sup>44</sup> McLane replied that if "under any circumstances" arbitration could be admissible, only the question of title and not of division could be considered. At the same time he insisted that the President had not closed the door on another proposition.

<sup>41</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Pakenham to Aberdeen, Jan. 29, 1846.

<sup>42</sup>F.O. 5/446. Copy enclosed in Pakenham to Aberdeen, no. 11, Jan. 29, 1846. His action was subsequently given "entire approval" by the Foreign Office.

<sup>43</sup>Reported in *ibid.*, Pakenham to Aberdeen, no. 12, Feb. 5, 1846.

<sup>44</sup>Aberdeen MSS, Aberdeen to Pakenham, Feb. 3, 1846. Cf. McLane to Buchanan, Feb. 3, D.S. Despatches, Great Britain, no. 34, of same date, quoted in Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, V, 57. This despatch of McLane's has been called "perhaps the turning-point in the whole crisis, for it forced the American cabinet, which had made no preparations for war, to reconsider its position." W. D. Jones and J. C. Vinson, "British Preparedness and the Oregon Settlement," *Pacific Historical Review*, 22, 362. Cf. Julius W. Pratt, "James K. Polk and John Bull," *Canadian Historical Review* (Dec., 1943), 341-9. Cf. also W. D. Jones, *Lord Aberdeen and the Americas*. (Athens, Georgia, 1958), 80-1.

At a subsequent meeting of the two on February 25, before the answer to Pakenham's second proposal of arbitration had reached London, the Foreign Secretary told McLane that much depended upon the nature and the terms of the reply to Pakenham. If the tone of the answer were favourable to renewal of the negotiation ended in the preceding July, Pakenham would be instructed to submit a further proposition for the equitable division of the territory, and it would be "in the nature of an ultimatum." McLane wrote home that Aberdeen

took occasion also to express his confident hope, and indeed his belief [*sic*] that notwithstanding the rejection of Mr. Pakenham's proposals to arbitrate, yet, rather than take the responsibility, under all the circumstances of the case, of involving the two nations in war, our Government would ultimately agree to arbitration, in some form or another. It was very evident that his confidence upon the point had been encouraged by advices from the United States, and that it could hardly fail to exert no small influence upon his mind. I, therefore, deemed it my duty, in pursuance of your Despatch, to assure him, that from my knowledge of the sentiments of the President, and of a majority of the Senate, a submission of the question to arbitration, under any circumstances, was altogether hopeless, and ought not again to be thought of.<sup>45</sup>

A despatch from Pakenham confirmed and emphasized the finality of the American view, for those Senators keen on a compromise solution had assured him that it would be impossible to get the Senate to agree to arbitration.<sup>46</sup> Aberdeen had to accept all this evidence as conclusive and final, and no more serious mention was made of arbitration. Instead he prepared himself for the worst and listened patiently to the debates in Congress on the motion to give notice of the abrogation of the Treaty of 1827. He told McLane he would no longer oppose defensive or offensive military measures "founded upon the contingency of war with the United States."<sup>47</sup> The discussions in both House and Senate were lengthy. The House passed the resolution on February 9 and the Senate spent nearly two months discussing it. Ultimately on April 23 the Senate decided to give notice of abrogation in very conciliatory terms.

Polk's policy of brinkmanship on Oregon was probably based on a genuine belief that Great Britain had no legitimate claims there and that "the only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye." Polk concurred fully with Thomas Hart Benton's view that "the British had no title, and were simply working for a division—for the right bank of the river and the harbour at its mouth—and waiting on time to ripen their joint occupation into a claim for half."<sup>48</sup> The boun-

<sup>45</sup>D.S. 56, Despatches, Great Britain, no. 35, March 3, 1846.

<sup>46</sup>F.O. 5/446, Pakenham to Aberdeen (separate and confidential), Feb. 26, 1846.

<sup>47</sup>Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts*, 62-5.

<sup>48</sup>T. H. Benton, *Thirty Years View* (London, 1857), II, 54.

daries of any country are too important to be submitted to an arbiter, and only matters of minor importance, especially those which arise from the construction of existing treaties are meant for decision by arbitration.<sup>49</sup> It seems doubtful if Polk was able to maintain his metaphorical glare in the face of Aberdeen's tougher policy initiated after the final rejection of arbitration, a policy intimated to Pakenham and to McLane, for transmission to the President, on February 3.

The persistence with which the British Government had adhered to arbitration over such a long period is remarkable. To an idealist like Lord Aberdeen, arbitration was logical, plausible, up-to-date, rancour-killing. It must be remembered that Great Britain had never at any time, even during the Nootka Sound negotiations of 1790, asserted an *exclusive* title to Oregon. Therefore it seemed reasonable, when her position had been completely vindicated, to employ arbitration to decide the extent of her share. Aberdeen had told Pakenham: "The possession of the litigated country is an object of no immediate or pressing national interest or importance to either Party; therefore, any moderate delay which might occur in finally determining the right to that possession is comparatively immaterial."<sup>50</sup>

Peel also "inclined to arbitration" because he was more worried about the effect of developments of the Oregon question upon relations with France than on Anglo-American relations. To him the importance of Oregon lay mainly in its tendency to exacerbate Anglo-French relations. Peel lived constantly in fear of what would happen if Louis Philippe, now 73, were to die. The heir to the throne had died in 1842, and there were grave differences of opinion in France as to the succession. In the existing state of Anglo-French relations, with the disturbing Spanish Marriages dispute impending, it was of paramount importance that Britain should appear untroubled in her relations with the United States. In a private letter to Aberdeen, for instance, Sir Robert reminds the Foreign Secretary that fifty years of French history show that Britain can have no confidence in the successors of Louis Philippe and Guizot. "But when I see the weakness of Civil Authority in France—the fruitful germs of War with France which will spring up in the event of war with the United States—when I look back on the suddenness with which there have been within our short memories revolutions in the Government of France—and look forward to the Events which *may* occur on the death of Louis Philippe—I cannot feel sanguine as to the future."<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 661.

<sup>50</sup>F.O. 5/423, Aberdeen to Pakenham, March 3, 1845.

<sup>51</sup>Peel MSS, Oct. 17, 1845. Cf. C. S. Parker, *Sir Robert Peel* (London, 1899), III, 406ff.; also Lord Cowley's despatches from Paris at this time in *Diary and Correspondence of Cowley*.

Arbitration could keep the wild men of both countries quiet, and it had the supreme additional merit of delaying a decision until passions roused by incessant discussion had died down. When minds on both sides were inflamed, acceptance of arbitration as a solution of the Oregon question would have been an effective anticlimax. President Polk had committed himself to maintaining a "clear and unquestionable" title to all Oregon, and both Aberdeen and he were aware that he would have to retreat from such an impossible and dangerous position. That is why the Foreign Secretary was mortified at Pakenham's mistake in summarily rejecting Polk's offer of July 12, 1845. That offer constituted retreat by the President from his extreme position, and the British Minister ought to have appreciated that fact. Aberdeen believed that Polk would be able to save face now only by agreeing to arbitration, though the President had thought up an equally effective device—submission to the Senate for their advice of any suitable proposition by Britain.

In the winter of 1845–6, all Aberdeen's sources of information made it clear that the United States had no intention of going to war over Oregon. There was no evidence of increases in the United States army or navy; indeed, the naval estimates presented to Congress at the end of 1845 showed an appreciable reduction upon those of the previous year. Aberdeen knew that the United States was sharply divided, and Edward Everett was assuring him that the war party was much the smaller one.<sup>52</sup> The new free trade policy would delight the South and West, it was said, and the whole Whig party wanted peace. Pakenham was writing that Buchanan had assured him in conversation that the risk of quarrel over Oregon was very remote and that there was a clear majority for peace among Senators and press.<sup>53</sup> Even the archpriest of "fifty-four-forty" claims, Thomas Hart Benton, was now a "forty-nine" man. And Louis McLane was insisting that he would not remain in England for a moment if he thought there was the slightest possibility of war over Oregon. Early in 1846 Pakenham wrote home that there was a party in the House of Representatives which urged that abrogation of the Convention of 1827 should be accompanied by a proposition to submit United States and British claims to arbitration.<sup>54</sup> The sage of the Oregon question, Albert Gallatin, now 85 years of age, who had negotiated for the United States in 1818 and 1827 was writing in the *National Intelligencer* that "neither party has an absolute and indisputable title to the whole of the contested territory."

All this explains why Aberdeen was constantly reiterating the view

<sup>52</sup>See especially Aberdeen MSS, Everett to Aberdeen, Jan. 28.

<sup>53</sup>F.O. 5/429, Pakenham to Aberdeen (separate and confidential), Nov. 13, 1845.

<sup>54</sup>F.O. 5/446, Pakenham to Aberdeen, no. 9, Jan. 29, 1846.

that he had never been "afraid of this Oregon Question" in spite of the recurring crises like the publication of the presidential message of December, 1845.<sup>55</sup> "I feel confident that in the course of the year [1846] we shall see it finally settled, either by arbitration, or by direct negotiation." The presidential message, he said, was just what he had expected.<sup>56</sup> It seemed to the Foreign Secretary now, with notice of abrogation certain, that President Polk only needed some kind of pacific device to settle the dispute. To his mind, the plausibility and fairness of arbitration were sure to appeal to Polk as the most practicable of such devices.

From the British government's point of view, submission of the Oregon controversy to an arbitrator had the great attraction that such an expedient could be readily and easily defended in Parliament. That Peel appreciated this is apparent from his reference to Oregon in Parliament after his return to office during the Cabinet crisis of December, 1845, when he announced that his government had offered arbitration of Oregon. After the Webster-Ashburton agreement of 1842 on the northeast boundary, the former Foreign Secretary, the redoubtable Viscount Palmerston, had conducted in the columns of the *Morning Chronicle* a virulent and abusive campaign of attack upon the foreign policy of the Peel government. Everything Aberdeen did was wrong. "As to our foreign affairs, they go on as usual," he had cried, "we yield to every foreign state and power all they ask and then make it our boast that they are all in good humour with us." *Fraser's Magazine* spoke in October, 1845, of the "extreme easiness of British Ministers" and the *Radical Spectator* denounced the British government for failing to "penetrate the sophistries" of the United States argument. But submission of Oregon to an arbiter would silence Palmerston and other critics, particularly since Lord John Russell, who was certain to succeed Peel as Prime Minister, and Lord Clarendon, Whig leader in the Lords, had spoken in favour of arbitration in connection with settling the Oregon controversy.<sup>57</sup> It would be very easy to shrug off, in Parliament, any criticisms of a policy of arbitration, especially when only a "few miles of pine swamp" were in dispute.

In the minds of Peel and Aberdeen the influence of British policy on Oregon upon foreign countries was also very important. Aberdeen's predecessor at the Foreign Office had ridden roughshod over the susceptibilities of many countries, and Aberdeen boasted that his policy would be the exact reverse of that. "Dread of the world's sneer" did

<sup>55</sup>Peel MSS, Aberdeen to Peel, Dec. 28, 1845.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup>Hansard, vol. 84, for March 17, 1846. Cf. Spencer Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell* (London, 1889), II, 421.

indeed affect him, and he firmly believed that no State "can venture obstinately to resist the voice of reason and justice with impunity." Thus he told Peel that if the United States rejected arbitration "the rest of the world could not hesitate to think us right. It is of consequence that this should be the case, and especially that the French Government should be able to declare this opinion."<sup>58</sup> W. R. King, United States Minister to France, went some way to divine the Foreign Secretary's intentions when he told Buchanan that "it strikes me that the motive for making it [the offer of arbitration] was to gain time, pass their free trade measures, and avail themselves of the effects it would have in the United States, to obtain more favourable terms than had been offered by us, or, should negotiations fail and war ensue, they would be able to prejudice the European governments against us by showing that they had tendered arbitration, which was rejected."<sup>59</sup>

The United States attitude and the British attitude to the Oregon question were based on totally opposite premises. While only idealists believed that arbitration should be used to settle all international disputes, the accepted contemporary view of arbitration, which sanctioned the use of arbitral machinery only when no major issue or principle was at stake, fitted in with the respective assessments of the two countries in regard to the intrinsic worth of the area in dispute. That arbitration was for minor disputes only was the attitude accepted by both countries but, unfortunately, Oregon was minor for Great Britain and major for the United States. The British believed Oregon to be valueless so far as they were concerned, and the presence of the Hudson's Bay Company there was little more than an embarrassment to them in their negotiations. Only the point of honour involved compelled them to take a positive attitude on the matter, and an arbitrator could therefore award the whole of Oregon to the United States if he saw fit.

The Americans on their part were much more realistic and inflexible in their policy. They were not prepared to risk losing any part of the Oregon region to which they felt they had a claim. Though previous administrations had been prepared to accept part of the territory, President Polk insisted that all of it should belong to his country. The British might consider Oregon's remote, worthless "miles of pine swamp" admirably suited to an arbiter's purview, but to the Americans the extent and importance of the territory in dispute were too vast to admit of compromise. The contiguity of Oregon to admittedly United States territory made it probable that it would be peopled by Americans; the United States looked westward across the Pacific as a

<sup>58</sup>Peel MSS, Aberdeen to Peel, April 29, 1845.

<sup>59</sup>King to Buchanan in G. T. Curtis, *Life of Buchanan* I, 568.



limitless avenue for her commerce, and the only ports and harbours on the Pacific north of San Francisco lay in the region of the 49th parallel and it was imperative that she should have these for her shipping. In short, argued the Americans, Oregon was of small importance to Great Britain and its loss would not affect her unduly; but to the United States its loss would be irreparable, so irreparable that the risk of allowing an arbitrator to decide upon its future could not be contemplated.

### Canadian

*Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. III. The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945.* By C. P. STACEY. Maps drawn by C. C. J. BOND. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 1960. Pp. xiv, 770, maps, sketches, illus. \$4.00.

IN A RECENT VOLUME published by the United States Army, *Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945*, Colonel Stanley Dziuban deplores the tendency of the United States and the United Kingdom to ignore or under-estimate the role played by Canada in World War II. With the appearance of *The Victory Campaign*, there is no longer an excuse for such attitudes. Colonel Stacey has told his story in considerable tactical detail, while adding valuable information on high-level planning, command decisions, and battles on other fronts. He has included material on such topics as supply, civil affairs, demobilization, and the early days of the occupation of Germany. The book is handsome in appearance and well provided with maps and illustrations.

Canada's story is presented with pride but without exaggeration. Always presented against the total Allied effort in northwest Europe during 1944-5, the account preserves a proper perspective. Drawing heavily on Allied and enemy accounts, Colonel Stacey has carefully avoided narrow nationalistic interpretations. One regrets that he did not have direct access to some of the American and British records, but is impressed by the manner in which he makes effective use of printed sources to complete his story. By declining to take either a pro-American or pro-British position in controversies, he is able to approach the war-time disputes in a peculiarly favourable position. American readers will be pleased by the fact that the author refuses to adopt the deprecatory tone toward American commanders and strategy which marks Chester Wilmot's *Struggle for Europe* and some British memoirs. Stacey is even able to forgive Patton some of his impatient—and unfair—jabs at Montgomery and to wish that on some occasions—as at Argentan—the commander of the Third Army had been given his head.

While justly proud of Canadian courage and fighting qualities, the author is quite ready to point out the weaknesses of his country's forces. He finds that his countrymen, like other Allied troops, were often slow to follow up their initial gains. At the top Canadian leadership showed up well; at the bottom there was great courage, initiative, and increasing skill. Some of the regimental officers had no superiors, but others lacked competence in the field, and as a result, they sometimes failed to take advantage of their opportunities. "In particular the capture of Falaise was long delayed, and it was necessary to mount . . . two set-piece operations . . . when an early closing of the Falaise Gap would have inflicted most grievous harm on the enemy" and might have brought the end of the

war some months sooner. He adds, "had our troops been more experienced, the Germans could hardly have been able to escape a worse disaster."

But the failure to press the advantage was not always at the regimental level. Eisenhower has been blamed for failing to allow Montgomery to press on his front towards the Rhine. Colonel Stacey here declines to take the Montgomery line and observes, quite accurately, that Eisenhower in the critical days of late August went a long way towards giving the 21st Army Group commander what he asked for. Readers who favour a pro-Montgomery or pro-Eisenhower verdict may feel that Colonel Stacey is unduly cautious, but in this he goes as far or farther than the official historians of the United States and the United Kingdom in assessing praise or blame.

There is a hint of censure over the Allied failure to make a quick thrust to Breda after the capture of Antwerp with its port virtually intact. Had the advance, which the Germans expected, been pressed, the escape route across the Scheldt would have been closed and at least part of the 85,000 troops and 600 guns which got away—to help deny the approaches to Antwerp to the Allies—would have been captured. Stacey notes that at this period Field Marshal Montgomery was deeply engaged in a strategic controversy with General Eisenhower "and it may be that his eye, fixed on the distant scene, was not focusing so well on the immediate foreground."

Before the port of Antwerp could be opened, the Allies engaged in one of the bitterest fights of the war to clear the enemy from Walcheren Island and the banks of the Scheldt estuary. This story, often neglected (Montgomery, for example, gives little space to it in his memoirs) is carefully described here with proper attention to the political as well as the military aspects of the problem. To keep down losses, General Simonds—who was commanding the Canadian forces during the illness of General Crerar—asked that the dykes on Walcheren be destroyed and parts of the island flooded. This met opposition from those who feared an unfavourable Dutch reaction and from the air leaders who preferred to attack other targets, and only after a costly assault from the sea was it possible to overcome enemy resistance. In the battle to clear the Scheldt estuary, the Allied forces suffered some 13,000 casualties of which almost half were Canadian.

In this, as in other battles, the Canadian leaders did not always see eye to eye with other Allied commanders. At one point Field Marshal Montgomery seems to have hoped that General Crerar would not return to his command. Later, however, any major differences seem to have been forgotten. It should be noted that while Colonel Stacey in some of the cases mentioned above has some doubts as to the wisdom of the Field Marshal's decisions, he praises most of his actions. On careful reading of the book, one concludes that the author regards Patton and Montgomery as the two great field commanders in the operations in the north.

General Eisenhower in summing up the results of the campaign in northwest Europe named three episodes as decisive in bringing victory. Colonel Stacey, in recalling this, notes that the Canadians had an important part in all three. At the beaches in Normandy, they faced some of the heaviest fighting on D-Day; in the battle to close the Falaise Gap, they suffered heavily; and in the battle for the Roer and to clear the area west of the Rhine, they met some of the strongest enemy resistance while fighting over some of the worst terrain. When one adds to all this their tremendous fight along the Scheldt, it is clear that they contributed heavily to final victory.

FORREST C. POGUE

George C. Marshall Research Center  
Arlington, Virginia

*Histoire du Canada. I. Des origines au régime royal.* By GUSTAVE LANCTOT.  
Montréal: Librairie Beauchemin Limitée. 1959. Pp. 460, maps. \$4.75.

THIS WORK supersedes all other accounts of the history of New France down to the royal assumption of the colony in 1663. It is the fruit of a lifetime's research by a scholar whose mastery of the sources is unmatched and whose literary style is both forceful and graceful. The documentation is impressive without being oppressive. Here and there the notes, which are gathered together at the end of each chapter, contain a judicious comment on the value of a cited authority or correct a false statement in a source. For example, note 22 on page 156, points out that Champlain did not visit Canada in 1617 despite his isolated reference to such a voyage and the supposed confirmation of it in Sagard and Le Clerq. The excellent bibliography also contains welcome remarks on the reliability of various sources. Some readers will wish that the index had not conformed rigidly to the French style of listing pages without any suggestion of what is in them; but this limitation is offset by the table of contents, which follows immediately and is gratifyingly detailed.

It now appears, from Lanctot's exhaustive re-examination of the available evidence, that the Vikings were not the first Europeans to reach America, and that what has long been regarded as an invention of Irish imagination and pride is not a myth. Celtic monks, with their supporting lay communities of men and women, migrated northward to the Scottish Isles and beyond to the Faroes; and then, fleeing from marauding Vikings, they moved first to Iceland, then to Greenland, and finally to the Gulf of St. Lawrence where they survived for several generations. There are countless other revisions of the traditional history, less striking, perhaps, but more important for their bearing on the evolution of Canadian history.

The two final chapters, xxiv and xxv, both entitled "Retrospective," are the best in the book. They take stock of what had been accomplished by 1663, the close of "la période héroïque canadienne." Here is an analytical account of the population, which had increased from 200 souls in 1640 to 2,500 in 1663; their origins in France, by province, by rural, and by urban background, by occupation, and by social class; the motives that brought colonists from France; the exact location and size of the settlements; and economic and social conditions. Lanctot disposes of Parkman's and other criticism of the French policy for excluding Huguenots from New France; and he laments the paucity of French emigration to New France, compared with that to the French Antilles on which he has some pertinent things to say and particularly with the many times larger emigration from England. But his explanation of why so few people migrated from the much richer and more populous France seems to miss the point that it was not French but English emigration that was peculiar, for in the seventeenth century more Englishmen settled overseas than the combined total of French, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Dutch in their respective colonies.

Lanctot rightly emphasizes the crippling effect of the chronic Iroquois war on the colony. For this he blames the French policy, initiated by Champlain, of withholding firearms from the allied natives while the Dutch supplied these weapons to the Five Nations, whose manpower was only half that of the Hurons. He also blames Richelieu for failing to provide a naval convoy for the first expedition sent by the Company of New France which, had it not been captured by the Kirkes, would have put the infant colony on its feet. The Company never recovered from this blow, yet it did more for Canada than any previous historian has observed, and Lanctot castigates the shabby treatment it received at the

royal hands after its rights were confiscated. Finally I would underline the eloquent tribute that Lanctot pays to the work of the Jesuits in and for Canada.

A. L. BURT

University of Manitoba

*Marie Morin: Premier historien canadien de Villemarie.* By ESTHER LEFEBVRE. Preface by LIONEL GROULX. Montréal: Fides. 1959. Pp. 211, illus. \$5.00.

IN 1662, the fourteen-year-old Marie Morin travelled from her native Quebec to enter the Sisterhood of Saint Joseph at Montreal's Hôtel-Dieu. The fifth Canadian girl to enter a convent, she was the first to enter the Hôtel-Dieu, and the first who was not a daughter of the colonial *noblesse*. Before her death at the age of eighty-one in 1730, she had served as Mistress of Novices, and twice as Superior of her order. Most important of all for the historian she had begun in 1697 her famous *Annales de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Montréal*, relating the story of her Institute from its beginnings in 1659 until 1725. Thus she qualified as the "*premier historien canadien de Villemarie*."

Sister Esther Lefebvre, a member of Marie Morin's own order, has written an excellent biography. She recreates not only the charming figure of Marie herself, but also introduces her readers to many more of the relatively unknown but most interesting early *Montréalistes*, such as Judith de Brésoles and Marie Barbier. She also adds many an anecdote to the more familiar portraits of La Dauversière, Maison-neuve, and Jeanne Mance. In fact, Sister Lefebvre has filled her book with interesting details, such as the number of Indian dialects the sisters had to learn, or the description of the headless ghost that shook the halls of the hospital during the winter of 1694. And although her tone often tends to hagiography ("*Rien ne manquait à ses affamées d'immolation*," p. 48), Sister Lefebvre displays a fine critical sense, especially when dealing with the great influence of the Jansenists upon her own order. She further displays her scholarship by including in her work a fifteen-page Bibliography of no small merit.

To the general reader *Marie Morin* will provide a most interesting and instructive evening; the student of New France will find it indispensable.

JACQUES MONET, S.J.

University of Toronto

*Sir Casimir Stanislaus Gzowski: A Biography.* By LUDWIK KOS-RABCEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI and WILLIAM EDWARD GREENING. Published under the auspices of the Engineering Institute of Canada. Toronto: Burns and MacEachern Limited. 1959. Pp. vi, 213. \$4.75.

TRADITIONALLY the title of "Maker of Canada" has been reserved for explorers and politicians, but educators and men of letters, especially poets, have been grudgingly admitted to the charmed circle in recent years. Scientists, however, with few exceptions, still stand outside the pale—a Keefer or a Dawson being ranked as a second-class historical citizen. This small volume, along with Dr. Frank Walker's *Light through the Mountain*, does something to redress the imbalance as far as the brotherhood of the iron ring is concerned.

Participation in an abortive Polish revolt against Tsarist rule made Casimir Gzowski into a New American in 1834. His subsequent career testifies to his

adaptability to new environments, his versatility as an engineer, and his diversity of interests as a citizen. Within three years of his arrival at New York he was called to the state bar, but he soon turned to his first love, engineering. In 1842 business with the Welland Canal Company brought Gzowski to Canada where Sir Charles Bagot offered this son of a former diplomatic friend in St. Petersburg the employment on government public works which was to link Gzowski's name with so many aspects of Canada's material progress. From public employment on roads, bridges, and harbours Gzowski moved to posts with the Bruce Mines, the St. Lawrence and Atlantic, Toronto and Guelph, and Grand Trunk railways, to several business partnerships, membership on the Canadian Canal Commission, and finally chairmanship of the Niagara Parks Commission. His private interests included music, sports, higher education, the Canadian militia, and Imperial Federation. Gzowski's extensive public services were recognized with a knighthood in 1890.

The authors candidly avow that scarcity of materials makes a complete biography of Gzowski impossible, but they have added to the slim biographical skeleton interesting sidelights on the physical development of the country. Unfortunately, their commendable effort is marred by some palpable historical errors, by an unsatisfactory index, and by a format for references and bibliography which will grate the sensitivity of academic readers.

JOHN S. MOIR

Carleton University

*Guide to the Manuscript Maps in the William L. Clements Library.* Compiled by CHRISTIAN BRUN. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. 1959. Pp. 209.

THIS CATALOGUE contains over eight hundred entries describing the manuscript maps in the William L. Clements Library. Most of the maps are from the papers of General Thomas Gage and General Sir Henry Clinton, commanders of the British forces in North America during the period from 1763 to 1782. Other groups of maps listed have been taken from the papers of Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for America (1775-1782), Lord Shelburne, British Prime Minister (1782-1783), and General Josiah Harman, first commander-in-chief of the American post-revolutionary army. The only prominent group of maps dating after 1800 are those from the papers of Loammi Baldwin and his sons, who were early American civil engineers. The origin and dates of the maps described make this catalogue of particular interest to Canadian students of the colonial and revolutionary period. About 150 of the items relate directly to Canada, being offshoots of surveys made of the conquered French territory.

The compiler makes no especial claim that any one of the manuscript maps in the William L. Clements Library is unique. However, the reader is apt to believe that because they are manuscript, and because they formed part of private collections, there is only one copy of each in existence. Such is not the case. Several of the maps listed exist in manuscript form in other collections. For instance, there are at least three other contemporary copies of each of the sixty-three maps and plans of the St. Lawrence Valley prepared from 1761 to 1763 by order of Governor Murray. Of these the British Museum has one, and the Public Archives of Canada two.

Such bibliographical detail will, however, only be available to cataloguers when all other institutions follow the example of the William L. Clements Library.



We suggest that Mr. Brun's work is a proper model for other custodians of maps. The entries have been photographed from a typescript and printed by offset lithography. Each one is clearly set forth, and contains a precise and adequate description. There are five full-page reproductions which further enhance this attractive little volume.

THEODORE E. LAYNG

Map Division,  
Public Archives of Canada

*Surveyor of the Sea: The Life and Voyages of Captain George Vancouver.* By BERN ANDERSON. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 274. \$6.75.

IN THIS RATHER conventional biography, Rear Admiral Anderson, building on personal experience as an American naval officer and as a hydrographic surveyor in the waters of Puget Sound—the "inside passage" of British Columbia and southeastern Alaska—pays tribute to one of the truly great voyages in the history of navigation and exploration. On his pages, Captain George Vancouver emerges primarily as a surveyor of the sea—as the map-maker who meticulously charted the tortured windings of the Pacific northwest coast and established the fact of a continuous coastline.

Admiral Anderson is convinced, however, that the contribution of the captain of the *Discovery*, was political as much as it was geographical. In this assertion he is probably right. But although he realizes that his subject's work should be depicted against a background of swiftly changing political and economic events, this part of his theme is never fully developed. Thus the figures and the features of the broader canvas remain indistinct, and from this study it is as difficult to obtain a sharp realization of the sudden awakening of the Pacific and an awareness of the burgeoning of trans-Pacific trade, as it is of the clash between monopoly and free trade in Pacific waters during the late eighteenth century. The nature of Vancouver's diplomatic mission at Nootka is still seen in the narrow setting established by W. R. Manning and not as much as might be is made of the political perceptiveness which led Vancouver to establish what was virtually a British protectorate over Hawaii.

Admiral Anderson has made extensive use of the logs and journals (including the interesting Manby journal) of members of Vancouver's expedition. In many respects these supply new details concerning Vancouver's character and work. It is possible, for example, to argue that he ill deserves the reputation of a harsh and even cruel disciplinarian that he gained from the Camelford Affair. There are enough hints in Vancouver's own *Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and round the World* to indicate that his was a character of great complexity. But the new sources of information as used by Admiral Anderson fail to reveal a striking personality. The great seaman still remains a strangely obscure individual and the depths of his character are still unplumbed.

*Surveyor of the Sea* is a welcome addition to the slight literature on Captain Vancouver. From his own experience in the navy, the author is able to make readers appreciate the suffering, the hardship, and the triumph involved in a journey under sail occupying four and one-half years and covering sixty-five thousand miles—with the surveying boats, in addition, covering about ten thousand miles under oars.

This biography is compact and incisive, but it is written with something less than the charm of Roderick Haig-Brown's tale for boys in the Great Stories of Canada Series. The bibliography fails to make note of the work of James Stirrat Marshall and Carrie Marshall, two dedicated amateur historians who have made Captain Vancouver their special study.

MARGARET A. ORMSBY

University of British Columbia

*The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806-1808.* Edited by W. KAYE LAMB. Maps by C. C. J. BOND. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1960. Pp. viii, 292. \$5.00.

CANADIAN HISTORIANS have already given considerable general approval to the Macmillan Company's attempt in its Pioneer Series to reprint and thus make widely available the records of early Canadian exploration and settlement. Volumes in this series have proven extremely valuable, particularly Professor Glover's edition of Samuel Hearne's *A Journey to the Northern Ocean*, Professor Craig's *Early Travellers in the Canadas*, and Dr. Lamb's earlier volume, a new edition of the journal of Daniel Harmon, *Sixteen Years in the Indian Country*. The latest volume, *The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806-1808*, will enhance both the reputation and the value of this series. One can only wonder why Canadian historians have been willing for so long to accept the deficiencies of the one early published version of one small part of Fraser's journal and to dismiss, with a brief statement of its outcome, one of the most dramatic and difficult journeys in the history of the exploration of North America. The story of the conquest of the Fraser River by the man for whom it was named is a story that has long deserved a retelling.

The main part of this volume is the Fraser journal of the expedition in 1808 from Fort George near the great bend of the River down to its mouth, and the return trip. The journal in a very imperfect form has appeared once, in R. L. Masson's *Les Bourgeois de la Compagnie du Nord-Ouest*, published in 1889. Masson's two volumes, however, are not readily available; in Dr. Lamb's work, the general reader will be given his first chance to read in Simon Fraser's own words, the narrative of his epic journey.

In addition to the journal for the key period of May-August, 1808, the volume contains a fragment of the rough notes which Fraser made from day to day during his expedition. Presumably these are the notes from which the fuller journal was later written. The notes give courses, compass readings, and daily distance logs which make it possible to check Fraser's daily position against a modern map. There is also a section of the journal which Fraser kept during 1806 when he and John Stuart were busy establishing posts in the region of New Caledonia and making preparations for the later expedition downstream to the coast. Finally, the volume contains a number of Fraser's letters from New Caledonia, and a selection of eleven miscellaneous papers of various kinds, ranging from Fraser's notes on the genealogy of his family to a "memorial" of his last will and testament.

Thus, all the available important documents bearing on the explorer's work in British Columbia are here reproduced. The editing is meticulous and the organization of the material effective. Some readers will wish that Dr. Lamb had been a little less terse in his introduction. It is certainly true that "Simon Fraser is the

most neglected of the major explorers of Canada." It is just as certainly true that his great exploration has not been given the importance in Canadian history that it deserves. A discussion of the part that Fraser and Stuart played in opening up the fur trade in New Caledonia, in giving the British Crown a claim to the lands of the Fraser valley, and in opening the way for settlement on what is now the mainland of British Columbia, could easily fill a little more than the single page which Dr. Lamb gives to these matters. This is a work which will be one of the major sources for later writing about the Canadian far west.

J. H. STEWART REID

C.A.U.T., Ottawa

*Sverdrup's Arctic Adventures*. Adapted from OTTO SVERDRUP's *New Land: Four Years in the Arctic Region* and edited with additional chapters by T. C. FAIRLEY. Toronto: Longmans, Green & Company. 1959. Pp. xii, 305. \$6.00.

THIS BOOK is a welcome, though belated, act of justice to a polar discoverer whose reputation while he lived was almost ludicrously inadequate to his deserts. In the years 1898 to 1902 Otto Sverdrup made the crossing of Ellesmere Island from Hayes Sound to Bay Fiord, made the first complete survey of Jones Sound, charted the west shore of Ellesmere, and discovered and mapped Axel Heiberg and the two Ringnes Islands—tasks tremendous in extent accomplished by sixteen men with no native aid and by spending a longer term in complete isolation than any other polar expedition on record.

Judged by the magnitude of his discoveries and the economy with which they were effected Sverdrup is as great a discoverer as any this century has produced. Yet he remains virtually unknown. He did not have the backing of a mammoth press, and he wholly lacked the gift of self-dramatization. The two volumes of his *New Land* are superbly illustrated with photographs (his voyage marked an epoch in the successful use of the camera) but the text is overburdened with detail and wanting in emphasis. Mr. Fairley has performed the difficult task of adapting this original narrative with skill and success. By abridging and revising he has given clarity and drama to Sverdrup's story, while preserving to a remarkable degree the tone and style of its bluff and unassuming author. In the epilogue he tells the later history of his hero well, but with tantalizing brevity. Sverdrup was not well used by the Norwegian and Canadian governments, although his services were acknowledged and rewarded before he died.

Mr. J. L. Beirnes furnishes a set of maps which have the rare merit of complete and exact correspondence with the needs of the text. Mr. Fairley has made a valuable addition to Canadian polar literature in the area where it was most needed.

L. H. NEATBY

Acadia University

*The White Road: A Survey of Polar Exploration from the Vikings to Fuchs*. By L. P. KIRWAN. London: Hollis and Carter [Montreal: Palm Publishers]. 1959. Pp. x, 374, maps, illus. \$6.00.

NOT CONTENT with reviewing the history of arctic exploration this volume devotes almost exactly half its space to the antarctic phase, a treatment which may well

become standard practice for works of this type. This approach is possible because the book has been conceived as a study in European (and North American) expansion and its central purpose is that of tracing the drives and incentives that have impelled the polar quest. The histories of two regions a world apart have been quite successfully blended into a single account which alternates from arctic to antarctic according to the rhythm of exploratory interest and discovery.

Given the vast scope of his subject it is understandable that the author who is Secretary and Director of the Royal Geographical Society should have singled out one section for more detailed examination than the rest. The account of exploration previous to 1815 is brief, almost perfunctory, and little more than a brief résumé is offered of scientific, military, and strategic developments during the past forty years. Fully two-thirds of the book falls in the century from Waterloo to Sarajevo and it is here that the account really springs to life. We are introduced to the controversies over objectives and methods and to the personal conflicts that figured so largely in the triumphs and tragedies of the period, and the section abounds with interesting character sketches. Though the author's sympathies lie with the explorer-scientists (and, on the whole, with British explorers), he properly treats the forces that impelled other adventurers to strive for popular acclaim rather than scientific discovery, and he weighs impartially the efforts of all nations and the accomplishments of all explorers, regardless of motives.

It is to be regretted that despite the generally high quality of the work facts, phrases, and ideas sometimes are repeated unnecessarily. There are occasional slipshod sentences, and the book appears to be insufficiently grounded in at least one of the areas lying outside its main theme—namely, Canadian history.

MORRIS ZASLOW

University of Toronto

*Brown of The Globe. I. The Voice of Upper Canada, 1818-1859.* By J. M. S. CARELESS. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1959. Pp. viii, 354, illus. \$6.00.

IN THE *Queen's Quarterly* a year ago A. R. M. Lower, striking out with his usual free-swinging vigour at the paucity of good biographical studies of Canadians, suggested that Donald Creighton's *Macdonald* constituted "virtually a new departure in Canadian biography, for it is a literary recreation of the man, intended not for a few scholars but for a wide range of readers." Judging by the present first volume, Professor Careless's work when it is completed will be a splendid second example of this new style in Canadian biographical writing and will stand up well to comparison with the prototype.

Such comparison is of course inevitable in any case. The close association of the authors, the one the student, colleague, and successor of the other, and the intense political rivalry of their subjects make these two works obvious companion pieces. And this being so, it is a special pleasure to be able to report that not only in scholarship but in literary quality and popular appeal Careless's study deserves the same high praise and wide acceptance accorded the other.

While similar in excellence the two biographies differ widely, as would be expected, in style and viewpoint. A good example of this is found in their treatments of the famous "double shuffle" crisis of 1858 when Brown and Macdonald reached an almost unparalleled peak of political antagonism toward one another.

Creighton in describing these events is bitingly sardonic and shares to the full Macdonald's glee over Brown's discomfiture. He speaks of "the blindly over-confident Brown" and clearly enjoys writing: "The gods finished their sport with George Brown very quickly; and indeed they had little need to manipulate circumstances, for Brown's infatuated presumption had brought about his own swift undoing." Careless, with the more difficult task of explaining the motives and behaviour of the man who failed, goes about it in a more leisurely fashion—eighteen pages as compared with Creighton's six. He admits that Brown was "over-eager" to bring about Macdonald's defeat and failed to look beyond the immediate events. However, he ably defends Brown's course once the crisis began, pointing out that while the attempt to form a government was dangerous, to refrain from even trying would have been more so. "A refusal on his part . . . could wholly destroy the West's confidence in him as a leader. . . . Should he fail it might be easy for party enemies to jeer at him. Should he not try, it seemed certain that party friends would do so."

When judging Brown's success in piecing together a ministry, Careless perhaps shares a little of Brown's own wishful thinking. After spending some time showing how diverse the ministry really was, he nevertheless ends by stating: "a great deal had . . . been accomplished by Brown and Dorion in composing a surprisingly strong ministry with a broad programme." A similar sympathy with his subject makes him a little disappointed at Head's refusal to grant Brown a dissolution. He concludes most fairly, however, that the basic reason for Brown's failure lay in his insufficient recognition of "the need of preparing for a viable Reform administration to take office after Macdonald and Cartier had been laid low. . . . Brown, in short, was still a victim of his own political impatience, and his inability to conciliate effectively."

In his balanced judgement of such well-known events as the "double shuffle," Careless makes a real contribution to our understanding of Brown and his period. Perhaps an even greater contribution, however, is the wealth of new material, clearly the result of long and intensive research. Private papers of the Browns, discovered in Scotland, help fill in details hitherto unknown about the family. Of special value is Professor Careless's thorough understanding of the Toronto and Western Ontario background and the vivid fashion in which he relates it to Brown's attitudes and actions. The consequence is that he is able to explain Brown's rise to power and the sort of influence he wielded regionally as no one else has been able to do.

In this connection, perhaps the author's most paradoxical achievement is to prove beyond all doubt that the title he has chosen for his biography is a rank understatement. The Brown of this volume is much more than the Brown of the *Globe*. He is also Brown the politician, away from the *Globe* offices for weeks at a time during elections and sessions of the legislature. He is, for an important period in the early life of the *Globe*, Brown the Prisons Commissioner devoting almost full time for awhile to this specific branch of reform. He is, perhaps most typically of his time, Brown the increasingly wealthy property owner, sharing personally in the economic development of his western section of the province, founding on his large estate in Kent County the town of Bothwell, laying out its streets, building a grist mill, a saw mill, several woodworking plants, a foundry, and a machine shop.

He is, of course, through it all Brown of the *Globe*. True there were other Browns at the *Globe*, first the father, Peter, and then the younger brother, Gordon, and without their help George would have had to remain closer to his

editorial desk. But essentially it was George Brown that made the *Globe* and it was, as Careless makes clear, the *Globe* that made Brown the voice of Upper Canada.

D. G. G. KERR

University of Western Ontario

*The Social Credit Movement in Alberta.* By JOHN A. IRVING. Social Credit in Alberta, its Background and Development, 10. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1959. Pp. xiv, 369. \$6.00.

THIS BOOK is a case study in Canadian political organization. It analyses the rise of the Social Credit movement in Alberta from its burgeoning in the winter of 1934 until it swept into power at the end of the summer of 1935. Professor Irving's approach is that of the social psychologist, and he has attempted to disclose the underlying factors which created what is no doubt the most astonishing mass movement in Canadian history.

William Aberhart possessed the natural endowments of a charismatic leader. He once explained that he had been profoundly impressed as a boy by a series of revival meetings, and that he had marvelled at the power of the preacher over the people. "I was so impressed," he said, "that I went into a woodlot, day after day, and practiced speaking and pounding a pine stump with my clenched fists. I had discovered the power of words and gestures over people." This was the urge that drove him through life. Even when he became a successful and busy high school principal, he tirelessly devoted long hours to Bible classes and to lay evangelism. It was in his nature that he should build his own religious movement, for he chafed at the authority of others. And so the aptly named Prophetic Bible Institute emerged as his personal instrument to bring salvation to southern Alberta. With this organization at his hand he was propelled into politics to evangelize the gospel of social credit.

Table-pounding became a natural part of him. "Never mind why!" he would say to his high school students. And many of them did well on examinations under his forceful teaching. No doubt his personality fed on the class room and the pulpit, where the relationship of speaker and listener do not favour the asking of embarrassing questions. Like many successful teachers he had the qualities of the ham actor. In front of an audience he could play many roles, hence his effectiveness as a public speaker. The hour was ripe for the man. Everywhere was failure and frustration. Aberhart spoke as one having authority, and provided the psychic therapy for the sense of guilt and personal inadequacy among those whose material world was in ruins. He gave new meaning to the lives of those who were prepared to believe in his message.

One particularly valuable part of Professor Irving's book is his lengthy study of the secondary leaders of the movement—for they were the sinews of the organization. It was the tireless voluntary effort of a large number of farmers, school teachers, and businessmen, which turned an evangelical crusade into a powerful movement. In happier days these men and women had been community leaders. Many of them were drawn from the corps of experienced leaders developed in rural Alberta by the wheat pools and the U.F.A. After the deadening frustration of poverty and despair, they found that their immersion in the new movement tapped in them tremendous reserves of energy. Speakers and organizers set out with nothing but the clothes they stood in and a car, for Aberhart did not believe in paying them expense allowances. Then they literally lived on the



country like itinerant evangelists, passing a collection plate to pay for the hall, living on the hospitality of their local hosts, and receiving running repairs and gasoline to carry them to their next stop. Thus the movement was built, and it was built by purposeful men and women who were trained and experienced in their job. It was, in short, a mass movement which was able to draw on the unused resources of community leadership which had been made surplus by the depression.

And so, by the summer of 1935, the movement swept onwards through the province. Speakers for the other political parties found that their audiences would no longer listen to them. Wherever they went, they found that the people had experienced the exaltation of Social Credit, and had become deaf to arguments against it. Sometimes the crowds were openly resentful of speeches attacking Aberhart, whom they had come to regard as a sacred person and "a man of God." As mass hysteria spread there were a few ugly incidents at political meetings where hooligan tactics by Social Credit supporters threatened to lead to riots. It was reported that Aberhart himself had said that eggs were cheap and could be used for other purposes than eating. Sometimes the audiences were not violent but deadly quiet. A cabinet minister in that campaign found that "a dead calm descended over our meetings. We moved like ghosts across Alberta, and everywhere the Social Crediters faced us in ice-cold silence. We carried out our assignments and kept up a bold front, but I knew that we had hopelessly lost."

This book has recaptured, largely from the oral reminiscences of the survivors of the conflict, a vivid picture of the time and the atmosphere. Professor Irving has steeped himself in his material and has handled it well. Only rarely does he lapse into the language of social psychology, but when he does opacity descends on both meaning and style. At one point he tells us "the rise of new norms was being made possible by the emergence of a new consensus, flowing from a new concord at the deepest level of the Alberta community." He is overly fond of phrases like "lashed to fury." But these are small faults in a formidable and successful enterprise.

J. R. MALLORY

McGill University

*NATO and American Security.* Edited by KLAUS KNORR. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. viii, 342. \$6.00 (U.S.).

*The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War.* By EDGAR MCINNIS. Published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1959. Pp. x, 163. \$4.50.

*Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World.* By JAMES M. MINIFIE. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1960. Pp. viii, 174. \$3.50.

PROFESSOR KNORR, associate director of the Princeton Center of International Studies, has edited a rather uneven but highly stimulating volume. While the contributors are by no means radical most of them succeed in meeting the central problems of NATO head on and some of them have packed a remarkable amount of solid information into their chapters. Again, although most of the authors hew close to the deliberately chosen theme of military strategy several of them have included mature reflection on the relevant political context. The right-wing British socialist Denis Healey, for example, examines carefully the political as well as the

strategic reasoning that led Britain to join the nuclear club and concludes that there is no basic difference between Britain's two major parties on foreign and nuclear policy. He touches, too, upon the great question that is also at the heart of the American contributions to this volume: the growing fear that "even before America acquires a fully intercontinental striking force, Russia's ability to inflict intolerable damage on the United States itself may make automatic nuclear retaliation by SAC a far less credible deterrent than it was a few years ago." It is this problem that leads nearly all the contributors to serious reconsideration of such questions as the increasing possession of the nuclear weapon and the diminishing plausibility of limited war.

While there can be no common conclusion in such a book, the editor presents a lucid summary of the major questions and points of view. The level of competence throughout the volume makes it one of the best (and at the moment the most up-to-date) discussions of NATO. Canadians will not, perhaps, be very surprised to learn that it contains not a single reference to their country.

Professor McNinn's book on the Atlantic triangle grew out of discussions at the C.I.I.A.-sponsored Montebello Conference of 1955 and the author's visits to NATO briefing sessions and countries in Asia and Africa. The volume exhibits its author's fine powers of organization and balance of treatment. In a wide ranging discussion of both the internal and external problems of this triangular relationship Professor McNinn does not, however, permit himself the luxury either of conclusions or prescriptions—except in so far as he employs an elegant turn of phrase to indicate the intractability of specific areas of friction in the wider world beyond the triangle. The basic assumption is that the solid core of the "free world" is found in the belief in freedom and democracy shared amongst Britain, Canada, and the United States. In view of the omission of any reference to Canada by Professor Knorr and his colleagues one may be permitted to wonder about the readiness with which Canadians acknowledge their new significance in the modern American world. However, there can be no doubt that Professor McNinn speaks for the bulk of informed Canadian opinion and that therefore his volume is important as a polished expression of that opinion.

To one who doubts the utility of such undefined expressions as "free world" and "liberty" it is a striking common feature of both these books that their various authors view the United Nations Organization and the possibility of negotiated disarmament with an undisguised, if sophisticated, skepticism bordering upon the cynical. Perhaps there is validity in the remark of C. Wright Mills that "intellectuals elaborate and justify."

At first glance Mr. Minifie's book is not strictly comparable to the preceding two volumes. While it deals with much the same problem areas of international affairs, it is consciously "popular" in style. Yet, while he eschews both footnotes and reflective language, Minifie cuts deeply into his subject. If one is too often shaken by his use of such phrases as "more bang for a buck," and by an unfortunate redundancy in his plan of discussion, still his book does not finish either in handwringing or in judicious impotence. It is also apparent that he is perfectly familiar with a very wide range of the military measurements, speculations, and statistics, as well as with the major political arguments which bear upon the subject of his book. Thus it would be foolish (although not unprecedented in academic circles) to write off this volume as just another piece of brash journalism designed to exploit a popular mood. In fact, this book, together with the trend of opinion displayed in such media as *Maclean's* magazine and the *Toronto Star*, probably represents the most critical shift to be observed in mid-1960 Canadian political thought.

Mr. Minifie's thesis is that Canada should adopt at once a foreign policy of neutralism. "Neutralism," he argues, "does not mean pacifism. It means renunciation of war as continuation of diplomacy, and a refusal to participate with other powers in combinations designed to increase the power factor so that the outmoded Clausewitzian diplomacy can be continued." He accepts the argument (touched upon at various points in Knorr's book) that military power is no longer a valid means of influencing international relations—because that power now means ultimate resort to world-wide destruction. He argues that Canada has lost her independence of action to the United States—is in fact an American satellite—and that it is important for her to regain her independence. Important not from chauvinistic reasoning, but because the peace of the world and the advancement of the humanistic purposes shared by Canada and the United States require absolutely the dissolution of nuclear alliance systems which inevitably keep the world poised on the brink of annihilation.

Minifie's proposals are positive: the dissolution of NORAD, which provides potential targets and satellite status rather than military security for either Canada or the United States; withdrawal from NATO, whose limited usefulness is now clearly overshadowed by its militarism; and a much more extensive co-operation with other neutral states and with such groupings as the U.N., the Commonwealth, and the Organization of American States. The purpose envisaged by this last proposal is the building of effective bridges between the industrial democracies and the emergent and underdeveloped nations of Afro-Asia and Latin America—nations which are in the painful process of making a choice between communism and democracy. "The old East-West axis of struggle," he writes, "is dissolving. The lines of action now run North and South, from the industrialized half of the globe to the underdeveloped half. The future of the underdeveloped nations is as critical today for the world balance of power as the future of western Europe was twelve years ago. If western Europe had slid into the communist fold twelve years ago, the balance of power would have gone with it. The Marshall Plan was devised to prevent that. It succeeded splendidly."

The implications of this reasoning, including that concerning the changed nature of "power," seem clear enough to the present reviewer. Whether the more cautious academics are right when they assert that the risk implicit in abandoning the nuclear alliance is greater than that of continuing it remains a matter of opinion. But it is an area of opinion in which the advocates of being instantly ready to attack have a steadily diminishing support.

KENNETH MCNAUGHT

University of Toronto

## European

*The Idea of Reform.* By GERHART B. LADNER. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. xiv, 553. \$11.50.

HERE IS AN ANALYSIS of the idea of reform as it existed in the Christian tradition during the Patristic Age. Ladner begins by distinguishing reform from such related concepts as change and renewal and defines it as "free, intentional and ever perfectible, multiple, prolonged and ever repeated efforts by man to reassert and augment values pre-existent in the spiritual-material compound of the

world." (p. 35) Having obtained this definition and designated it Christian, Ladner undertakes to investigate notions of reform beginning with the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures and proceeding through early Christian writers and other sources *seriatim*. The virtues of this Herculean labour will be appreciated by any reader: vast erudition and an almost unbelievable accuracy. The defects will also be equally plain: a style which does not make the subject matter more appealing and footnotes which are often cluttered with irrelevant material and *obiter dicta* of dubious value.

There are, however, more serious considerations. It is not too much to say that while this work is an admirable compendium of ideas it has serious limitations. In the first place, the structure of the book itself, definition first and investigation second, perhaps explains why Ladner's definition of reform has prevented him from doing full justice to various elements within the Christian tradition. The discussion of Pauline doctrine, especially in its eschatological aspects, will not satisfy anyone even slightly acquainted with modern Pauline research. The chapters on the Greek theologians, for all their amplitude and formal correctness, are lacking in insight and true appreciation. Secondly, the entire study tends to ignore the dynamic interaction so characteristic of the relationship between Christianity and Graeco-Roman civilization from the beginning. For example, nowhere is any rigorous attempt made to determine how much the fully developed patristic ideas of reform owed to specifically Christian sources as opposed to classical sources. To put it differently, the fundamental problem of the "Hellenization of the Gospel" does not exist for Ladner. Again, it is not sufficient to explain the differences in Church-state doctrine between Eusebius of Caesarea and Augustine in purely theological terms ("Rather than to veil the chasm between heaven and earth by a sacred symbolism and ritualism in which the border line between the ruler's and the priest's functions was constantly shifting, Augustine wanted to point up the difference between that which is essentially celestial and that which was all too terrestrial." p. 267) and ignore the diverse paths travelled by East and West Rome since Diocletian. Again, Frend has argued in *The Donatist Church* that Augustine did not perceive the socio-economic roots of Donatism and was thus unable to deal with it effectively. Ladner replies that this is a wider problem involving "the whole relationship between wealth, culture and religion" (pp. 370-1, n. 22) and that "a man of the intellect and faith of Augustine was able largely to control his social conditioning." (p. 467) This is hardly convincing since it cannot be denied that Augustine became completely identified with the ruling classes of North Africa and ultimately the advocate of punitive measures against the Donatists. Similar objections might follow. In the end, the net effect of Ladner's investigation is to make the ambiguous role played by Christianity in the period of Roman decline in the West all the more ambiguous.

Yet, whatever the limitations inherent in this work, its great originality and importance cannot be denied. Ladner has called our attention to a group of ideas whose influence in the formation of our restlessly progressive culture has been profound and lasting. When we read that the concept of reform "presupposes the possibility at least that from the very depth of his dependence on God man can form something that he had possessed only potentially: new form . . ." (p. 436), who can resist speculating on the lines of descent from Prometheus, through Augustine, to Faust?

JOHN GORDON ROWE

Huron College  
University of Western Ontario

*The Defeat of the Spanish Armada.* By GARRETT MATTINGLY. London: Jonathan Cape [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. 382, maps. \$6.75.

SINCE THE APPEARANCE of Professor Mattingly's book late last year, this stimulating and impressive work has received enthusiastic endorsements from both literary critics and students of history. Such distinguished men as A. L. Rowse and J. H. Plumb have not spared the superlatives in their evaluation of this latest treatment of the Armada. Professor Plumb, for example, has described this work, in his review in the *Bookman*, as a "... faultless book; and one which most historians would have given half their working lives to have written." These accolades are, in the main, deserved by this fresh and fascinating treatment of an historical event which has become a part of the heritage of English-speaking peoples.

Professor Mattingly deserves our praise and gratitude for the manner in which scrupulous and exhaustive scholarship has been presented in a readable, exciting narrative characterized by an excellent style. We should be grateful for his conclusive demonstration that history is an art form, one in which imagination and literary skill are requisite to the recovery of any sense of the past. Through exercise of that gift for empathy which we call historical insight, the author has been able to rescue the age of the Armada from an increasingly stereotyped interpretation in which the great Enterprise is viewed merely as a phase in the struggle for naval and commercial supremacy. Surely, what men *thought* to be the essential meaning of the events and movements of their day is as necessary to our understanding of the past as our notions concerning the nature of historical causation.

Professor Mattingly has accomplished this recovery of the contemporary concern about the Armada and the events leading up to its sailing by investing this event with an ideological rather than economic character. Thus, for Mattingly, the battle in the Channel becomes "the focus of the first great international crisis of modern history." (p. 16) It was a crisis which denoted the transference of religious and political loyalties from the Church to the monarchies, the bases upon which were to be erected the abstract national state as the object of later loyalties. In viewing the Armada as the focal point around which old and new political and religious loyalties were to turn the author has probably approached nearer to the actual temper of those times than the generally accepted view of the battle in the Channel reveals. Rather interestingly he asserts that the much older historians, such as Froude and Motley, have penetrated more closely to the heart of the matter by arguing that the defeat of the Spanish fleet basically decided the failure of the efforts of the Counter-Reformation to triumph in Europe.

In keeping with his insistence on the ideological character of the struggle which the Armada symbolized, Professor Mattingly has devoted much of his book to a consideration of the various situations and personalities that played a part in making the Armada the *dénouement* of a drama filled with plots, calculations, and excitement. Beginning with the execution of Mary of Scotland in 1587 the scene shifts swiftly and graphically to Madrid, Paris, the Low Countries, and Rome. In addition to the usual *dramatis personae* of Philip, Drake, and Elizabeth, new characters are introduced whose aims and machinations made them central figures either in the preparation of the Armada or the attempt to thwart its sailing. Parma, Mendoza (ambassador to the Court of Henry III of France), Cardinal Allen, and the Duke of Guise are all introduced as significant players in this high drama. Thanks to Mattingly's insight and skill the Armada is revealed to us as the centre of a web of intrigue in which Spain and the forces of the Counter-Reformation manipulate the military and political situation in France and the

Low Countries for the purpose of rendering the Enterprise of England feasible. Parma's masterful operations in the Low Countries and the intrigues of the Guise, Valois, and Bourbon parties in France are skilfully woven into an absorbing story that carries historical as well as narrative conviction.

Mattingly's treatment of the significant personalities involved in these events contains some of the finest writing in the book but occasionally one feels that perhaps literary skill has not succeeded in revealing the true character and motives of two or three of the leading figures. One is grateful for a more sympathetic treatment of Philip II than is still to be found among most historians of the Anglo-Saxon world; yet, even Mattingly fails to evoke a completely convincing picture of this sombre and still slightly sinister figure. Perhaps it is an impossible task. One can accept only with reservations Mattingly's assertion that, in many ways, Drake and Philip were alike. Drake's arrogant identification of his will and cause with that of God's jars perceptibly with Philip the Prudent's reluctance to presume to know the will of the Almighty. His stoical acceptance of victory or submission to defeat has the ring of religious sincerity. Despite Mattingly's admirable attempt to understand the mind and motives of the Spanish sovereign, the traditional portrait of Philip still needs retouching. The author's assessments of Mary Stuart and Elizabeth sparkle with literary skill but, nonetheless, seem to suffer from the lack of clear delineation of character. For example, one doubts if the author's descriptions of the thoughts and feelings of Mary Stuart at her execution could be verified historically.

In his description and assessment of the defeat of the Armada, Professor Mattingly offers some corrections of the popular assumptions about this significant episode. The leader of the Armada, the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, is thoroughly rehabilitated; this Spanish grandee showed great courage and intelligence in carrying out his difficult and impossible responsibilities. The Spanish fought with magnificent bravery; their crescent formation proved most formidable until the introduction of fireships as the fleet lay anchored near Calais. Lord Howard's role in the running battle up the Channel is given more significance and Drake's participation is correspondingly reduced to its proper proportions. The English were far from being the underdogs as the usual text-book accounts would have it and they enjoyed the advantage of being close to a constant supply of reinforcements. Yet, the basic picture remains the same. The English had the best ships and the best guns; their morale, after a few anxious hours in the Channel, was to remain relatively high while the Spanish doubts about the possibility of victory were in evidence even before the fleet sailed from Spain.

W. H. STOCKDALE

University College  
University of Western Ontario

*Le Clergé de France et la monarchie: Etude sur les Assemblées Générales du Clergé de 1615 à 1666.* By PIERRE BLET, S. J. Preface by VICTOR-L. TAPIÉ. Analecta Gregoriana, vols. 106, 107. Rome: Librairie Editrice de l'Université Gregorienne. 1959. Pp. xii, 533, 468. \$10.00 the set.

IN THIS CAREFUL and judicious study Father Blet has established himself as an authority on seventeenth-century Gallicanism and contributed greatly to our knowledge of one of the least known periods of French history. Based on extensive archival research, the work provides a wealth of detail on the periodic granting of subsidies to the Crown by the financial assemblies of the French



clergy. In addition, it surveys the many religious and political problems of the French clergy whenever they became issues at the assembly meetings. The result is a fresh interpretation of French Gallicanism.

The author's thesis is that the clerical assemblies were largely able to steer a middle course between ultramontanist and subservience to royal absolutism, while being sympathetic to both Papacy and monarchy. Louis XIII's religious policies emerge as highly satisfactory to the clergy, while the Gallicanism of Louis XIV appears as more satisfactory to the royal judges in the Parlement of Paris than to either the clergy or the Crown.

While Father Blet's persuasive arguments tend to suppress one's reservations about his book, a few questions remain. One wonders why the clergy, with its wealth, organization, and international connections, was unable to use its power to vote subsidies to wrest more substantial concessions from the Crown than it did. There are answers in the study, but they are never quite pulled together. Another weakness is that the book deals with the clerical assemblies, while many issues of the Gallican clergy were debated and acted on outside as well as inside the assembly halls. Because of the subject of his study, the author has regrettably but necessarily had to restrict his discussion of Gallicanism in an arbitrary fashion.

Despite these reservations, the study must be recognized as a major revision of traditional interpretations of Gallicanism.

A. LLOYD MOOTE

University of Toronto

*A Crown of Fire: The Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola.* By PIERRE VAN PAASSEN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xxii, 330. \$4.95.

THIS BIOGRAPHY is pleasing and straightforward, as well as written in a most readable style for the general public by a Dutch man of letters. Mr. van Paassen admires his Dominican friar from Ferrara, who had greatness thrust upon him in Florence after the "revolution" (the flight of the Medici) in 1494. But he is not baselessly partisan; and the book may be recommended in general as an introduction to Renaissance Italy. Fra Girolamo was born (as his Ferrara monument says) *in tempi corrotti e servili dei vizi e dei tiranni flagellatore*: it is proper for insulated spirits to be reminded of such out-of-joint times. The theme of the godly democrat betrayed—predecessor of Mayor La Pira?—sounds more happily for us than that of the puritan reformer, the prophet to a chosen people. The Kingdom of God, as one of the friars of San Marco reminded his prior, cannot be forced. It may be that the prevalent clerical confusion between Old and New Rome was less reprehensible than that between Christian witness and spiritual McCarthyism; though those tempted to think of Florence in its brief sojourn under *Cristo nostra re* as the apotheosis of Toronto on Sunday might note that the friar did not condemn licensed brothels—though he wished to discourage streetwalking in Lent. (On the other hand, his attacks on sodomy are a classic example of the Christian conscience strayed out of its wits.) Lorenzo de Medici put the opposition case rather well: "I respect the Friar, but I do not think his piety and poverty sufficient guarantees for religious or political infallibility."

In retelling the story, Mr. van Paassen raises once again the classic theme of the use and abuse of Christian liberty and witness; and he looks for the beatification of the Friar by John XXIII—strait, thus far, has been the Vatican gate. Savonarola is usually compared with Calvin and Knox. It is good to be

reassured that, perhaps because he was Italian, he is more attractive than either: *le mie cose erano poche ma grandi*.

H. C. PORTER

Selwyn College, Cambridge

*Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to the Emperor Charles V.* By HAYWARD KENISTON. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1960. Pp. xvi, 463. \$9.50.

IT IS RATHER SURPRISING that a man as important as Francisco de los Cobos, who was for thirty years secretary to Charles V and for a large part of that time one of the most influential figures in the imperial administration, has not hitherto found a biographer. One reason for this neglect is no doubt to be found in the enormous mass of correspondence which a biographer must wade through, as Professor Keniston has done with incredible industry. The correspondence, moreover, despite its bulk, is curiously unrewarding from the point of view of a biographer. Not only is much of it official, as one might expect, but Cobos himself carefully destroyed all personal letters. The result is that we see the secretary, but can only dimly perceive the man behind the office. The career of Cobos, too, like that of his imperial master, presents a further problem for the biographer. Closely attached to the emperor by the nature of his duties, Cobos had to follow Charles in his perpetual wanderings from one to another of his many lands. The extraordinary complexity of Charles's empire was reflected in the correspondingly complex duties of his principal secretary. Professor Keniston has attempted to solve the problem by an annalistic method, following the activity of Cobos year by year, almost day by day at times. What emerges is a mass of detailed information in which even the most conscientious reader may find himself bogged down. Time and again the story of imperial government is interrupted to note favours or rewards granted to Cobos or to his innumerable friends and relations. These were doubtless important to their recipients, but their significance has paled somewhat with the passage of four centuries. Detailed information of any sort, it is true, may always prove useful to some student of the period; but for most historians Professor Keniston's work will be of interest principally for the view it affords of the inner workings of the imperial secretariat. Even this, however, might have emerged more clearly if the author had been more selective in his use of detail and if he had more frequently embodied the results of his research in generalized statement.

WALLACE K. FERGUSON

University of Western Ontario

*From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials: Government Policy and Public Opinion in the Habsburg Dominions in the Period of the French Revolution.* By ERNST WANGERMANN. Oxford Historical Series, Second Series, edited by R. W. SOUTHERN, J. S. WATSON, and R. B. WERNHAM. London and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 212. \$3.75.

THIS SHORT MONOGRAPH possesses every virtue that such a book can have. It is the result of two years' work in the archives at Vienna, provides new knowledge, and has far-reaching implications for general history. It does for the Habsburg empire, and most especially the Austro-Bohemian provinces, what historians in Italy, Switzerland, Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere have recently been doing for

these countries, by showing the strength of native groups with ideas like those of the French Revolution.

The author begins with a survey of the "Fourth" Estate, the unprivileged townspeople and peasants corresponding to the French Third, during the reign of Joseph II. He finds more political consciousness, more effects of the Enlightenment, more opposition to aristocracy and clergy, and more knowledge of the world and of the French Revolution than it has been common for historians to attribute to the burghers and peasants of the Habsburg empire. These classes, appealed to and in a sense awakened by Joseph II in his struggle against the privileged orders, soon went beyond anything that Joseph would grant, objecting to his arbitrariness, his Turkish war, and the ensuing high prices and bread shortages. The rise of this sentiment which the author calls "democratic," as distinct from the neo-feudal resurgence of the Estates, made enlightened despotism unworkable.

Leopold II, reigning from 1790 to 1792, is interpreted not merely as a philosophical prince but an intelligent ruler with an understanding of practical needs. While he pacified the Hungarian estates and other privileged groups with concessions, he also favoured, and even solicited, a little democratic agitation (but not too much), as a balance against them. The author concludes that Leopold, before his death, was on his way to winning the confidence of the unprivileged classes.

Francis II, by a "senseless" war against revolutionary France, became "the gravedigger of enlightened despotism in Austria." Leopold had already aroused opposition by his famous Declaration of Pillnitz. Wangermann revises the somewhat counter-revolutionary view that much modern historiography derives from Sorel, to the effect that the Declaration of Pillnitz was an innocuous document of which the French revolutionaries hardly needed to be afraid. He shows its anti-revolutionary intent, and the alarm of the Austrian as well as the French peasants and middle classes. The war of 1792 was unpopular in Austria, and remained so. The government, to maintain the war effort, made further concessions to the aristocracy and clergy, intensified police repression and censorship, and magnified the spectre of subversive activity.

The Austrian "Jacobins," however, as distinct from some of those in Hungary, had no revolutionary programme. They had no contacts with French or other revolutionaries. They were simply men of democratic views who under police repression continued to meet in private. Their arrest and condemnation was followed by other ruinously "conservative" measures: more severe censorship, clerical influence in the schools, and laws to check urban growth, economic expansion, and new factories, which might promote disaffection. The *Vormärz* in Austria dates from 1794.

Such are some of the main theses in this model of condensed thoughtfulness and careful documentation, which brings powerful support to the idea of a Europe-wide struggle of "democratic" forces against aristocracies to which kings and clergy had become allied in the 1790's.

R. R. PALMER

Princeton University

*Bismarck's Rival: A Political Biography of General and Admiral Albrecht von Stosch.* By FREDERIC B. M. HOLLYDAY. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 316. \$7.50.

ORIGINALLY a doctoral dissertation, Hollyday's biography of Stosch, the reputedly

liberal candidate for the Imperial Chancellorship and the first chief of the Imperial Admiralty, sets out to make an important contribution to German history. Hollyday has drawn upon the published material on the Bismarckian period and the unpublished second and third volumes of Stosch's diary, but he has excluded from his bibliography so important a book as Egmont Zechlin's *Die Staatsstreicheplaene Bismarcks und Wilhelms II.* Unfortunately, Hollyday has presented his readers with a work of uneven quality. He makes a real contribution by drawing together a number of important episodes and by throwing new light on them, by exploring the workings of the complex governmental machinery of the Bismarckian empire, and by rectifying the distorted view of Stosch's political position. The first chapter which describes the problems confronting an aspiring young officer of modest means and a liberal reputation is good; so are chapters seven and eight which deal with Stosch's activity after his resignation from the Imperial Admiralty in 1883; particularly illuminating is the discussion of Stosch's relations with Emperor Frederick III. Moreover, Hollyday has succeeded in dispelling the aspersions cast upon Stosch by Bismarck and his admirers who attempted to depict him as an egotistical intriguer and a doctrinaire liberal. Yet his own portrayal of Stosch as a loyal monarchist, a conservative, and a nationalist is not entirely convincing, for much of his evidence fails to support his case. Stosch's position after 1883 was perhaps more conservative than it had been earlier, particularly when he had come to adhere to Bismarck's view that the Social Democrats had to be crushed by force and that the Empress Frederick was an unfavourable influence. Yet Stosch regretted the emasculation of political life by Bismarck, desired the introduction of ministerial responsibility and the broadening of the powers of the *Reichstag*, and was in his younger days pro-British. If such views did not make a German of the Bismarckian period a liberal, what would? One will also wonder if Stosch wanted to reconcile William I and the Crown Prince because of any profound adhesion to the monarchical cause, or because he had repeatedly experienced the disadvantages of being the Crown Prince's friend while he opposed his father and Bismarck. Nor does Stosch's desire to find a successor to Bismarck who would be strong enough to stand up to William II support the author's contention that "he always rejected any weakening of the Crown's prerogative." (p. 285) This reviewer also feels that the author does not adequately explore the reasons for the hostility between Bismarck and Stosch. Although Stosch does not emerge from this book as a particularly able political figure (apart from some of his observations), he must have had real military and administrative talents to have reached the rank of general and to have held for a number of years the position of chief of the Admiralty. Yet Hollyday fails to do justice to these aspects of Stosch's activity. The reader is thus left with the impression that Stosch's greatest claim to fame was neither his ability (which the author fails to show) nor his challenge to Bismarck's position (which the author refutes), but the dislike taken to him by the Iron Chancellor.

There are several instances of confused expression and inconsistency. Hollyday twice makes a point and then contradicts it. On page 17 he cites the young Stosch's opinion that the "German-Christian element" could only control German Poland by "exterminating all Philistines," but states a few lines down that "the opinion formed at this time led him later to oppose the Prussianization of German Poland." On page 97 he states that when serving with the German occupation army in France, Stosch led "a relatively quiet life," but proceeds to say half a page down that he returned to Berlin, "his brief but tempestuous service with the occupation army concluded." In including the negotiations of Saxony's adhesion

to the North German Confederation in his book (pp. 49-57), Hollyday bogs down in diplomatic detail and entirely loses sight of Stosch's role in them. However, in spite of its shortcomings, this book casts new light on the Bismarckian period and should therefore be consulted by all of its serious students.

IVO N. LAMBI

University of Omaha

*Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras.* By MICHAEL CURTIS. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. vi, 313. \$6.90.

DRIVING THREE temperamental horses in harness must always be something of a problem, and Mr. Curtis has his in this book. But Max Beloff has already said enough unpleasant (and perhaps even untrue) things about it. And if there is anything much to be quarrelled with about the writing, it seems to me to follow more from the impossibility of talking about three different people at once than from the literary talents of the author. They didn't like the parliamentary Republic, and that was about all they had in common all the way. They all disliked its decadence, although Barrès was the more ready to tolerate the Revolution and democracy. All agreed on the need for action, but not on any particular course of action. Their divergences make interesting reading, but do they make a theme for a book? One can't help feeling that Mr. Curtis's best chapters are those where he does not have to keep grouping and marshalling them like so many rustic recruits. His device is his undoing, for his knowledge is very great, his selection of evidence admirable, and his general introduction to his detailed examination of his men an excellent approach to the Third Republic. He presents his subjects as archetypal characters in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, forerunners of other Europeans who would do more harm, exponents of Julian Benda's observation that "the modern age was typified by the intellectual organization of political hatreds." But for all their irrationalism, blindness, and extreme unfairness, he concedes that they performed a service in revealing the weakness of the régime's foundation. A service, Mr. Curtis believes, which was not appreciated or taken to heart. Inevitably in such an analytical account, there is some repetition, perhaps too much here: one gets a bit weary going around and around, taking up one and then another, on this and then on that; one has the impression that this is where one came in, even when it isn't. But the study itself is worthwhile, and the skill with which this discussion of the critical trio is carried off seems to augur well for Mr. Curtis's next book—which will, I hope, have a less diffuse theme.

JOHN C. CAIRNS

University of Toronto

*The Future as History.* By ROBERT HEILBRONER. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1960. Pp. 217. \$5.00.

ALTHOUGH THIS BOOK bears the subtitle, "The historic currents of our time and the direction in which they are taking America," the reasoning of the author is no less applicable to Canada or, for that matter, to the Western world than it is to the United States. It is, in fact, a plea to those elements in the West—and

they are strongest in North America—who stubbornly refuse to recognize that the set of historic influences at the present time and for the foreseeable future is unlikely to be that which has characterized the development of several past generations, and that, therefore, to prognosticate the future on the basis of a belief in the continuation of such familiar and desired influences is to put ourselves into a dangerous state of unreality and to invite continuous and intense disillusionment.

Like many other liberal rationalists who have been forced to reconsider their outlook in the light of post-1914 history Mr. Heilbroner though retaining his hopes has found himself required to postpone their realization until some distant time. The present prospect and that of the next few generations, he asserts, is tragic for those whose past centres in the Western world and its traditions. He talks of "the closing-in of history," meaning the coming into effect of unanticipated developments: the regimenting and other unhappy impacts of the machinery of war and of technology in general, the violence of the leap into freedom of colonial and underdeveloped nations, the submergence of the individual—all of these and other developments tending to take us away from rather than towards the society of which liberals and rationalists have dreamed since the eighteenth century. There has been a failure on the part of those immersed in such ideals to see history as it really has been, hence a failure to foresee the possible coming of these unpleasant events.

In this book Mr. Heilbroner joins the long list of those who have always seen history as fundamentally a study of the past which enables men to prepare themselves for the future. This line stretches back at least to Thucydides. In his sombre reflections the author is nearer to that ancient Greek than he is to his admired spiritual forebear, the Marquis de Condorcet, though by deferring the progress he hopes for to the distant future he maintains his foothold in the ranks of those who anticipate earthly salvation. This book is another chapter, a thoughtfully reasoned one, in the painful reassessment of history and of our place in it which is being forced upon all thinking people.

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS

University of Toronto

## British

*The Elizabethans and America.* By A. L. ROWSE. The Trevelyan Lectures at Cambridge, 1958. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1959. Pp. xiv, 222. \$5.00.

THE CHOICE of A. L. ROWSE to inaugurate the Trevelyan Lectures at Cambridge was an honour richly deserved. It was also a challenge, as Rowse understood. In his preface he speaks of G. M. Trevelyan's work as "a model of integrity in scholarship and of accomplishment in art," and is patently aware that lectures bearing Trevelyan's name may be held to his high standards.

The scholarship of *The Elizabethans and America* is above reproach. The author does not provide new material or strikingly new interpretations. But he knows his subject intimately; he has absorbed the latest contributions of others and makes several of his own, particularly in emphasizing the role played by the



Queen. He is as much at home with cartographers and pamphleteers as with the actual colonizers, and treats them all with far more tolerance than he sometimes shows. Even the Puritans of Massachusetts, uncongenial as they are to him, evoke few of the patronizing or angry *obiter dicta* with which he damns all extremists in *The Expansion of Elizabethan England*. He is no longer fighting the cause of the moderates but telling a story.

The title of the story is deceptive because much of it is not in the strict sense Elizabethan at all. The first three chapters sketch the prelude to colonization; the remaining five, on such subjects as Virginia, New England, the Northwest Passage, and the impact of America on British culture, run into the Stuart period. Any narrative of colonization must obviously have its focus after 1603, but then why call it Elizabethan? The author's answer, repeatedly implied, seems to be that the subjects of James I and Charles I were in essence Elizabethan. Perhaps they were in Massachusetts, where his case for the persistence of "the Elizabethan element" is a strong one. Outside that cultural island, however, the world was changing by the 1620's. Smythe and Sandys and Gorges, Bacon and Donne, had of course grown to manhood under Elizabeth; yet if that made them Elizabethans for the rest of their lives, many of us today are living in the era of King and Chamberlain and Roosevelt.

As an accomplishment in art this book is disappointing. Its occasional obscurities in syntax are outweighed by the general vivacity of style, but Rowse falls down at the hurdle that tests all historians—the use of detail. His curiosity about the people he describes, engaging in itself, produces such a wealth of information that the theme is often lost in gossip. Gorges, for instance, is scarcely introduced before he is shouldered aside by members of his clan (pp. 90–2); an overly minute discussion of John Winthrop's forebears is interrupted by the appearance of "the curious, the asinine [and the utterly irrelevant] William Alabaster." (pp. 140–1) At such moments—and they are many—the reader has as little focus as if he were perusing a sprightly biographical dictionary. The result is entertaining enough, but it is a far cry from the masterly technique of a Trevelyan.

W. B. WILLCOX

University of Michigan

*Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth*. By CONYERS READ. London: Jonathan Cape [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited]. 1959. Pp. 599. \$12.25.

THE LATE PROFESSOR READ'S two-volume study of William Cecil is now complete, and there can be no doubt whatever that Read knew more about Cecil than any person now living. I doubt that Read overlooked anything significant that Cecil ever committed to writing, or any aspect of the man's life and career for which the evidence still exists. Everything is there, or nearly everything—the major themes, many of the minor ones, even some obscure themes—in detail, accurately recorded, and judiciously interpreted. From Cecil as Secretary and mere commoner, as he was in the first volume up to 1570, the focus changes in the second volume to Cecil as peer and Lord Treasurer, the head of the Exchequer and the Court of Wards, spokesman of the Crown in the Lords, and above all else, for forty years the indestructible and most favoured counsellor of the magnificent Elizabeth. He understood her better than anyone else ever did. He never annoyed her the way Walsingham did, or the way her favourites, Leicester and Essex did, by trying to coerce her. He suffered disgrace only once,

when he decided for her to carry out the execution of Mary Stuart, that "bosom serpent," for him the most reptilian of all England's enemies. In everything else he never forgot in his whole life that only his mistress would in the end decide and act, despite her apparent indecision and delay. Views he had on everything, but all his views were moderate and English, as indeed, Elizabeth's were too. Differences in emphasis they would experience, and their prejudices varied too; he was more anti-Catholic than she, for example, and she more anti-Puritan than he. Yet, Elizabeth valued him for his "circumspection, stoutness, wisdom, dexterity, integrity of life, providence, care and faithfulness," as she herself put it in her patent for his barony of Burghley. And at the end of his life, dying of gout, his arms too weak to use, she came to his bedside and fed him with a spoon. It was a fitting gesture of affection for the man who had so devotedly helped her to create the Church of England, divorce Scotland from France, unmask the Counter-Reformation in its many disguises, come to terms with France, and wreck the Spanish state. Indeed, together, they more than any others, saved the English state. It is a magnificent story, and though it is painful to have to say it, a great pity that Professor Read did not tell it with more style. He clearly admired Cecil, but there is little emotion in his admiration. The book is badly wanting in passion and imaginative expression. On every subject its judgments are sound, but they are stated with so much reserve, or so drably sometimes, that they too often lose their impact. The admirable body of otherwise inaccessible Cecilian prose on every conceivable subject is certainly welcome, but it is too often badly worked into the fabric of Professor Read's narrative. Above all, the paragraph structure of the book is extremely faulty. Neither the eye nor the mind can easily cope with single sentence paragraphs, one right after another, over and over again. Only persistence and intense concentration on the part of the reader will overcome these difficulties, so that the grandeur of the subject, and its drama, will in the end triumph.

W. W. PIEPENBURG

University of Toronto

1859: *Entering an Age of Crisis*. Edited by PHILIP APPLEMAN, WILLIAM A. MADDEN, and MICHAEL WOLFF. Introduction by HOWARD MUMFORD JONES. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1959. Pp. 320. \$6.75.

"WE KNOW that some people have a distaste for centennials because they provide occasion for collections of essays—and that some people simply dislike collections of essays." In this provocatively modest way the editors introduce their book. It is really a remarkably good collection, perhaps because it is written mostly by younger scholars who have been doing historical research in British Victorian society rather than re-reading the nineteenth-century classics over again. Nearly every essay makes one wish for a further, more comprehensive treatment of the ideas advanced in it. What holds the essays together is the leading idea that 1859 formed a sort of watershed in the Victorian age, and that from that time on the student can discern more and more clearly the critical doubts and dissensions which have culminated in our own age of confusion.

Nearly every essay in the volume might be said to stem from the two great works published in 1859, Darwin's *Origin of Species* and Mill's *On Liberty*. The most penetrating chapter in the book seems to me to be that of Noel Annan on "Science, Religion and the Critical Mind." The Provost of King's College takes

Darwin's epoch-making work as the culmination and final triumph of the dominant empirical positivist tradition in English thought, and analyses its effect upon British religious thought. This theme is carried on by several other contributors whose combined efforts make one realize how badly we need a new systematic study of the conflict of science and religion in the later nineteenth century. In this part of the book the one disappointing essay is that of Basil Willey who has written so much on these topics that he seems now to have settled down to a weary rest in the sentimental consolations of religion.

In the part of the book that stems from Mill the main theme is naturally the coming of mass democracy. There is a very thoughtful study of the *Liberty* essay by R. B. McCallum, another by Richard D. Altick on the "Literature of an Imminent Democracy," and another by William A. Madden on the artist's sense of alienation. But it is rather unfair to pick out particular essays when all are so good and all remind us of how much our age has in common with this period just after 1859. One other essay must, however, be mentioned because it is by a Canadian historical student, Professor J. B. Conacher of Toronto. He shows in a very interesting analysis how the year 1859 marks the emergence of the classical two-party system of Liberals and Conservatives out of the political confusion of the 1850's. Altogether this volume is a brilliant demonstration of the usefulness of the young historical quarterly published at Indiana University, *Victorian Studies*.

FRANK H. UNDERHILL

*Edmund Burke and Ireland.* By THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xvi, 413. \$9.00.

BURKE'S CAREER in parliament synchronized with one of the most important and most troubled periods in the history of Anglo-Irish relations. When he entered the House of Commons the nationalist movement, stimulated by events in America, was just becoming an active force. When he retired some thirty years later, the hollowness of Grattan's victory was fully revealed, the disastrous incident of the appointment and speedy recall of Lord Fitzwilliam had just occurred, and the country was in the throes of a revolutionary struggle that would lead on to the rebellion of 1798 and the Act of Union. Almost inevitably Burke was forced into the position of an unofficial spokesman for Irish interests at Westminster, a task which he did not greatly relish, but which he performed ably and conscientiously during these years of crisis.

Some part of this history has been related in other books. Mr. Mahoney's is the first serious and scholarly attempt to examine the evidence in its entirety, and to draw some conclusions about Burke's ideas on this most difficult of imperial problems. He has had access to material either not available to, or not extensively used by, earlier writers; and the book will be valued in part for the many striking passages quoted from unpublished letters and other sources. Its merits are its thoroughness and the clear and orderly way in which the material is presented. Its weakness, perhaps not a very serious one, is that it is rather too simply a chronological narrative, rich in detail and well documented, but written with little or no thought of relating Burke's activities in this field to the whole body of his ideas on such matters as law, government, national societies, imperial relations, and the like.

Burke was never an Irish nationalist in the contemporary sense of that term. He was unsparing in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of Dublin Castle and its agents, but he accepted the existing relationship as sound in principle, and resolutely opposed any attempt to change it. The ideas of the "patriots," self-appointed leaders of a "Protestant nation," filled him with alarm; and more than once he pleaded for some one to "put a stop to that madman Grattan." Although he was generally regarded as the Rockingham party's expert on Irish affairs, he took no part in the constitutional settlements which they carried out in 1782. Mr. Mahoney offers no very adequate explanation for this but it seems probable that only party loyalty prevented Burke from openly opposing a change on the ground that it removed Ireland from "the common constitutional protection of the Empire." His own statements, frequently quoted in this book, afford some evidence of just what that protection had meant through the whole period since 1689. This chapter, and that which follows, on the proposed commercial treaty of 1785, are the least satisfactory in the book. The rather sketchy account of the latter episode entirely fails to explain the political situation and the economic issues involved, either in England, or in Ireland.

It was in his tireless campaign to secure the repeal of the penal laws against the Irish Catholics that Burke was most consistent. That was a subject on which he held deep and unshakeable convictions. His stand on this matter brought him into accord and co-operation with Grattan and his party after 1782, a circumstance which did nothing to commend his arguments to Pitt and his fellow ministers. The question impinged closely upon that of the appointment of Lord Fitzwilliam; and some of the most original and illuminating material in this book is taken from the correspondence on that subject. Mr. Mahoney is inclined to put the emphasis on Burke's natural tolerance. That need not be discounted, but the explanation goes deeper than that. His first essay on the subject, *Tracts relative to the Popery Laws*, is in effect an argument that such enactments, depriving the great majority of a people of the most elementary rights of citizenship, are a negation of the very idea of law as the basis of organized society. Other arguments were added, especially in the 1790's, and they are fully dealt with here; but from that position he never deviated.

Mr. Mahoney's sympathies are clearly with Burke and the people whose cause he espoused; but he is not uncritical, and his narrative is marked by a high degree of objectivity. The writing is generally clear, straightforward, and suited to the matter, but there are some curious lapses into colloquialism. The statement, for example, that the *Reflections on the French Revolution* "made quite a hit with George III" is no doubt accurate; but it is not quite the sort of appraisal one would expect in such a book.

D. J. McDOUGALL

University of Toronto

*The Fall of Parnell, 1890-91.* By F. S. L. LYONS. Studies in Irish History, Second Series, I, edited by T. W. MOODY, J. C. BECKETT, and T. D. WILLIAMS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 362. \$6.50.

IN MODERN IRISH HISTORY the downfall of Charles Stewart Parnell stands out as an event of the greatest political and psychological significance. The impact of Parnell's personal tragedy—total and irrevocable—profoundly affected the politics of his own generation. Moreover, as W. B. Yeats's "Parnell's Funeral," Sean O'Casey's *I Knock at the Door*, and almost all of James Joyce's major books testify,

Parnell's romantic image—whether it be that of Samson pulling down the pillars of the temple or that of a murdered Caesar—has never lost its hold over the most inspired Irish imaginations. While Parnell's personal crisis has had endless fascination for the young in heart of all ages, Professor Lyons has eschewed it for the broader issues of national policy which *O'Shea v. O'Shea* brought out into the open. Any study of the Parnell split must necessarily concern itself with more than the clash of personalities. It must examine such fundamental problems as the role of the Catholic Church in Irish politics, the organization and management of a democratic Irish parliamentary party, and the relation of that party to government, to British political parties, and to public opinion in both England and Ireland. Although limiting himself to the period between the hearing of the divorce case in November, 1890, and Parnell's death in the following October, Professor Lyons has addressed himself to all of these problems with a sensitivity and understanding of one who is the complete master of his material. For example, Lyons relates the Parnell crisis to a reaction of the Irish hierarchy to the groundswell of anti-clericalism that swept over Catholic Europe during the late nineteenth century. That anti-clericalism did not develop in Ireland as it did elsewhere, Lyons attributes to two circumstances. First, outside of Dublin city, Parnellites were a minority; and, second, Gladstone had provided Irishmen with a perfectly intelligible political argument for opposing Parnell.

To be sure, *The Fall of Parnell, 1890-91*, is a book that all devotees of the Victorian period cannot afford to ignore and one that most students of late nineteenth-century Church history can read with great profit.

R. E. BURNS

University of Notre Dame  
Notre Dame, Indiana

*Queen Mary, 1867-1953.* By JAMES POPE-HENNESSY. London: George Allen and Unwin Limited [Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons (Canada) Limited]. 1959. Pp. 685, map, table. \$9.00.

TWO-THIRDS of this long and interesting book are devoted to the years before the accession of George V, one-half to the late Victorian era. Mr. Pope-Hennessy is extraordinarily successful in bringing to life again the royal society of those long vanished days in which Princess "May," the future Queen Mary, was born and brought up. The task is made possible by the survival of a surprising amount of family correspondence which the biographer puts to good use in a very skilful piece of reconstruction. The substantial scaffolding on which the edifice is raised remains well concealed, except to the student who wants to consult the 46 closely packed pages of references, mostly to primary sources, hidden in the back of the book. One source that he delights to parade in the open for his reader's amusement, however, is the cattiest of diaries kept by one Lady Geraldine Somerset, lady-in-waiting to the dowager Duchess of Cambridge, who could not abide the Teck family, gloated over their discomfitures and squirmed at their successes.

One of the incidental merits of the book is the light that it sheds on the old Queen, Victoria, as head of the family, and, it would seem, as the wisest and most sensible member of it. Mr. Pope-Hennessy seeks to explode the myth of Queen Victoria as an austere and alarming old lady. "She was neither," he writes. "She was primarily benevolent and anxious for others to be happy," and the numerous extracts he culls from her family correspondence bear out this judgment.

Although George III had fifteen children, Queen Victoria, his eldest grandchild, had only four royal cousins of whom but two lived in England, the Duke of Cambridge of military fame, and his sister, the popular Princess Mary Adelaide, a high-spirited, warm-hearted, but unbusinesslike lady with a penchant for living beyond her means. Her great size (even in her youth a sharp-eyed American ambassador at the Court of St. James estimated her weight as at least 250 pounds) made the search for a suitable husband somewhat difficult, but eventually one was found in the person of Prince Franz of Teck, a colourless nonentity who spent his life bemoaning his father's morganatic marriage and rearranging the furniture in his wife's various abodes. Princess May was the eldest child and only daughter of this strange couple. Shy and retiring, she found solace, especially when financial straits drove her family into temporary exile in Italy, in books and works of art. Naturally sensitive and possessed of an orderly mind she reacted against her mother's unbusinesslike habits, but she was always a loyal and devoted daughter, who, as she grew older, was of great assistance to her mother in the latter's numerous charitable activities.

Princess May of Teck was born and bred an English princess and England was always her home, but her girlhood was marked by numerous visits to German relatives in their various *Schlösser*, which her biographer describes with vivid detail that brings to life a world long extinct. The Wales family looked upon their poor Teck cousins rather condescendingly, but when the problem arose of finding a suitable wife for Prince Eddy, the indolent and dissipated eldest son of the Prince of Wales, Princess May was suddenly seen in a new light as the sensible girl most likely to succeed in keeping the wayward heir to the throne safely on the right road—much more so than the unfortunate Orleanist (and Catholic) princess with whom he had fallen in love. May had always looked upon her Wales cousins as rather rowdy and juvenile, but she accepted her duty readily, only to be relieved at the last moment by the prince's sudden death. She was considerably embarrassed when Queen Victoria, her mother, and public opinion all immediately substituted Prince George, the new heir, as the proper suitor for her hand. She had always been on closer terms with cousin George, however, and when that sober and solid young prince proposed she willingly accepted him.

Although her tastes were more sophisticated, their ideals and their beliefs were similar and they proved a well-matched couple who developed a deep and abiding love for each other which survived the challenge of two self-centred mothers-in-law, George's possessive "Motherdear" and May's irrepressible "Mama." Her biographer emphasizes that for the serious-minded young princess, who was to become Queen Mary in 1910, it was to be a life where private inclinations were to be subordinated to her sense of duty as a wife and a queen. He says little of the reign which has been so well described by Sir Harold Nicolson, but it is clear that King George was not an easy person to live with. His letters show how greatly he appreciated her loyalty and devotion, but he did little to ease the strain for her and she had to accommodate herself to his narrow and austere way of life.

As we come closer to the present, with people still living and the available correspondence scarcer, Mr. Pope-Hennessy's touch becomes less sure and his lavish praise of his heroine less convincing. (One doubts for example that she was really of as great assistance to Mr. Attlee in the economic crisis of 1947 as is suggested on page 615.) For all her understanding and good sense, the inhibitions created by the strange family life in which she had been reared and the straight-jacket imposed by her insensitive husband and by the official demands of her position combined to prevent her making that full contact which is the secret of



a happy relationship between parent and child. As a result when the sad hour of crisis came she was powerless to influence or advise her eldest son and was shocked beyond measure at what she considered his abandonment of duty.

From this perceptive book Queen Mary emerges as a traditionalist greatly attached to the historic background and connections of the numerous institutions, places, and works of art which crossed the path of her life. Her natural conservatism was tempered by a strong social sense and by a surprising readiness to adapt herself to changing times. The new world of the twentieth century might seem a strange one, but she would not let it leave her behind. Her more narrow-minded husband had put an end to her one attempt to learn the fox trot in the twenties, but in her last years she was capable of enjoying such popular musicals as *Oklahoma* and *Annie get your Gun*. To those of us who first remember her as "the Queen" this book will help to transform her in retrospect into a person of flesh and blood, who served her country well but who also possessed a very human personality of her own.

J. B. CONACHER

University of Toronto

*The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910.* By L. M. THOMPSON. London and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. xvi, 549. \$7.50.

POLITICAL and constitutional history is no longer in its former dominant position. Some may question, therefore, the value of having a five hundred-page volume devoted to the origins of the present constitution of the Union of South Africa, when so many other aspects of South African history have barely been touched. In this case, Professor Thompson's work is its own defence: within the rather narrow field with which it claims to deal, it is a model of historical investigation. And Professor Thompson's view is somewhat broader than the title might indicate. He is concerned not simply with the political unification of the four South African colonies, but with the whole pattern of white South African politics and the play of forces in bringing about the South Africa Act of 1910. The core of the book is necessarily the proceedings of the National Convention itself, and Professor Thompson's account of these technically secret discussions occupies more than 130 pages of the work. His more important contribution, however, is the detailed analysis of the sentiments, attitudes, and ultimate aspirations of all those who had a hand in creating the Union—going back to Milner and his "Kindergarten" and carrying the account through the first general election under the new constitution. It is based on a very wide consultation of private papers of prominent South Africans, as well as the archives of the South African colonies, and some British sources. The only apparent missing source is the manuscript records of the British government, which were still closed after 1902 at the time the research was completed.

Even beyond the uncovering of new information, Professor Thompson's work is valuable for the attitude with which he has approached the topic. Unlike some of the older legalistic constitutional studies, or the "rise-and-progress" school of historical writing with an implicit nationalist slant, Thompson began with the assumption that South Africa is not now a healthy society. He asks, more explicitly, whether a wrong turning may not have been taken in constitutional decisions reached after the Boer War. He shows that they were based in part on the widely held belief that Afrikaners and British South Africans would be fused together into a single nationality, which turned out to be a false assumption. It

was also based on a serious failure to take account of the fact that South Africa was a plural society with a submerged majority of non-Europeans. Neither of these problems was met very well by the creation of a flexible parliamentary system in a unitary state. The society was too diverse to be safely entrusted to the parliamentary majority of the day. He concludes that a federal system, and a system closer to the American than to the English model, might have helped to protect the rights of minorities by the division of powers between branches of the government and between the states. One might argue that the problems of South Africa were not likely to be solved as late as 1910 by any kind of political expedient, but this is another and broader question than the one Professor Thompson has chosen to answer. His book is likely to stand for many years as the definitive work in its field.

PHILIP D. CURTIN

University of Wisconsin

*Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-war Change, 1939-1952.* By NICHOLAS MANSEERGH. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. xvi, 469. \$9.50.

*Commonwealth Perspectives.* By NICHOLAS MANSEERGH, ROBERT WILSON, et al. Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center Publications, no. 8. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press [Toronto: Burns and MacEachern]. 1958. Pp. x, 214. \$5.95.

SOME HISTORIANS of the modern Commonwealth describe its growth in sharply defined stages. In his lectures at Duke University, Professor Frank Underhill divided his theme into the Liberal Victorian Empire, the First Commonwealth, which developed after the First World War, and the Second Commonwealth, which emerged after 1945. Nicholas Mansergh in his two admirable surveys is compelled to break his subject into two chronological periods, 1931-9 and 1939-52, but he is at pains to emphasize that these periods are not intended to suggest watersheds that sharply separate one phase of Commonwealth history from another. He rejects any notion of a historical series of British empires or a series of Commonwealths. In his first volume he remarked that "the transformation of Empire into Commonwealth was both real and possible not on account of some great watershed that divided the present from the past, but because the history of the old British Empire, its evolution towards autonomy and equality, provided the solid and indispensable foundation upon which the Commonwealth of the future could be built."

In the second volume of his survey, with which we are concerned here, Professor Mansergh examines profound changes that seem revolutionary; but throughout he is anxious to show that they resulted from evolution. They are rendered possible only by the former basic character of the Commonwealth, and they simply illustrate its capacity to maintain a unity of purpose in the trials of the war; an equal capacity after the war to adapt itself to the powerful drives of nationalism in Asia and Africa; and likewise a capability to preserve cohesion and purpose in a world where the balance of power had become transformed. In all this the Commonwealth was evolving in harmony with an inner logic of its own. Professor Mansergh not merely describes what happened in the critical years 1939-52. He dispassionately probes into the forces and ideas which underlie events. His volume has no rival.

The primary force throughout the period is, of course, nationalism. This book tells about its manifestations and the factors which shaped its character. It relates how the Japanese conquests inflamed it in southeast Asia and thus accelerated the transition to independence in countries like Burma, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. It was not simply that the diffusion of nationalist feeling undermined the foundations of the old imperial régime and made its survival impossible. In Britain itself the will for such a régime was sapped by the national sacrifices of the Japanese war. Why hold such hostages to fortune as imperial territories which want to be free? For this question the British Labour party and many in the Conservative party had a decisive answer.

As Professor Mansergh illustrates nationalism was not simply a factor in the East. In the older dominions it was stimulated by the war into new forms, all of which expressed the idea of national autonomy. Before 1939 the Commonwealth had not been a super state; it now resembled even less a super state. By 1952 it was a society of genuinely independent but co-operative nations. As a consequence its older internal cohesion diminished, and conceptions that in the past had contributed to solidarity were discarded, such as the idea that the bond of unity rested solely in common allegiance to the Crown. Also gone with much else was the venerable belief in an undifferentiated British subjecthood, which permitted a person derivatively to enjoy the nationality of any Commonwealth state wherein he resided. The stretch of history treated in this book indirectly throws interesting light on the remarkable role of symbols in political life. Ireland left the Commonwealth because it was baffled in its attempt to acquire an appropriate verbal formula for remaining in; India remained in because it quickly procured a formula. But it is surely a paradox that Ireland is more closely bound to Britain in numerous ways than any other member of the Commonwealth and will remain bound into the remote future. "A very great part," wrote Burke, "of the mischiefs that vex the world arises from words." Professor Mansergh's book amply illustrates Burke's dictum.

North American students in particular are indebted to the series of short studies published by the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. Of these not the least worthy is *Commonwealth Perspectives*, a symposium of seven papers originally read before a seminar at Duke University in 1957. The first two by Nicholas Mansergh, "Commonwealth Membership" and "Commonwealth Foreign Policies, 1945-56," naturally contain little not already present in the author's large survey volumes. Yet his essays are useful in that they extract from the larger works material that is here presented in a consecutive and more extended manner.

In "The Commonwealth and the Law of Nations" Robert Wilson provides a specialized supplement to Nicholas Mansergh's broad treatment in discussing the issues of international law raised by the peculiar and legally untidy manner whereby the Commonwealth developed. The member states are emphatic in declaring their complete independence in the family of nations and at the same time assert that their fellow members are not foreign to them. The problems in international jurisprudence created by this situation are examined by Wilson in reference to the law of nationality, obligatory jurisdiction for the settlement of international disputes, and international organizations. His conclusions are not original, but his brief treatment in technical terms of the matter is welcome.

In "The Commonwealth Demographic Dimensions; Implications" Professor Joseph Spengler presents a thesis concerning certain factors important in determining the survival of the Commonwealth. The empire which fathered it resulted from a vast outflow of people, capital, and commercial energy from Britain. In

the period 1815-1930 some twenty-four million people migrated from Britain, constituting nearly two-fifths of the world's emigrants. A fair portion of them went to the United States (about three-eighths) and the remainder developed the empire that has grown into the Commonwealth. At the same time an immense outflow of capital assisted the migrants in building the material structure of civilized life in many parts of the world. In contemporary times this movement of people and capital has relatively diminished, and the more pronounced its diminution, the more the Commonwealth is weakened by centrifugal forces and its survival threatened. This is the gist of the thesis, although its simplification in such terms will scarcely do justice to Professor Spengler's skilful marshalling of details. The essay raises more challenging questions than any other in the book. It leaves most of them unanswered, but that is not surprising: to answer them adequately after stating them would require a whole volume, rather than a chapter.

James L. Godfrey traces lucidly the emergence of Ghana from tribal institutions to political independence in the Commonwealth. Professor B. U. Ratchford in "The Development of Health and Welfare Programs in Australia" employs his theme as a case study in the complex field of social politics and federal finance. Brinley Thomas concludes the book with an essay on the evolution of the Sterling Area and its prospects. None of these chapters breaks virgin soil. But they treat major questions of government in the Commonwealth with careful learning and good sense. Within their limited space they do justice to their themes.

ALEXANDER BRADY

University of Toronto

## Noted

*Marco Polo's Asia: An Introduction to his description of the world called "il Milione."* By LEONARDO OLSCHKI. Translated by JOHN A. SCOTT. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1960. Pp. x, 459, map. \$10.00.

THIS EXCELLENT translation of a work published in Italian in 1957 is doubly welcome. Not only does it make available in English perhaps the most valuable companion piece to Polo's own work, but also it stands by itself as a first rate discussion of the European discovery of Asia. A lengthy introduction and a good chapter on Polo's precursors are followed by seven topical chapters on nature, religion, history and the like, each of which is a contribution in itself.

*La Banque protestante en France de la révocation de l'Edit de Nantes à la Révolution. I. Dispersion et regroupement (1685-1730).* By HERBERT LÜTHY. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N. 1959. Pp. xvi, 454.

THE DISPERSION throughout Europe of thousands of French Protestants following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes may have drained France of considerable economic talent; but this loss was not complete, for the dispersed Huguenots and their descendants maintained contact with their native land and, because of their

international monetary dealings, proved to be of inestimable value to the French crown in times of acute financial need. This function of these expatriates is the subject of the present volume, the first in a series that is to terminate with the Revolution. M. Lüthy describes, in particular, the banking activities of the Genevan *dispersés*, whose operations were focused at Lyons. During the later wars of Louis XIV their role as procurers of funds was primary; but with the Regency and the favour accorded Law's "System" they fell in importance, only to rise again after Law's disgrace.

*Histoire du Catholicisme en France. II. Sous les rois très chrétiens.* By E. DELARUELLE, A. LATREILLE, J. R. PALANQUE. Paris: Editions Spes. 1960. Pp. 508. 1400 F.

THIS SECOND VOLUME of a new history of Catholicism in France deals with the period from Saint Louis to Louis XV and provides a masterly presentation of the opinions of modern scholars on the subject. Written in a beautifully clear and balanced style and marked by careful scholarship, this book shows how a subject once resounding with controversy can become a matter of sober, satisfying, historical writing. Canadian readers will be particularly interested in Professor Latreille's able summary of the last three centuries (to 1740) which covers the time during which this same French Catholicism was established in North America where it was to become so important a part of Canadian society and culture. The manner in which subjects such as the Jansenist and Quietist quarrels, the Huguenot question, the rise of natural religion, and Gallicanism are dealt with are a tribute to the fairness of a leading French Catholic historian, one, incidentally, who has been closely associated with Canada through his ties with Laval University.

*Alexis de Tocqueville: Journey to America.* Edited by J. P. MAYER. Translated by GEORGE LAWRENCE. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1960. Pp. 394. \$6.50.

IN 1957 Alexis de Tocqueville's *Voyages en Sicile et aux Etats-Unis* was published in Paris as volume V of the *Oeuvres Complètes*, edited by J. P. Mayer. *Journey to America* consists of a translation, with introduction and notes, of the American section of this volume; it provides the complete texts of the notebooks which Tocqueville kept during his famous trip to North America in 1831-2. The notebooks are not only interesting in themselves but they allow us to see how Tocqueville gathered his information and made his first generalizations preliminary to the writing of his great work on *Democracy in America*.

*Peter Kalm's North American Journey: Its Ideological Background and Results.* By MARTTI KERKKONEN. *Studia Historica*, I. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society. 1959. Pp. 266, map, illus. \$3.50.

PETER KALM, a Finnish natural scientist and professor of economics, sent by the Swedish Academy of Sciences in 1747-51 to collect North American plants, travelled through the English colonies from Philadelphia to New York and from

there to Montreal and Quebec. He was a very astute observer of the social scene and his account of his travels has been published several times and in many languages. It has long been recognized as a valuable source for the study of society in the colonies, and more particularly for that of New France. The author's purpose in the present work is to view Kalm's journey in its historical perspective, explain why and how it was undertaken, and to draw attention to the valuable detailed information contained in the surviving portions of the manuscript journals which Kalm did not include in his published account.

*The Diary of Benjamin Robert Haydon.* Edited by WILLARD BISSELL POPE. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xxvi, 495; x, 553. \$24.00 the set.

THIS IS THE FIRST COMPLETE and scholarly publication of a strange and fascinating diary kept by the artist Benjamin Haydon from the year 1808 when he was a young art student in London to 1846 the year of his death by suicide. Two large and impressive volumes bring the diary down to 1824 and other volumes are to follow until the work is completed. This is no ordinary diary of day-to-day events, committed to paper by a meticulous and matter of fact observer; rather it is the personal testimony of a highly sensitive and anguished artist, forever trying to reconcile his hot human passions and his fervent religious convictions, his artistic integrity and his need to provide for the necessities of life. There is more here for the psychologist, for the art student, and for the literary critic than for the historian who can scarce afford to spend so much time on the affairs of one man who had little influence on the course of history. For its human interest, however, we may well read on to the end.

*Wilfred Grenfell: His Life and Work.* By J. LENNOX KERR. Foreword by LORD GRENFELL OF KILVEY. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1959. Pp. 272, maps. \$4.00.

THIS ACCOUNT of the noted Labrador medical missionary portrays Dr. Grenfell as a dynamic organizer but a difficult subordinate, endowed with a fine flair for publicity and a supreme, even reckless, confidence in his ability to "carry off" any enterprise which came to mind. Unable to accept bounds to his work and seemingly more interested in the physical than the spiritual well-being of his adopted charges ("with his Christianity went a vast and uncritical humanitarianism"), Grenfell strove to improve their lot by encouraging lumbering, mining, and tourism, establishing a handicrafts industry and introducing reindeer—thereby anticipating by many years the present policies of the Canadian government. One notes with interest, too, Grenfell's gradual transformation into a true North American, heading a distinct, autonomous organization, finding its support mainly in New England, New York, and Canada.

*Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914.* By ANTHONY WOOD. London and Toronto: Longmans, Green & Company. 1960. Pp. xiv, 476. \$3.80.

THIS is an excellent text book, quite acceptable as an introductory survey for North American undergraduates. It is well balanced, accurate, and readable, and



is supplemented by a very useful series of appendices with chronological and statistical information. The author departs from the beaten track in selecting anecdotal material with which he enlivens his pages from time to time and even the specialist may come across the odd story that he has not heard before; some developments such as the extension of local government receive rather more attention than is usual in a text of this scope. There are inevitably occasional statements and generalizations open to question, but these are few and far between and do not detract from the value of the book.

*The Shaping of Modern Ireland.* Edited by CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. vi, 201. \$3.50.

ORIGINALLY given as talks over Radio Eireann some years ago, the fourteen biographical essays are concerned with the period between Parnell's disgrace and the Easter Rebellion. The essays are short and lively, as befits radio talks, and well suited for the undergraduate who has little time for longer works. He and the general reader will find Mansergh's essay on Redmond, White's on Griffith, and McDowell's on Carson the most useful.

*War Memoirs, General de Gaulle: Unity, 1942-1944. Documents.* By GENERAL DE GAULLE. Translated by JOYCE MURCHIE and HAMISH ERSKINE. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited]. 1959. Pp. 424.

THE GENERAL TONE of the documents is quite sanguine, despite a chillingly prophetic account of Soviet Russian apprehensions, at the end of 1943, that France will return to a situation where "two groups, of more or less equal power . . . would neutralize each other and paralyze the policy of the country" after the Liberation. The selections concern the largely successful realization of de Gaulle's mystique of personal identification with the French nation, a self-concept supported here by such former luminaries of the Third Republic as Léon Blum, Edouard Herriot, and Jules Jeanneney. At the end of this careful selection of documents dealing with quite polemical subjects, it is no accident that one should feel that when de Gaulle congratulates the French people on their "order and . . . ardour" at the Liberation, he is under no illusion that it is not he himself who now incarnates these qualities of the race.

*The True Face of Duplessis.* By PIERRE LAPORTE. Montreal: Harvest House Limited. 1960. Pp. 140. \$1.50.

AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT of Pierre Laporte, an outstanding journalist on the staff of *Le Devoir*, this is first-rate journalism. Laporte makes no attempt to write a life of Duplessis, but rather has presented an impressionistic account of *le chef*. Brightly written, perceptive, and sparkling with anecdotes, the small volume is fascinating reading. Its widespread sale in the spring of 1960 undoubtedly helped to bring about the electoral reversal of June 22.

## Recent Publications Relating to Canada

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS  
BY MARION MAGEE

NOTICE in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review.

The following abbreviations are used: C.H.R.—*Canadian Historical Review*; C.J.E.P.S.—*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*; R.H.A.F.—*Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*.

See also *Canadians*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa; *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs; *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, issued quarterly by the General Council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

### I. CANADA'S COMMONWEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- BLAIS, MARCEL. La Politique extérieure du Canada (*Canadian Banker*, LXVII (2), summer, 1960, 97-103).
- CONANT, MELVIN. Canada and Continental Defence: An American View (*International Journal*, XV (3), summer, 1960, 219-28).
- DARTFORD, GERALD P. Failure of Federalism in the British Community (*Current History*, XXXIX (228), Aug., 1960, 108-13).
- DEUTSCH, HERMAN J. The Evolution of Territorial and State Boundaries in the Inland Empire of the Pacific Northwest (*Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, LI (3), July, 1960, 115-31). Maps.
- DONELLY, M. S. J. W. Daffoe and Lionel Curtis—Two Concepts of the Commonwealth (*Political Studies*, VIII (2), June, 1960, 170-82).
- JOHNSON, HARRY G. Canada's Foreign Trade Problems (*International Journal*, XV (3), summer, 1960, 233-41).
- MACPHERSON, JOHN. Colonialism and the Commonwealth (*Journal of the Royal Commonwealth Society*, III (4), July-Aug., 1960, 125-9).
- MATLAND, PATRICK. Commonwealth Status (*Quarterly Review*, 625, July, 1960, 243-54).
- Round Table*, 200, Sept., 1960, is a jubilee issue devoted to views of the Commonwealth by its various members and the United States.
- SANSBURY, KENNETH. The Moral Basis of the Commonwealth (*Journal of the Royal Commonwealth Society*, III (4), July-Aug., 1960, 130-2).

- United States. *Foreign Relations, Diplomatic Papers, 1942. I. General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office for the Department of State. 1960. Pp. xii, 963.
- YARDLEY, D. C. M. Commonwealth Membership: Its Present and its Future (*Parliamentary Affairs*, XIII (3), summer, 1960, 346-62).

## II. HISTORY OF CANADA

### (1) General History

- BARKWAY, MICHAEL. The Fifties: An Ottawa Retrospect (*Waterloo Review*, 5, summer, 1960, 28-39). The author discusses James Eayrs's book *Canada in World Affairs: October 1955 to June 1957*.
- BARNARD, W. T. *The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada: One Hundred Years of Canada*. Maps drawn by R. A. WITH. Don Mills: Ontario Publishing Company Limited. 1960. Pp. xvi, 398, maps, illus. \$5.00.
- COSTAIN, THOMAS B. *The Chord of Steel: The Story of the Invention of the Telephone*. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. [Toronto: Doubleday Publishers]. 1960. Pp. 238. \$3.95.
- HARDY, W. C. *From Sea unto Sea: The Road to Nationhood, 1850-1910*. Canadian History Series, Thomas B. Costain, Editor, IV. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. [Toronto: Doubleday Publishers]. 1960. Pp. 528. \$6.00.
- HOWARD, C. S. Another Man from Glengarry (*Canadian Banker*, LXVII (2), summer, 1960, 35-9). The author relates the life of Sir Edward Robert Peacock.
- JACOBS, WILBUR J., ed. *Letters of Francis Parkman*. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press in co-operation with the Massachusetts Historical Society [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern Ltd.]. 1960. Two volumes. Pp. lxvi, 204; lx, 286, illus. \$15.50 the set. To be reviewed later.
- MANION, JAMES P. *A Canadian Errant: Twenty-five Years in the Canadian Foreign Service*. Edited by GUY SYLVESTRE. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1960. Pp. x, 196. \$5.00. To be reviewed later.
- PICKERSGILL, J. W. *The Mackenzie King Record. I. 1939-1944*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. xvi, 723. \$11.50. To be reviewed later.
- QUIMBY, GEORGE IRVING. *Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes, 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1800*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xvi, 182. \$5.95.
- ROUSSEAU, JACQUES. *Les Premiers Canadiens*. Montréal: Editions des Dix. 1960. Pp. 9-64. Un tiré-à-part des *Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960.

### (3) New France

- DESROSIER, LÉO-PAUL. Il y a trois cents ans (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 85-101).
- DOUVILLE, RAYMOND. Les Lents Débuts d'une seigneurie des Jésuites (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 249-76). L'auteur discute la seigneurie de Batiscan.
- EGGLESTON, J. F. Some Financial Details of the Seven Years' War (*Canadian Banker*, LXVII (2), summer, 1960, 129-42).
- LECLERC, PAUL-ANDRÉ. Le Mariage sous le régime français (R.H.A.F., XIII (2), sept. 1959, 230-46; XIII (3), déc. 1959, 375-401; XIII (4), mars 1960, 524-43; XIV (1), juin 1960, 34-60; XIV (2), sept. 1960, 226-45).
- MALCHELOSSE, GÉRARD. Mémoires romancés (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 103-46). Les mémoires sont ceux de la famille Laterrière.
- MORIN, VICTOR. L'évolution de la médecine au Canada français (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 65-83).
- POULIOT, ADRIEN. L'Exploit du Long-Sault: Ses motifs, ses résultats (R.H.A.F., XIV (1), juin 1960, 3-15; XIV (2), sept. 1960, 157-70).
- ROUSSEAU, JACQUES. *Les Sachems délibèrent autour du feu de camp*. Montréal: Editions des Dix. 1959. Pp. 9-49. \$.75. Ce tiré-à-part des *Cahiers des Dix*, 1959, est disponible de la Librairie Ducharme Ltée, Montréal.
- ROY, ANTOINE. Bois et pierre (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 237-48). L'auteur discute l'architecture primitive de la Nouvelle France.

## (4) British North America before 1867

- BOOTH, MICHAEL R. Pioneer Entertainment (*Canadian Literature*, 4, spring, 1960, 52-8).
- CHALMERS, J. W. A Family Affair (*Alberta Historical Review*, VIII (2), spring, 1960, 1-5). The author writes about Sir George Simpson.
- MORISON, DANIEL. *The Doctor's Secret Journal*. Edited by GEORGE S. MAY. Illustrated by DIRK GRINGHUIS. Mackinac Island: Fort Mackinac Division Press. 1960. Pp. 47. \$3.00 cloth, \$.50 paper. An account of events at Fort Michilimackinac between 1769 and 1772 very attractively printed, illustrated, and bound.
- REIBEL, DANIEL B. *Lion in the Wilderness: The 200th Anniversary of British Rule in Detroit*. Introduction by HENRY D. BROWN. Woodward at Kirby: Detroit Historical Society. 1960. Pp. 24. The pamphlet is a description of the exhibit in the Detroit Historical Museum.
- RICH, E. E. *The History of the Hudson's Bay Company 1670-1870*. II. 1763-1870. London: The Hudson's Bay Record Society. 1959. Pp. xii, 974, xv, maps, illus. To be reviewed later.
- SYLVAIN, ROBERT. Le 9 juin 1853 à Montréal: Encore l'affaire Gavazzi (*R.H.A.F.*, XIV (2), sept. 1960, 173-216).

## (5) Canada since 1867

- FORRESTER, MARJORIE. That Northwest Angle (*Beaver*, outfit 291, autumn, 1960, 32-8). The author discusses one of the problems of the international boundary.
- MACLEOD, GEORGE P. Sir Hugh John Macdonald (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 14, 1959, 33-53). The main part of the article consists of letters written by Sir Hugh to his wife while on active service in the Riel Rebellion of 1885.
- REGENSTREIF, PETER. The Canadian General Election of 1958 (*Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (2), June, 1960, 349-73).
- WURTELE, DOUGLAS J. The Drummond-Arthabaska By-election of 1910 (*Dalhousie Review*, XL (1), spring, 1960, 14-33).

## III. PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL HISTORY

## (1) Atlantic Provinces

- CLARK, ANDREW H. Old World Origins and Religious Adherence in Nova Scotia (*Geographical Review*, L (3), July, 1960, 317-44). Tables, charts, maps.
- COOKE, ALAN. A Woman's Way (*Beaver*, outfit 291, summer, 1960, 40-5). The author describes the trip to Labrador of Mrs. Mina Hubbard in 1905.
- ENGLISH, LEO E. F. Some Aspects of the Beothuck Culture (*Newfoundland Quarterly*, LVIII (4), Dec., 1959, 6, 40-2; LIX (2), summer, 1960, 11-13, 37).
- GRAHAM, JOHN F. Economic Development of the Atlantic Provinces (*Dalhousie Review*, XL (1), spring, 1960, 50-60).
- HARPER, J. R. In Quest of Lord Baltimore's House at Ferryland (*Canadian Geographical Journal*, LXI (3), Sept., 1960, 106-13). Map, illus.
- LONGLEY, R. S. New England Planters of Nova Scotia (*Atlantic Advocate*, L (12), Aug., 1960, 43-7).
- NICHOLSON, F. W. *The Dory*. Occasional Papers, 7. Halifax: Maritime Museum of Canada. 1960. Pp. 7, diagrams. \$.50.

## (2) The Province of Quebec

- AUDET, LOUIS-PHILIPPE. *La Querelle de l'instruction obligatoire*. Montréal: Editions des Dix. 1959. Pp. 133-50. \$.75. Ce tiré-à-part des *Cahiers des Dix*, 1959, est disponible de la Librairie Ducharme Ltée, Montréal.
- MORIN, VICTOR. *Cent vingt-cinq ans d'oeuvres sociales et économiques: Réhabilitation historique*. Montréal: Editions des Dix. 1959. Pp. 52. Distributed by the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal. A limited number of copies are available at Librairie Ducharme Ltée for \$.75.

- Quebec. *La Province de Québec*, 1959. Québec: Bureau des Statistiques de Québec. 1960. Pp. 103.
- Quebec. *Statistiques municipales*, 1958; *Municipal Statistics*, 1958. Un rapport du Bureau des Statistiques de Québec; A report from the Quebec Bureau of Statistics. 1960. Québec: Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce; Department of Trade and Commerce. Pp. xvi, 169.
- RUMILLY, ROBERT. *Histoire de la Province de Québec. XXXII. La Dépression*. Montréal: Fides. 1960. Pp. 262.
- TRÉPANIÉ, LÉON. Nos Hôtels de Ville (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 219-35).

### (3) The Province of Ontario

- The Diary of Captain William Gilkison, 28 May 1832-31 March 1833 (*Western Ontario Historical Notes*, XVI (2), Sept., 1960, 39-70).
- EDWARDS, C. A. M. *Taylor Statten: A Biography*. With a foreword by J. ALEX. EDMISON. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1960. Pp. xiv, 161. \$5.00.
- LACEY, E. A. The Trials of John Montgomery (*Ontario History*, LII (3), Sept., 1960, 141-58).
- PAIN, S. A. *Three Miles of Gold: The Story of Kirkland Lake*. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1960. Pp. x, 109, map. \$3.50. A useful contribution to the local and economic history of Ontario by a long-time resident of the area.
- SMITH, ALISON. John Strachan and Early Upper Canada, 1799-1814 (*Ontario History*, LII (3), Sept., 1960, 159-73).
- YOUNG, ANNA G. Sounding: Three Long and Two Short (*Inland Seas*, XVI (2), summer, 1960, 111-14). The author relates the service of the Foote family in shipping on the Great Lakes.

### (4) The Prairie Provinces

- AHENAKEW, EDWARD. An Opinion of the Frog Lake Massacre (*Alberta Historical Review*, VIII (3), summer, 1960, 9-15). With a foreword by A. E. PETERSON.
- BRADLEY, WALTER E. A History of Transportation in Winnipeg (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 15, 1960, 7-38).
- DOUGLAS, WILLIAM. Winnipeg Parks (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 14, 1959, 61-5).
- HEDLIN, RALPH. Edmund A. Partridge (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 15, 1960, 59-68).
- LEGASSE, JEAN. The Métis in Manitoba (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 15, 1960, 39-57).
- MCDUGALL, JOHN F. John A. McDougall: Trader (*Alberta Historical Review*, VIII (3), summer, 1960, 16-26).
- MOLYNEAUX, MARIANNE M. Early Days in Alberta (*Alberta Historical Review*, VIII (2), spring, 1960, 6-14).
- PRATT, A. M. Early Manitoba Rural Newspapers (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 14, 1959, 11-23).
- ROSE, WILLIAM JOHN. Early Minnedosa: The Crossing, the Town of the Railway (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 15, 1960, 69-79).
- SWITZER, HARVEY A. On the Edson-Grande Prairie Trail (*Alberta Historical Review*, VIII (3), summer, 1960, 1-8).

## IV. EDUCATIONAL HISTORY

- ALEXANDER, WILLIAM HARDY. In the Beginning (*Alberta Historical Review*, VIII (2), spring, 1960, 15-20). The author writes about the first six years in the history of the University of Alberta.
- AUDET, LOUIS PHILIPPE. La Surintendance de l'éducation et la loi scolaire de 1841 (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 147-69).
- KLINCK, C. A. L'Enseignement de français dans nos écoles de langue anglaise (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, XV (1), sept. 1960, 43-54).

MAURALT, OLIVIER. Galerie de portraits des supérieurs du Collège de Montréal (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 191-217).

MORRIS, PHILIP. The Commonwealth Education Conference (*Journal of the Royal Commonwealth Society*, III (4), July-Aug., 1960, 133-6).

#### V. RELIGIOUS HISTORY

FRENCH, GOLDWIN. The Papers of Daniel Fidler, Methodist Missionary in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 1792-1798 (Recordings and Proceedings of the Committee on Archives of the United Church of Canada, *Bulletin*, 13, 1960, 28-46).

JORDAN, PHILIP D., ed. Letters of William H. Oram: Red River Missionary (*Catholic Historical Review*, XLVI (2), July, 1960, 157-81).

NIX, JAMES ERNEST. *Mission among the Buffalo: The Labours of the Reverends George M. and John C. McDougall in the Canadian Northwest, 1860-1876*. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1960. Pp. xii, 123, maps, illus. \$3.50.

TESSIER, ALBERT. Les Soeurs des petites écoles (*Cahiers des Dix*, 25, 1960, 171-90).

#### VI. GENEALOGY

GILBERT, J.-GEORGES. Gilbert Dupuis dit Gilbert en Nouvelle Beauce (Canada) (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, XI (1 et 2), jan. et avril 1960, 32-46).

GODBOUT, ARCHANGE. Urbain Tessier dit Lavigne (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, XI (1 et 2), jan. et avril 1960, 16-21).

JURGENS, M. Recherches sur Louis Hébert et sa famille, III (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, XI (1 et 2), jan. et avril 1960, 24-31).

KAYE, V. J. Canadians of Byelorussian Origin (*Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, XXX (3), juillet-sept. 1960, 300-14).

KOS-RABCEWICZ-ZUBKOWSKI, LUDWIK. Notes sur la famille Globensky (*Polish Past in Canada*, 3, 1960, 101-22).

LE BLANT, ROBERT. Du nouveau sur les La Tour (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, XI (1 et 2), jan. et avril 1960, 22-3).

— Généalogie de la famille Tapie de Monteil (*R.H.A.F.*, XIV (2), sept. 1960, 277-81).

*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, XI (1 et 2), jan. et avril 1960, contient ces courtes études généalogiques: "L'Ascendance paternelle de Mgr Arthur Beliveau," "Beaugrand famille," "Le capitaine Charles Koenig et sa famille," "Jean Gaudet," "Jean-Baptiste Guillot dit Grandmaison" et "Fabas-Galocheau."

#### VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

BERTON, PIERRE. Gold Rush Writing (*Canadian Literature*, 4, spring, 1960, 59-67).

BISHOP, OLGA. Checklist of Historical Works on Western Ontario in the Libraries of the University of Western Ontario: Kent County (*Western Ontario Historical Notes*, XVI (2), Sept. 1960, 85-93).

BOYLE, GERTRUDE M., ed. *A Bibliography of Canadiana*, First Supplement. Being items in the Public Library of Toronto, Canada, relating to the early history and development of Canada. Toronto: The Public Library. 1960. Pp. xvi, 333.

TANGHE, RAYMOND, comp. *Bibliography of Canadian Bibliographies; Bibliographie des bibliographies canadiennes*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. x, 206. \$10.00.

THOMAS, L. G. Churches and Church Records in the History of the Canadian West (Records and Proceedings of the Committee on Archives of the United Church of Canada, *Bulletin*, 13, 1960, 18-27).

#### VIII. ARTS AND SCIENCES

##### (1) Literature, Art, and Music

BICE, CLARE. The Young Artist in Canada (*Canadian Art*, XVII (5), Sept., 1960, 274-7). Illustrated.



- FOWKE, EDITH, and MILLS, ALAN. *Canada's Story in Song*. Piano accompaniments by HELMUT BLUME. Toronto: W. J. Gage Limited. 1960. Pp. x, 230. \$5.00.
- MORISSET, GÉRARD. *L'Encyclopédie du Canada français*. II. *La Peinture traditionnelle au Canada français*. Montréal: Cercle du livre de France. 1960. Pp. 216, illus. \$5.00.
- PICHER, CLAUDE, and CLAIREAUX, MARCEL. Jean-Paul Lemieux (*Canadian Art*, XVII (5), Sept., 1960, 264-73). Illustrated.
- PILON, JEAN-GUY. Situation de l'écrivain canadien de langue française (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, XV (1), sept. 1960, 55-64).
- La Vie littéraire au Canada français: Essai de Bilan pour l'année 1959-1960 (*Canadian Literature*, 5, summer, 1960, 55-61).
- PRIMEAU, MARGUERITE A. Gratien Gélinas et le théâtre populaire au Canada français (*Canadian Literature*, 4, spring, 1960, 31-9).
- Revue Dominicaine*, LXVI (2), juillet-août 1960, contient des études au sujet de "La Société des Ecrivains canadiens" et "Notre littérature, image de notre milieu" par Antonin Lamarche, Maurice Gagnon, Claire Martin, Guy Beaulne, Jean-Charles Bonenfant et Clément Lockquell.
- SABBATH, LAWRENCE. Louis Muhlstock (*Canadian Art*, XVII (4), July, 1960, 216-23). Illustrated.
- WATT, F. W. Critic or Entertainer? Stephen Leacock and the Growth of Materialism (*Canadian Literature*, 5, summer, 1960, 33-42).
- Peter McArthur and the Agrarian Myth (*Queen's Quarterly*, LXVII (2), summer, 1960, 245-57).
- WATTERS, R. E. A Special Tang: Stephen Leacock's Canadian Humour (*Canadian Literature*, 5, summer, 1960, 21-32).

### (3) Geography, Transportation and Migration

- BARBEAU, MARIUS. Legend and History in the Oldest Geographical Names of the St. Lawrence (*Canadian Geographical Journal*, LXI (1), July, 1960, 2-9). Maps, illus.
- BROWN, ROY. The Origin and Growth of Western Canadian Aviation As I Have Seen It (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 14, 1959, 54-60).
- COTTINGHAM, KENNETH. Erie—The Record of a Lake (*Inland Seas*, XVI (2), summer, 1960, 131-7; XVI (3), fall, 1960, 215-23). The author discusses the geological history of the lake.
- EARL, LEONARD F. The Hudson Bay Railway (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 14, 1959, 24-32).
- REEVES, PAMELA WILSON. Navigation on Lake Erie, 1825-1860, II (*Inland Seas*, XV (1), spring, 1959, 55-60; XV (2), summer, 1959, 97-105; XV (3), fall, 1959, 190 ff.; XV (4), winter, 1959, 306-11; XVI (1), spring, 1960, 25-31).
- TITUS, STEPHEN R. Hydrography in Canada (*Canadian Geographical Journal*, LXI (2), Aug., 1960, 68-76). Illustrated.

## Books Received

- BEMIS, SAMUEL FLAGG. *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution*. Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 293. \$3.50.
- CASSON, LIONEL, ed. and trans. *Selections from Aristophanes, Menander, Plautus, and Terence, Masters of Ancient Comedy*. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan Ltd.]. 1960. Pp. x, 424. \$5.95.
- CHAPMAN, HESTER W. *Two Tudor Portraits: Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey and Lady Katherine Grey*. London: Jonathan Cape [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. 252. \$5.50.
- CRAWFORD, R. M. *An Australian Perspective*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 1960. Pp. x, 82. \$4.00 cloth, \$1.50 paper.
- DECONDE, ALEXANDER. *Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1958. Pp. xvi, 536. \$7.50.
- DUNLEAVY, GARETH W. *Colum's Other Island: The Irish of Lindsfarne*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 1960. Pp. x, 149. \$4.50.
- The Face of Toronto*. Pictures by RALPH GREENHILL. Introduced by ALAN GOWANS. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. 22 and 58 plates. \$3.00.
- GEISS, IMMANUEL. *Historische Studien*. 378. *Der Polnische Grenzstreifen, 1914-1918: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegspolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg*. Lübeck and Hamburg: Matthesen Verlag. 1960. Pp. 188, 18DM.
- HILTON, R. H., ed. *The Stoneleigh Leger Book*. Oxford: Printed for the Dugdale Society at the University Press. 1960. Pp. lxiv, 292, illus. 35s.
- JONES, MALDWYN ALLEN. *American Immigration*. Chicago History of American Civilization, edited by DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xii, 360, illus. \$6.00.
- KAHL, WILLIAM F. *The Development of the London Livery Companies: An Historical Essay and a Select Bibliography*. Boston, Mass.: Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. 1960. Pp. viii, 104.
- KEPHART, CALVIN I., ed. *Races of Mankind: Their Origin and Migration*. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1960. Pp. xvi, 566. \$6.00.
- MITTELBERGER, GOTTLIEB. *Journey to Pennsylvania*. Edited and translated by OSCAR HANDLIN and JOHN CLIVE. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xx, 102. \$3.95.
- NORTHROP, F. S. C. *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics: A Prelude to War or to Just Law*. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan Ltd.]. 1960. Pp. xii, 384. \$6.50.
- PÖLS, WERNER. *Historische Studien*. 377. *Sozialisten Frage und Revolutionsfurcht in ihrem Zusammenhang mit den angeblichen Staatsstreichplänen Bismarcks*. Lübeck and Hamburg: Matthesen Verlag. 1960. Pp. 104. 9.80DM.
- PORTER, MCKENZIE. *To All Men: The Story of the Canadian Red Cross*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited. 1960. Pp. 148, illus. \$3.95.
- POTTER, E. B., and NIMITZ, CHESTER W., eds. *Sea Power: A Naval History*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1960. Pp. xii, 932, maps. \$11.00.
- QUIMBY, GEORGE IRVING. *Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes, 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1800*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. xvi, 182. \$5.95.

- REDMAN, ALVIN. *The House of Hanover*. Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co. 1960. Pp. 471, illus. \$5.50.
- SIRJEAN, GASTON. *Encyclopédie généalogique des maisons souveraines du monde: Histoire de l'Europe en tableaux*. Préface de M. DUGAST ROUILLÉ. Paris: Editions Sirjean. 1960. 4 folios.
- SIRJEAN, GASTON. *Encyclopédie généalogique des maisons souveraines du monde*. V. *Les Bourbons*. Préface de M. DUGAST ROUILLÉ. Paris: Editions Sirjean. 1960. Pp. 99-125, folios.
- SIRJEAN, GASTON. *Encyclopédie généalogique des maisons souveraines du monde*. IV. *Les Valois*. Préface de M. DUGAST ROUILLÉ. Paris: Editions Sirjean. 1960. Folios. Pp. 95.
- SMITH, GOLDWIN. *The Heritage of Man: A History of the World*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 881, illus. \$13.75.
- ULAM, ADAM B. *The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism*. New York: Random House. 1960. Pp. viii, 307. \$5.00.
- WILEY, W. L. *The Early Public Theatre in France*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited]. 1960. Pp. xiv, 326. \$5.00.

## CONTRIBUTORS

MARGARET PRANG is an Instructor in the Department of History, University of British Columbia.

JAMES O. MCCABE, a graduate of the Universities of Alberta and Glasgow, has been for some time the principal of a high school in Scotland.

## REVIEWS (Cont.)

APPLEMAN, MADDEN, and WOLFF, eds. <i>1859: Entering an Age of Crisis</i> : by Frank H. Underhill .....	352
MAHONEY, <i>Edmund Burke and Ireland</i> : by D. J. McDougall .....	353
LYONS, <i>The Fall of Parnell, 1890-91</i> : by R. E. Burns .....	354
POPE-HENNESSY, <i>Queen Mary, 1867-1953</i> : by J. B. Conacher .....	355
THOMPSON, <i>The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910</i> : by Philip D. Curtin .....	357
MANSERGH, <i>Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change, 1939-1952</i> ; MANSERGH, WILSON, et al. <i>Commonwealth Perspectives</i> : by Alexander Brady .....	358
NOTED .....	360

# THE *CANADIAN* *HISTORICAL* *REVIEW*

OF MICHIGAN

READING ROOM

DEC 21 1960

PERIODICALS, POLITICIANS, AND THE BILINGUAL SCHOOLS  
Issue in Ontario, 1910-1917

*by Margaret Prang*

Arbitration and the Oregon Question

*by James O. McCabe*

VOLUME XLI, No. 4

DECEMBER, 1960

A QUARTERLY \$1.50 A COPY \$4.00 A YEAR

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

# the Canadian Historical Association

## OBJECTS

To encourage historical research and public interest in history;  
To promote the preservation of historic sites and buildings, documents, relics and other significant heirlooms of the past;  
To publish historical studies and documents as circumstances may permit.

## MEMBERSHIP

The Association offers membership and joint membership as follows:

LIFE MEMBERSHIP .....	\$100.00 or more
MEMBERSHIP: Including Annual Report and Historical Booklets ..	4.00
MEMBERSHIP: Including Annual Report and Historical Booklets, and subscription to the <i>Canadian Historical Review</i> .....	7.00
MEMBERSHIP: Including Annual Report and Historical Booklets, and subscription to the <i>Revue d'Histoire de l'Amerique française</i> ..	8.00
MEMBERSHIP: Including Annual Report and Historical Booklets, and subscription to both historical publications .....	11.00
JOINT MEMBERSHIP WITH THE CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION: Including Annual Report and Historical Booklets, and subscription to the <i>Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science</i> and the <i>Canadian Historical Review</i> .....	12.00
JOINT MEMBERSHIP WITH THE CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION: Including Annual Report and Historical Booklets, and subscriptions to the <i>Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science</i> , the <i>Canadian Historical Review</i> , and the <i>Revue d'Histoire de l'Amerique française</i> .....	16.00

## ANNUAL REPORTS

Papers read at the annual meetings of the Association are printed in the Annual Reports. Copies of Reports from 1922 to 1958, with the exception of 1922, 1927, 1937, 1944, 1946-1949, 1951 and 1952, which are out of print, are still available. The price is \$3.00 per copy up to that of 1957, and \$4.00 for subsequent issues. An index to the Reports for the years 1922 to 1951 is available at \$1.50 per copy.

## HISTORICAL BOOKLETS

Each member of the Association receives one copy of each booklet free, and in addition the booklets are on sale to the public. Price of booklets for general sale is 25 cents (30 cents post paid) or 20 cents each for bulk orders of ten copies or more. Minimum order is \$1.00 unless paid in cash or stamps. Apply to the Treasurer, Canadian Historical Association, Public Archives, Ottawa.

The following booklets have been published to date:

Titles marked with an asterisk are available in both French and English; the remainder in English only.

1. C. P. Stacey, *The Undefended Border: The Myth and the Reality* (1953)
2. G. F. G. Stanley, *Louis Riel: Patriot or Rebel?* (1954)\*
3. Guy Frégault, *La Société canadienne sous le régime français* (1954)\*
4. W. S. MacNutt, *The Making of the Maritime Provinces, 1713-1784* (1955)
5. A. L. Burt, *Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, 1724-1808* (1955)
6. Marcel Trudel, *Le Régime seigneurial* (1956)\*
7. F. H. Soward, *The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy, 1899-1939* (1956)
8. F. H. Underhill, *Canadian Political Parties* (1957)
9. W. L. Morton, *The West and Confederation, 1857-1871* (1958)
10. G. O. Rothney, *Newfoundland* (1959)
11. F. Ouellet, *Louis-Joseph Papineau* (1960). (In French only)

## INFORMATION

Address the Treasurer, Canadian Historical Association, Public Archives, Ottawa, Canada.



## THE HERITAGE OF MAN

by Goldwin Smith

A survey of world history from earliest times to the present covering all the great civilizations, with emphasis on Man—his achievements and his failures. The author, born and educated in Canada, is Professor of History at Wayne State University.

896 pp.                      100 illustrations  
40 maps                      \$13.75



## A LIGHT SHINING IN DARK PLACES

### REVELATION REVEALED

By Atamus Richards

These two books, containing the personal religious views of the late Henry Richard Astridge, of Toronto, will be forwarded on request, without charge and while stock is available.

Please address your inquiry as follows: The Trustees of the Henry Richard Astridge Estate, Box 309, Adelaide St. P.O., Toronto, Ontario.

**lively,  
provocative,  
topical!**

More than half of the twentieth century has gone and much of the old order of things has gone with it. Three brilliant Canadian historians take stock of these changes as they affected Britain, Canada and the United States. They outline the nature of the problems facing man today, explain their background and discuss their implications.

*Hundreds of illustrations*

At all bookstores, \$3.95

# the modern era

J. C. RICKER  
J. T. SAYWELL  
E. E. ROSE



CLARKE IRWIN  
TORONTO VANCOUVER

# ARTHUR MEIGHEN

Vol. I: The Door of Opportunity, 1874-1920

BY ROGER GRAHAM, PH.D.

"The name of Arthur Meighen, once one to be seriously reckoned with in Canadian affairs, is undoubtedly now unknown or known only vaguely to the great majority of Canadians . . . It is my hope that this volume, and the one that is to follow, will help to rescue that name from oblivion . . ." *From the preface*

At all bookstores, \$7.50



CLARKE IRWIN TORONTO VANCOUVER

AN EXCELLENT  
BOOK FOR  
YOUR LIBRARY | BY  
FRED LANDON

## AN EXILE FROM CANADA to Van Dieman's Land

Dr. Landon brings before the eyes an era that seems far more remote to us than the lapse of 130 years would indicate. The violence of political feeling, the ruthlessness of those in power, the brutality of the penal system revealed in the meticulously researched study make it a fascinating contribution to the history of those stormy years. Such is the value of this work that it has been awarded a Canada Council grant.

\$5.00



LONGMANS

---

## HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY

---

1670-1870

by E. E. RICH  
Master of St. Catharine's College  
Cambridge University

The complete history of the great Company's first two centuries of achievement.

"Learned, readable and judicious."  
—*Times Literary Supplement*

3 volumes. \$35.00

McClelland & Stewart Limited

---

# HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

PUBLISHED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE CONFERENCE ON LATIN AMERICAN  
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Volume XLI

Number 1

February 1961

---

## ARTICLES

- Seville in the Sixteenth Century ..... RUTH PIKE
- The Private Contract System of Presidio Supply in Northern New  
Spain ..... MAX L. MOORHEAD
- The Undeclared War of 1773-1777: Climax of Luso-Spanish Platine  
Rivalry ..... DAURIL ALDEN
- William H. Taft and the United States Intervention in Cuba  
..... RALPH ELDIN MINGER
- The Guatemalan Merchants, the Government, and the *Provincianos*,  
1750-1800 ..... TROY S. FLOYD

## REVIEW ARTICLES

- Freyre's Brazil Revisited. A Review of *New World in the Tropics: the  
Culture of Modern Brazil*, by Gilberto Freyre ..... STANLEY J. STEIN
- From Problem Children to *Wunderkinder*: Some New Books on Puerto  
Rico ..... FRANK OTTO GATELL

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

- Soviet News and Notes ..... J. GREGORY OSWALD

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK NOTICES

PROFESSIONAL NOTES

---

*Subscription rates:* \$4.00 per year in Pan-American countries, \$6.00 per year in  
U.S. and Canada, \$.60 additional postage in all other countries. Single copies:  
\$1.75 current, \$2.00 back issues. \$8.00 back volumes, as available.

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Durham, North Carolina

## THE MACKENZIE KING RECORD

*Vol. 1, 1939-1944*

*by J. W. Pickersgill*

This volume is the story, told largely by Mackenzie King himself, of his leadership of the Government of Canada through more than four and a half years of war from September 1939 to the end of May, 1944.

Mackenzie King confided to what must be the most remarkable diary ever kept by a Canadian, the day-to-day impressions and secrets that other men would have given to their wives or intimate friends. From this detailed and meticulously kept diary, Mr. Pickersgill has drawn his amazing record of the leading preoccupations of Canadian public men in the war years: Canada's relations with the Commonwealth, the nature of her participation in the total Allied war effort, conscription, and national government. He describes the planning of some of the devices by which the heavy initial military reserves were countered: the Air Training Plan, the Ogdensburg Agreement, the Hyde Park Declaration, the destroyer-bases exchange, Lend-Lease. Further, he describes how Mackenzie King visits Roosevelt in Washington, goes to England to visit the Canadian Army and to confer with Churchill and other war leaders; Churchill comes to Ottawa and addresses Parliament, the three leaders come together on the heights of Quebec, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers debate in London—the diary reports minutely and with many fascinating details of formal and informal discussions.

Both amateur and specialist students will find the record deliberate and revealing in its day-to-day account of Canadian affairs.

728 pages      half-tone illustrations      \$11.50

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

#388

